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Introduction
This volume analyses the key orientation dilemma of Turkey in the early 21st 
century. Should Turkey continue to follow its Euro-Atlantic policy which aims 
at Western modernisation and seeks to join the West at all costs? Or, should 
it return to its Oriental roots and follow an alternative path of development? 
Turkey, as Huntington says, is a torn country with a Muslim culture yet with 
a legal system and efforts that make it shift towards the Western civiliza-
tion.1 In the Cold War period, Turkey fostered strong connections with the 
West and received external support, but after the end of the Cold War, the 
issue of Turkey’s real identity was raised again. The Kemalist model, based 
on secular fundaments and seeking to adopt the Western pattern, is being 
augmented or replaced by an emerging ideology of modernisation that is 
based on Islam yet – as opposed to ideas of Islamist fundamentalists – does 
not basically reject the Western model.
At the same time, Turkey has long sought to act as a bridge between the 
East and the West, and today it aspires to be not only a bridge but a regional 
factor that is significant on its own right in a strategically important region. 
Turks often say that Turkey is the Easternmost part of the West and the 
Westernmost part of the East, i.e. they understand the Western and Eastern 
way of thinking alike, and as such are natural mediators between the two 
civilisations. A Turkey that can combine the elements of both civilisations 
and ways of thinking may become a most successful and competitive 
society of the 21st century, and may serve as a model and regional hub for 
neighbouring countries and regions.
The first part of the book discusses the radical turn that took place after 
the beginning of the new millennium. The Turkish nation state, established in 
1923, opted very radically for embracing Western civilisation when it changed 
its laws, system of writing and ways of dressing. Islam was removed from 
public life. European countries came to be regarded as primary political and 
economic partners, while relations with the neighbours were given a lower 
1 Huntington 1993, 42.
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priority. Yet the modernisation process based on the Kemalist model brought 
mixed results. Turkey became embedded in the Euro-Atlantic institutional 
system, but – despite the association and the customs union – the European 
integration has failed to accept Turkey as a member. For a long time, the 
main counterargument has been the underdeveloped status of Turkey’s 
economy, yet nowadays this position is getting difficult to hold.
This book offers a detailed analysis of the reasons why Turkey has 
become the fastest growing economy of Europe. Investigating whether it 
is possible for the economic development of the last decade to continue 
and whether Turkey will be able to turn into a hub of growth of the region, 
it concludes that, in spite of the positive signs, the “miracle”, as of now, is 
not firm enough. It also gives an account of how the moderately Islamist 
AKP Party, led by Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, came to power in 2002 and, 
with a relatively strong support from the society, how it has managed to 
remain the governing party since then. Then it discusses the extent to which 
Turkey’s foreign policy and external economy was transformed under the 
new leadership, and the way its ideological orientation and economic inter-
ests affected its foreign relations.
Part 2 is an analysis of Turkey’s foreign relations, and sheds light on 
how much today’s Turkey is interested in promoting European integra-
tion or what alternatives it has with regard to the neighbouring regions it 
formerly neglected. The issue of the ambivalent Turkey–EU relations and 
their possible future is discussed in detail. Officially, Turkey’s objective is 
full EU membership. It remains, however, an open question which depends 
on the EU’s future, yet the EU’s future also depends on the way Turkey’s 
potential accession takes place. In any case, relations with the EU are of 
paramount importance for Turkey (and vice versa); therefore, this book lays 
special emphasis on dealing with their key factors (e.g. the customs union). 
For the Balkan countries, an economically successful Turkey has become 
a valuable partner. Turkey tries to tap into this opportunity, especially in 
those countries in the region where the majority of the population is Muslim. 
In Middle East, the Arab Spring and the crisis in Syria reshaped the former 
flourishing relations, and drastically changed the previously good Turkey–
Russia relations. The changes in the political and economic influence of 
distant great powers (the United States, China) are also analysed, along with 
the changes that have occurred in the relations with other Asian, African 
or Latin American countries.
Introduction 11
The summary is intended to answer the question whether Turkey 
will remain a country attached to the Western civilisation and continue 
its attempts to accede the EU, or will “open towards the East” and find an 
alternative way, turning away from Europe and the West.
This volume relies heavily on the works published by the author in 
the past ten years.
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Chapter 1  
Turkey in the 20th Century
1.1. The first decades of the Kemalist Turkey (1923–1945)
In 1923, after ten years of war, the newly created Turkish state faced an 
exceedingly difficult situation. It was an impoverished country ravaged by 
war, with a major loss of population and with many rootless refugees. Anatolia 
lost almost 20% of its population1 due to the war, deportations, famines 
and epidemics. In the framework of a population exchange scheme, nearly 
one million Greeks left Turkey and 400,000 Muslims were re-settled from 
Greece to Turkey (the rate of Muslims in Anatolia grew from 80% to 98%).2
The performance of Turkey’s economy did not reach its pre-war level 
until around 1930. The war did not cause significant damage to industrial 
facilities, which, however, was mainly due to the fact that there were 
hardly any of them. By contrast, transport infrastructure suffered extensive 
damage. As the Greeks and the Armenians left, most entrepreneurs and 
traders disappeared, which was a significant loss in terms of expertise 
and external relations.
The republic was proclaimed on 23 October 1923. Mustafa Kemal, hero 
of the War of Independence became the first President of the Republic, while 
his comrade-in-arms and friend, Ismet (Inönü)3 the Prime Minister. The 
capital was moved from Istanbul to Ankara. The Sultanate and, afterwards, 
the Caliphate was abolished, which was of a symbolic significance not 
1 Out of whom 2.5 million were Muslims, 600,000–800,000 Armenian and 300,000 Greek. 
Zürcher 2004, 163.
2 Zürcher 2004, 164.
3 The use of family names was introduced in 1934; Mustafa Kemal became “Atatürk” 
(Father of the Turks), and Ismet took the name “Inönü”.
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only for Turkey’s political system but also for the global Muslim religious 
community.4
1.1.1. Modernisation by Atatürk
After its establishment in 1923, modern Turkey was cut off for decades 
from the regions it had once controlled. Kemal Atatürk was convinced 
that for Turkey, a path of modernisation was the full adoption of European 
civilisation. As Abdullah Cevdet, a Turkish intellectual who influenced 
Atatürk’s way of thinking put it: “There is no second civilization; civili-
zation means European civilization, and it must be imported with both its 
roses and thorns.”5
The new Turkish leaders held Islam responsible for backwardness, and 
regarded the Arabs as traitors who, in collusion with the English, fought 
for the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire. The establishment of Turkey 
was a radical break with the Ottoman traditions and, to some extent, with 
Muslim traditions. Clearly, the new state sought to implement a Western-
type modernisation. It broke with its predecessors in many respects, yet 
its reforms actually were a continuation of the reforms introduced in the 
Ottoman era.
The Arabic writing was substituted with the Latin alphabet, the Islamic 
calendar with the Gregorian calendar, and the wearing of European clothes 
was introduced (e.g. the traditional turban and fez was banned, and the use 
of headscarf was restricted). In an attempt to strengthen Turkish national 
identity, Arabic and Persian loanwords were removed from the Turkish 
language. In the legal system, the Italian Criminal Code and the Swiss Civil 
Code were adopted without any modification.6 Although certain elements 
of the Western legal system were introduced as early as in the 19th century, 
Kemal’s reforms were unprecedentedly radical, as they completely ignored 
4 The Caliph is a successor of the Prophet Muhammad, elected by the Muslim commu-
nity, and a leader of the religious community. Murad I (1362–1389) was the first to use 
the title, when Selim I defeated the Mamluk Sultanate of Cairo in 1517, Mecca and 
Medina came under his rule or protection, and the Caliphate of the Ottoman Sultan 
became more widely recognised.
5 Lewis 1965, 231.
6 Sen 2014; for details see Örüncü 2013.
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the Islamic legal system and traditions.7 In 1934, voting rights and the right 
to be to elected were extended to women; in that respect, Turkey was ahead 
of numerous European countries.
The Kemalist ideology also followed the pattern of Western mod-
ernisation and was especially influenced by its French version. The key 
principles of Kemalism are summarised by the “six arrows” (altı ok, which 
in 1937 were included in the Constitution): republicanism, which replaced 
absolute monarchy, and ensured the rule of law and the nation’s sovereignty; 
laicism (or secularisation) that reduced the role of religion in public life; 
statism, which emphasised the central role of the state in social and eco-
nomic processes; nationalism, which replaced the multi-national empire 
and was based on the Turkish sense of national identity; populism, which 
prioritised the interest of the community over that of smaller groups; and 
revolutionism or reformism, which sought to change society. The six arrows 
were disseminated and professed almost as religious principles, yet they 
were not coherent or particularly attractive. Rather, they were accepted out 
of respect for Mustafa Kemal.
To strengthen political power, Kemal Atatürk took decisive steps. In 
1926, in the aftermath of a plot to assassinate him, he settled scores with 
his major political opponents, having many of them executed. To ensure 
his monopoly of power, he restructured the political system; in 1931, he 
officially established a one-party regime. Functions in the state and the party 
closely intertwined, as heads of the provinces were also local leaders of the 
Party. The opposition was weak; most of its representatives were forced 
to emigrate. Insubordination to the power manifested, above all, in the 
resistance of the Kurds; the power used the military to take action against 
minor revolts in the mountains.
Similarly to the systems of Franco in Spain, Salazar in Portugal or 
Metaxas in Greece, the Turkish regime was authoritarian, albeit in a revolu-
tionary way rather than in a religious or conservative manner. In this respect, 
the Mussolini regime in Italy, with its nationalism and totalitarianism, was 
closer to the Greek system, and, indeed, was regarded by Greek political 
leaders as an example to follow. Yet Mussolini’s system and the Greek 
regime also showed major differences, e.g. the latter lacked the militarist 
7 Oguz 2005, 381.
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and expansionist (irredentist) character of the former, and was implementing 
a cautious, defensive foreign policy.8
1.1.2. Economy
After the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire, the new Turkish nation state 
faced serious problems. Turkey had lost its most prosperous regions, and 
its economy had to rely primarily on agriculture. The new government 
redistributed land; plots were given to the poorest farmers.
The primary objective was to establish Turkey’s economic independence 
as a key prerequisite of political independence. Yet Kemalist leaders were 
divided over the strategy to follow. Some would have opted for a liberal 
capitalist model, others for a Soviet-type national economic programme 
based on state intervention. Initially (from 1923 to 1929), state intervention 
started to lose its significance; the objective was to establish a modern econ-
omy based on private enterprises, while the state attempted only to support 
the better functioning of the economy with infrastructural investments. In 
that period, 800 km of new railway lines was constructed. In 1929, another 
800 km was under construction, and foreign-owned railway lines were pur-
chased.9 Tobacco monopoly, another significant foreign-owned asset, also 
came to the possession of the state and, later, to Turkish private companies.
The period from 1930 to 1946 was marked by a strong state intervention 
in the economy, as Kemalism saw the state as a driving force of moderni-
sation. Statism differed from socialism, as it regarded private property as 
fundamental, yet it was the state’s role to create and operate those economic 
sectors which, due to lack of capital, the private sector could not create or 
operate.
During the Great Depression, the Soviet model of planned economy 
apparently managed the crisis successfully, and thus seemed highly appeal-
ing. In 1932, a Soviet delegation visited Turkey, and recommended the 
development of the textile, steel and iron, paper, cement, glass and chemical 
8 Zürcher 2004, 186.
9 By 1930, 3,000 had been purchased; 2,400 km was still foreign-owned (Zürcher 2004, 
195).
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industries.10 In 1934, Turkey introduced planned economy, primarily relying 
on Soviet advice.11
Economic strategy centred on the development of heavy industry. 
The programme successfully laid down the foundations of Turkey’s heavy 
industry, but the one-sided concentration of the resources inflicted exten-
sive damage on other sectors. Instead of coordinating the market, the state 
controlled investments. Turkey was poor in capital; the state encouraged 
the development of capital-intensive sectors, yet trained workforce was 
not available, while low-skilled workers hardly found employment.12 The 
newly established public corporations employed masses of engineers and 
skilled industrial workers who could later capitalise on their expertise in 
the private sector.
Thus, at the beginning of the 20th century the Muslim–Turkish bour-
geois class evolved with active state participation and control. As a result, 
strong ties were established between the state and the Turkish bourgeoisie, 
the latter being in a dependent position. The private sector continued to exist 
along the big public corporations, but private companies were also highly 
dependent on the benevolence of the state.13 The Turkish state regarded 
private companies as important partners and a basis for modernisation, yet 
prohibited employees from setting up trade unions.
1.2. Western alliance and import substitution 
industrialisation (1946–1980)
World War II changed Turkey’s status in terms of politics, economy, foreign 
affairs and external economy considerably. Turkey turned from a neutral 
state into a prominent member of the Western system of alliances, and the 
US alliance called for a political and economic opening-up.
After World War II, Turkey’s strategic situation gained relevance; in the 
framework of the Marshall Plan and the Truman Doctrine, Turkey received 
considerable support from the United States. Turkey became a part of the 
global capitalist system and the evolving Euro-Atlantic institutional system, 
10 Zürcher 2004, 197.
11 Findley 2010, 274.
12 Ahmad 1998.
13 Findley 2010, 274.
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i.e. it abandoned its former cautious, neutral foreign policy. In 1950, it applied 
to become a member of NATO, and in 1952 – in the face of opposition from 
Denmark and Norway – acceded. Given the Cold War circumstances, this 
act was of significance in terms of Turkey’s safety, and, at the same time, 
fulfilled an old dream: the Western world accepted Turkey as an equal partner.
After its accession to the NATO, Turkey supported the aspirations of 
the United States and other Western powers with great enthusiasm. Unlike 
developing countries and neighbouring Arab states where anti-imperialist 
ideology was popular, Turkey vigorously defended Western values and 
interests.14
The United States attempted to strengthen Turkey with regional coalitions 
as well. Due to the diplomatic recognition of Israel, the Arab countries were 
not keen to ally with Turkey; so in 1954 Turkey signed the Baghdad Pact 
with Pakistan, Iran and Iraq. Most Arab countries saw the Pact as a way of 
being controlled by American imperialism. The Pact proved short-lived due 
to the nationalist coup in Iraq in 1958. To replace the Pact, a military alliance 
was formed with the United States (CENTO, Central Treaty Organisation).
A similarly dysfunctional pact was concluded in 1953 with Greece and 
Yugoslavia (the “Balkan Pact”). The Greek–Turkish relations were almost 
friendly until the Cyprus conflict (1954). The actions taken by pro-Greek 
unity nationalists in Cyprus against British occupation gave rise to conflicts 
between them. Though in 1960 independent Cyprus was established with 
Greece, Turkey and UK as guarantor powers, the issue of sharing the power 
between the Turkish and Greek Cypriot communities created constant tension.
1.2.1. Changes in economy
Changes in the economy were also mixed. Like many developing coun-
tries, Turkey based its economic development policy primarily on import 
substitution industrialisation. As evidenced by macroeconomic indicators, 
the growth was spectacular: the GNP grew on average by 7% a year, while 
from 1963 to 1976 industrial production grew even faster, on average by 
10% a year.15
14 Karataşli 2015, 394.
15 Aydin 2005, 38; Pamuk 2007.
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The state played a dominant role in the industrial sectors, and 40% 
of the industrial output came from big public corporations. As a rule, such 
corporations operated with poor efficiency; their decisions were often deter-
mined by political interests. Even in the private sector, aids and development 
resources depended on the National Planning Authority, which added to 
dependence on the state and promoted clientelism. In many cases, industri-
alisation took place via joint ventures, where the foreign company provided 
the technology, the know-how and, quite often, the components, while the 
Turkish party ensured labour force and, partially, capital. Dependence 
continued to be excessive.
Oligopoly market structures evolved in the Turkish market, with a low 
number of big actors and a low level of competition. The army was gradually 
gaining significance, above all, due to the investments of its pension funds. 
By contrast, the agricultural sector was hardly affected by the plans and 
rarely had access to development funds.
Industrial development focussed on the domestic market. Manufacturing 
export hardly existed at all: exports made up 4% of the GDP, two-thirds of 
which were accounted for by agricultural products. The current account 
deficit resulted in recurrent funding problems. Remittances from migrant 
workers, aids from America and – to a lesser extent – capital flowing from 
the European markets played a major role in upkeeping the external balance, 
but, at the same time, made the economy vulnerable. In 1973–1974, the oil 
price shock triggered yet another major increase of import, while export 
opportunities diminished. For a short period of time, the central bank 
reserves and remittances provided for the funding of the deficits; but then 
those resources decreased, too. The government measures taken to address 
rising raw material prices and internal economic problems accelerated 
inflation, which had reached an annual rate of 90% by 1979.
In the 1960s, Turkey’s economic development started to exhibit a dual 
nature. On the one hand, there were processes pointing towards free trade 
and international cooperation with the EC; on the other hand, industrial 
development and economic policy were shaped on the basis of a model that 
assumed an inward-oriented, closed economy. The policy based on import 
substitution – a major engine of economic development between 1963 and 
1968 – gradually turned into a negative force in the 1970s. According to 
the World Bank, from 1963 to 1968 import substitution contributed to the 
growth of Turkish GDP (+8.3%), while from 1968 to 1973 the effects were 
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negative (–1.4%).16 The reason was that in the production processes in emerg-
ing sectors there was a growing demand for the import of semi-finished 
products, which further increased the need for imports.
To reduce the current account deficit, protectionist measures were 
introduced; the competitiveness of the Turkish production remained weak, 
which, however, did not pose a problem for a long time. Turkey’s indus-
try focussed on the properly-sized internal market, and exports played 
a minor role. The overvaluation of the lira also discouraged companies from 
exports. Yet by the late 1970s, increasingly severe economic problems have 
emerged. By 1978, external debt had grown to 14 billion dollars (out of which 
7.5 billion was short-term debt). The annual debt burden had reached 41% of 
exports, as opposed to the situation in 1973, when the debt was 3.3 billion 
(10% of exports). Besides the import substitution strategy, a reason for the 
degradation of Turkey’s position was the oil shock of 1973, which caused 
deteriorating terms of trade. Some studies highlight other factors of the 
disturbance of the balance. Dervis and Robinson17 point to the fact that 
rising oil prices contributed to the deterioration of the current account only 
to a degree of 12%, while the fundamental reason was the overvaluation of 
the lira (32%). Other important factors included the decrease of remittances18 
(21%), an increase of investments and a drop in external demand.
In 1978–1979, Turkey needed aid from the IMF to avoid bankruptcy. 
The conditions for the IMF aid were a major restructuration and measures 
of deregulation and liberalisation as per the Washington consensus.19 
Most export and import restrictions had to be eliminated, and government 
expenditures had to be cut. When Demirel became head of government in 
1979 again, he attached special importance to the implementation of the 
programme. Turgut Özal, undersecretary for economy, assumed a central 
role in the process. In January 1980, the government launched an extensive 
programme of stabilisation and economic reforms. The lira was devalued 
by almost 50%. But the effects of the measures emerged among new cir-
cumstances, as the military assumed power with a coup in September.
16 Celasun 1983, 112.
17 Cited by Akagül 1987, 9.
18 The drop in remittances was due to the restrictions of immigration in the EC and the 
deterioration of the economic situation in Turkey, as foreign workers did not transfer 
their wages to their families immediately (see Table 1).
19 Öniş 2010, 50.
Turkey in the 20th Century 23
1.3. Economic opening and European integration  
(1980–2001)
1.3.1. Özal’s reforms
On 12 September 1980, the military assumed power, claiming that public 
bodies were no longer capable of ensuring Turkey’s normal operation.
The Programme of Economic Stabilisation, announced before the 
military coup (in January 1980), introduced radical changes in Turkey’s 
economic strategy which, until then, had primarily been based on state 
intervention and isolation. Özal participated in the elaboration of the IMF-
inspired approach, and continued to represent it as Prime Minister. The 
objectives included the reduction of public intervention in production, 
focussing on market conditions, and replacing import substitution with an 
export-focussed strategy and effective incentives of foreign investments. 
The government – in parallel with a drastic devaluation of the lira – firmly 
supported production for export: it assumed 30% of export costs of com-
panies and offered them advantages in terms of energy and transport costs.
The development process that started in 1980 was more promising 
than the results of the previous two decades. Due to the economic open-
ing, private enterprises started to prosper; tourism and foreign investment 
gained momentum. The state monopoly was eliminated in several sectors. 
Private airlines and television channels appeared; almost all major holdings 
launched a television channel.
Income disparities were on the rise. Formerly, there had hardly been 
any instances of conspicuous luxury consumption; now, it was prestigious 
to show off wealth. At the same time, the unemployment rate was high; 
many left the agricultural sector due to the growing difficulties of earning 
a living, but did not necessarily find employment. As trade union activity 
intensified, many businesses opted for subcontractors where the labour 
force was not organised and, thus, workers earned less.
The “Anatolian Tigers” – relatively small Anatolian enterprises that 
were competitive in the external markets and could prosper among liberal 
economic conditions without state aid – were instrumental in boosting 
production and export. As Prime Minister Özal put it: “We are lucky that 
we don’t have oil, we have to work hard to make money.”20
20 Akyol 2006, 5. 
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A major consequence of the economic liberalisation process was a focus 
on exports. From 1980 to 1983, when total global trade decreased by 10%, 
Turkish exports almost doubled; then, by 1988 they had reached 11.7 billion 
dollars (as opposed to USD 3 billion in 1980). In the same period, the current 
account deficit decreased from 4.9% of the GNP to 3.2%, and the inflation 
rate dropped from 110% to 30%.21 The structure of exports changed, too. 
Formerly, 60% of exports had been accounted for by agricultural products, 
while in 1988 their rate was 20%. In the early 1980s, after the second oil 
shock, the share of Middle East countries was higher than that of the EC. 
However, the drop of oil prices, along with the transformation of Turkey’s 
production and economic structure, proved to be favourable for the European 
markets again.
Main export products were vehicles, textiles, products of other man-
ufacturing sectors and steel products. New industrial areas evolved in 
relatively underdeveloped regions where economy had previously relied on 
agricultural products and traditional crafts.22 Due to industrial traditions, 
labour force was available; the lack of trade unions allowed for low wages. 
Most enterprises were launched as family businesses, without state support 
and, in most cases, without foreign capital.23
However – due to a fast growth of internal demand and faults of economic 
governance – the signs of imbalance became more visible in the late 1980s. 
Due to the hotchpotch implementation of structural reforms, the funding of 
loss-making public companies involved enormous costs, which resulted 
in a steady increase of the budget deficit (3.5% in 1986 and 8% in 1990). 
Inflation remained persistently above 50%, while economic growth slowed 
down dramatically.24
1.3.2. The background of economic processes
Regardless the economic restructuration, attempts to set Turkey on a stable 
growth path failed for a long time. From 1970 to 2001, the per capita income 
grew by an average annual rate of 2%, which lagged far behind the rate 
21 Krueger 1995.
22 Gaziantep, Denzili, Kayseri, Malatya, Konya etc.
23 Resources included the capital transferred by Turkish workers employed in Europe.
24 Krueger 1995.
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in East Asia (4.3%). The divergence from the average values is even more 
revealing: compared to the value of 1 percentage point in East Asia, Turkey’s 
rate was 2.2 percentage points, which evidences a marked fluctuation of 
growth.25 As a rule, a few years of dynamic development were followed by 
downturns. Such volatility was especially characteristic of the 1990s, when 
three major crises – involving GDP contractions of 5–10% – occurred within 
a decade (in 1994, 1999 and 2001). Besides external circumstances,26 factors 
leading to crises included the deficiencies of the financial institutional system 
and problems deriving from the malfunctioning of the banking system.27
The vulnerability of Turkey’s economy increased in the late 1980s, with 
the launch of an extensive liberalisation process which allowed a freer inflow 
of foreign capital. This contributed to funding the deficit, yet short-term 
capital (“hot capital”) made Turkey vulnerable at a time of external crises.28
The first crisis (1994) caused considerable damage to Turkey’s economy, 
yet its magnitude was not sufficient to cause major changes in economic 
policy, and, in any event, the weak coalitions would not have been capable 
of implementing changes consistently. The imbalance had deteriorated, and 
in December 1999 Turkey had to resort to a stand-by arrangement with the 
IMF, the conditions of which included mid-term structural reforms and 
an adjustment of the central budget. Albeit the immediate crisis situation 
was not exceedingly severe, the framework offered by the arrangement 
could not prevent an actual crisis. The amount of the loan was low, and the 
coalition government was not firmly committed to the implementation of 
the privatisation process and the regulation of the banking system. This 
resulted in a “twin crisis” of November 2000 and February 2001. Due to 
the decline of confidence, the lira started to fall, and inflation accelerated. 
The weak banking sector was unable to address the situation, and was in 
need of state assistance.29
25 Üngör 2014, 705.
26 Financial crises arose in Mexico in 1994 and in Southeast Asia in 1997–1998, and had 
a powerful impact on the financial environment of other emerging countries, including 
Turkey.
27 Cizre–Yeldan 2005.
28 Öniş–Şenses 2009.
29 The publicly owned banks (e.g. Ziraat and Halk) had a significant amount of bad loans. 
During the crisis of 2000–2001, the state implemented a bank rescue scheme (amounting 
to approximately 30% of Turkey’s GDP), which resulted in an unfinanceable public 
debt. (Şimşek–Şimşek 2011, 171–172.)
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1.3.3. Foreign relations
The 1980s and 1990s saw a radical transformation in international politics, 
which affected Turkey’s foreign relations. The end of the Cold War, the 
breakup of the Soviet Union and the recurring challenges in the Middle 
East put Turkey’s foreign policy to a serious test.
Özal, as a pro-American politician, sought to establish good relations 
with the United States, and, after the invasion of Kuwait by Iraq, he and his 
government enthusiastically backed the UN-supported action of the United 
States. Turkey, having lost its former strategic position at the end of the Cold 
War, was quick to seize the new opportunity. The public opinion, however, 
was not keen on the unilateral pro-American approach. Concerns were raised 
that the fact that American bombers used a Turkish airbase might provoke 
an Iraqi counter-strike. At the end of the war, the Turks were concerned 
about the Kurdish uprising in northern Iraq (inspired, among others, by the 
United States). The uprising was suppressed by Saddam Hussein. To avoid 
a massive influx of Kurdish refugees, Turkey planned to set up a safety zone 
in northern Iraq; however, the United States did not support the concept.
Turkey’s relations with European countries were even more changeable. 
It was not until 1983 that political relations – which had deteriorated due to 
the coup – started to improve, although Greece, having joined the European 
Communities in 1981, made attempts on every platform to prevent such 
improvement. In 1987, Turkey applied for EC membership. The EC did not 
reject it, yet did not consider it timely either and, instead, recommended 
accession to the customs union (CU). The Cyprus problem persisted, which 
influenced the relations with Greece as well. The Aegean Border Dispute 
also deteriorated the relations. In the 1990s, political relations were clouded 
by actions against the Kurds. The rest of the 1990s saw discussions on the 
launch of accession negotiations, which frequently resulted in recurrent 
lows in relations.30
In the 1980s, relations with the Soviet Union started to improve, and, 
by the beginning of the 1990s, Russia had already become a major export 
partner of Turkey. The Trans-Balkan pipeline allowed Russian gas import. 
With the breakup of the Soviet Union, republics of the Caucasus and Central 
Asia became independent. In the beginning, Turkey envisioned a new Turk 
unity, and America supported the concept, keen to prevent Iran from taking 
30 For details see Chapter 6.
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advantage of the new political vacuum. Albeit Turkey was active, the Russian 
market offered a more attractive and advantageous opportunity; moreover, 
Central Asia was connected with Russia with many ties (e.g. infrastructure).
In the 1980s, the Iranian revolution and the Iran–Iraq War determined 
regional relations. The military government (1980–1983) viewed Khomeini’s 
takeover as a suspicious matter, and was afraid of its effect on Turkey’s 
domestic policy, more specifically, the strengthening of the Islamists. Turkey, 
however, remained neutral in the Iran–Iraq War. Economically, Turkey ben-
efited from its position. For Iran, embargoed by America, Turkey became 
a major source for supply, while it helped Iraq to forward oil via pipelines 
to the Mediterranean region, bypassing the Strait of Hormuz, which, at that 
time, was under Iranian control.
In the late 1980s, Turkey’s relations with Iraq and Syria deteriorated, 
primarily because Turkey built the Atatürk Dam on the Euphrates River 
without consulting Iraq or Syria. Syria reacted with an increased support of 
the PKK, in an unsuccessful attempt to blackmail Turkey or make it open to 
negotiations. The Caucasian republics which became independent with the 
dissolution of the Soviet Union offered new opportunities, but also brought 
about new conflicts. Turkey’s good relations with the Azeris resulted in 
unfavourable changes in its historically problematic relations with Armenia.
With regard to Bulgaria, the situation of the Turkish minority was 
a source of conflict. In 1989, 300,000 Bulgarian nationals who were ethni-
cally Turkish fled to Turkey to escape forced assimilation, which affected 
bilateral relations negatively for a long time. The dissolution of Yugoslavia 
created additional challenges for Turkey. The Balkan issue arose again, yet 
it entailed not only challenges but also opportunities.
When coming to power, Erbakan introduced new aspects: as opposed 
to the traditional orientation towards the West, the objectives of the Islamist 
Fazilet (Virtue) Party entailed a change of foreign political orientation whose 
significance had been emphasised for decades. Although Tansu Çiller, the 
Minister of Foreign Affairs of the coalition government continued to main-
tain close contacts with her foreign counterparts, Erbakan – in the hope 
of closer future cooperation – convened the heads of the major Muslim 
states (Turkey, Bangladesh, Egypt, Indonesia, Iran, Malaysia, Nigeria and 
Pakistan) under the name of D-8. Yet due to time constraints and a hostile 
internal environment, the attempt proved to be short-lived.
In May 2000, Necdet Sezer, President of the Constitutional Court 
was elected as President of the Republic. Sezer, as a consistently secular 
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politician, refused to sign any act or decree that he deemed to be against 
the rule of law. By February 2001, the dispute between Sezer and Ecevit 
had turned into a domestic political crisis, which shook investors’ trust and 
brought about yet another, more severe crisis.
In June 2001, the FP (Refah’s successor) was banned, and a debate 
took place within the party as to how to continue. Followers of the tra-
ditional Islamic movement established the Felicity (Saadet) Party, while 
modernists, led by Abdullah Gül and Tayyip Erdoğan, set up the Justice 
and Development Party (Adelet ve Kalkınma Partisi, AKP), which won 
support greater than expected (34%) in the general elections of November 
2002, gaining an absolute majority in the Parliament. An Islamist party’s 
coming to power at the beginning of the 21st century marked the beginning 
of a new era in Turkey’s history.
Chapter 2  
Islam in Turkey’s Policy
2.1. The political representation of Islam
The modern Turkish state deliberately removed Islam from public life, so 
religion existed only as an aspect of private life. It was not an atheist state 
that was created, but a secularised state system, which, however, clearly 
contradicts the approach of Islam, which seeks to regulate life as a whole, 
including the political, economic and legal aspects of social life.
In Turkey, there are two approaches to secularism.1 Assertive secu-
larism claims that religion is a part of a person’s private sphere, and bans 
or limits its visibility in public life (or even in public spaces). It separates 
religion from “worldly matters”, and claims that religious regulations should 
not appear in social life, mode of dress, behaviour or – if possible – in any 
other aspect. Passive secularism (which is more accepted in Western Europe) 
promotes the neutrality of the state towards religions, but does not limit 
their visibility in public life. Kemalist secularism is markedly assertive, and, 
in general, was embraced by the Kemalist CHP and the army. As a rule, 
Turkey’s Constitutional Court also preferred it, while centre-right parties 
(DP, AP, ANAP, DYP) tended to opt for passive secularism.
Atatürk’s reforms entailed more than the abolition of the Caliphate. 
They also abolished religious courts, religious schools and dervish monas-
teries (a major institution of religious life in Asia Minor). The traditional 
fez was banned, and women were prohibited from wearing headscarf in 
public institutions. In 1928, the declaration that the “religion of Turkey is 
Islam” was removed from the Constitution. In 1935, Sunday was declared 
the weekly day of rest instead of Friday.
Kemalism was intended to substitute religion; in official communication, 
religiosity came to be a synonym for backwardness. In 1924, the Presidency 
1 Hale–Özbudun 2010, 22.
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of Religious Affairs (Diyanet İsleri Başkanlığı) was set up to control reli-
gious life, more specifically, to monitor the activity of imams; it also issued 
central guidelines to “direct” imams towards the official interpretation.
Religious schools (Imam Hatip) started to operate again in 1951: by 
1970, 72 had been established; by 1996, their number had risen to 464.2 
Their curricula contained religious knowledge (reading the Quran; the 
history of Islam) and subjects as per general requirements. Imam Hatip 
schools operated as vocational schools, but the qualification they offered 
were not recognised everywhere (e.g. by the army).
In the increasingly democratic atmosphere of the post-World War II 
years parties making reference to Islam reappeared, yet most of them were 
short-lived.3 Religious communities played a more important role than parties 
did; still, their immediate political effect was insignificant. An important 
change was the gradual evolution of a layer of society – composed of land-
owners and religious conservative retailers – in Anatolia which shunned 
the clientelism of the state and later became the basis of the Islam-based 
National Order Party (Millî Nizam Partisi), established in 1970 and led by 
Necmittin Erbakan. In 1971, the Constitutional Court banned the National 
Order Party, which was re-established in 1972 as the National Salvation Party 
(Milli Selamet Partisi, MSP). In the elections of 1973, the MSP won 12% of 
the votes (48 seats), which made it a kingmaker besides the two parties (the 
CHP and the AP) rivals to each other. First, the CHP and the MSP entered 
into a coalition, and Erbakan became Deputy Prime Minister under Ecevit. 
Then, in 1974, Erbakan opted for a coalition with right-wing parties. In the 
elections of 1971, support for the MSP dropped to 8.6% (24 seats). The loss 
of popularity was attributable to a conflict between Erbakan and the Nurcu 
movement that accounted for a significant part of the party’s supporters.
The concept of Turkish–Islamic Synthesis (Türk İslam Sentezı) became 
popular in the 1970s. It centres around the concept that the 2500-year-old 
Turkish culture and the 1000-year-old culture of Islam bear similarities and 
are built on each other, and that the Turks are the chosen people in Islam. 
The approach proved to be attractive even for the secular army.
By contrast to its previous approach, the military, acting as the main 
guardian of the secular state, was not strongly against the political rise of 
the Islamist forces. That was due to the fact that in the 1970s, left-wing 
2 Kicsi 2008, 33.
3 Azak 2010, 192.
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forces gained momentum in Turkey’s political life, relying mainly on mar-
ginalised urban groups of the society. Those in power regarded Islam as 
a tool to weaken left-wing forces; this is why the Turkish–Islamic sense of 
identity was propagated as a mixture of Turkish nationalism and a sense of 
belonging to the Islamic Ummah (the community of Muslims).
The military intervention of 1980 abolished the parties; therefore, in 
the 1980s, new parties were set up. In 1983, the Islamist forces established 
a party of their own (Welfare Party or Refah Partisi, RP) under the leadership 
of Ahmet Tekdal. Erbakan and the other leaders of the MSP were banned 
from political activity for years.
Albeit Islamist parties were banned from political life, the military 
regime attributed a new role to Islam when, to counterbalance left-wing 
propaganda, they turned the concept of Turkish–Islamic Synthesis into 
a theory hammered into public consciousness by the central power. The 
leader of the coup, Kenan Evren himself regarded Islam as an enlightened 
religion that is open to science and technology.4
The first free elections after the coup were won by the ANAP, which was 
not an Islamist Party, but embraced the values of Islam along with economic 
liberalism and nationalism, and included an Islamic platform. The majority 
of the voters of the MSP (banned in the 1980s) supported the ANAP.5
Turgut Özal, leader of the ANAP, was a pro-West politician and a reli-
gious Muslim. He had lived in the United States long, and was convinced 
that – besides an American-type entrepreneurial spirit and technological 
innovation – it was religion that could enable Turkey to compete with 
Western countries. The groups that called for economic liberalisation and 
pro-Islam forces entered into a Holy League (Kutsal Ittifak) to achieve their 
common goals, which promoted a gradual acceptance of Islam within the 
state structure.6 However, in the 1990s, after Özal’s retirement, the party 
ideology laid less emphasis on that connection.
As Anatolian enterprises strengthened, the political forces they sup-
ported also gained momentum. After the 1970s, Necmettin Erbakan could 
enter the government again. At the time, Erbakan and the Refah were 
allowed to participate in the elections, and they were elected members of 
4 Sunier–Landman 2015, 31.
5 Yeşilada 2002, 102.
6 Atasoy 2001.
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the Parliament.7 They also won 19.1% of the votes in the local elections of 
1994, and their two members became the mayors of the two biggest cities, 
Istanbul and Ankara.8 In 1995, the Refah – much to the dismay of secular 
powers – gained the most votes in the elections. In June 1996, Erbakan 
became the Prime Minister of the coalition government.
Albeit the coalition did not leave ample scope for Erbakan to imple-
ment the ideas he had claimed to have before, in 1997 the Army, pressed by 
the traditional elite, forced him to resign on the grounds that the growing 
influence of Islam threatened the secular state system. After that, the Refah 
was banned, its property was confiscated, and the party leaders were banned 
from political life for years.
In 2001, the new Islamist party, the Fazilet (Virtue), established by 
Erbakan, was banned, which meant that religious forces had to reorganise 
themselves before the elections. As a result of the growing differences, two 
Islamist movements emerged. Erbakan (who, at that time, was banned from 
public life again) and his conservative followers established the Saadet 
(Felicity) Party under the leadership of Recai Kutan, while modernist/
reformist powers, under the leadership of Erdoğan (also banned from high-
level political activity) and Abdullah Gül, set up the Justice and Development 
Party (AKP). In the elections of November 2002, Saadet got 2.5% of the 
votes, and AKP, with its 34.2%, won the elections.
2.1.1. The ideology of the Islamist parties
Turkey’s Islamist parties have always identified themselves as national 
parties (milli görüs, National Outlook), as the Constitution did not allow 
political parties to employ religious symbols or concepts. Here, the term 
“national” (millet) refers to a religious community. In Erbakan’s opinion, 
there were three major systems of view in Turkish society: the liberal app-
roach represented by the AP, the left-wing approach of the CHP and the 
national approach of the MSP (milli görüs).9
7 In 1991, it became the 4th biggest parliamentary force (62 seats).
8 From 1994 to 1998, Erdoğan from Refah acted as the Mayor of Istanbul; he established 
his future popularity then.
9 Sunier–Landman 2015, 29.
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According to Erbakan, a reason for the fall of the Ottoman Empire was 
that along with modern Western technology it adopted Western ethics, and, 
consequently, the Turks got alienated from their own culture and roots.10 
Erbakan felt that there were fundamental differences between Western 
civilisation and Islam, and, with its materialistic, oppressive and colonising 
ideology, the former posed a threat to Turkey. In his opinion, the fall of 
the Ottoman Empire began with the adoption of Western ideas, and other 
parties were but imitators of Western (either capitalist or socialist) ideas.
The leaders of the Refah (above all, Erbakan) did not support economic 
liberalisation; rather, they opted for the idea of industrialisation to ensure 
production for the domestic market and strengthening the protection of 
the markets. This was one of the reasons why they were not committed 
to rapprochement to the EU and were against the customs union treaty. 
Islamic forces adopted a negative attitude to Europe and, in general, the 
West, due to economic interests and, primarily, ideological reasons. They 
regarded the EU as a Christian club; as Erbakan put it, accession would be 
a betrayal of Turkey’s history, civilisation, culture and sovereignty. Even 
Abdullah Gül (the future President of the Republic who belonged to the 
reformist wing of the Islamic powers) said in 1995 that the EU was a club 
of the rich and, should Turkey accede, foreign capital would invade into 
Turkey and Turkish industry.
This view permeated their approach to foreign policy: they were critical 
of the EU customs union, the EU accession and the NATO membership. 
As Erbakan said, scaring his audience, the EU either would not let Turkey 
accede or, if yes, then it would approve of Israel’s accession, too, making 
Turkey and Israel one country.11 For him, EU accession was a Zionist 
scheme to tear Turkey away from its own Muslim roots. The vision was 
an Islamic world that would be established under Turkish leadership and 
would be governed by Muslim institutions, such as the Muslim Common 
Market with Islamic dinar as its common currency.12 It was quite clear that 
Turkish nationalism had Pan-Islamism underlying: it was the Turks who 
were bound to play the role of the natural leader.
In the early 1990s, the Refah experimented with the third-way concept 
of “Just Order” (adil düzen), which was based on private companies yet 
10 He emphasised the role of Turks as soldiers of Islam.
11 Hale–Özbudun 2010, 6.
12 Toprak 2006, 40.
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was characterised by strong state control. Many condemned “Just Order” 
as a concept that – albeit did not use Marxist terminology – worked with 
a clearly Marxist approach. The Islamic concept of interest-free economy was 
propagated, and the international system was shunned as an IMF-controlled 
system of slavery.13 Then the 1990s saw a shift towards the centre, as less 
radical slogans came into the foreground.
The ideology of the Refah and its predecessors was incoherent and 
eclectic: it made references to the Islam, but also incorporated elements of 
pragmatic liberalism, social conservatism, welfare and classical capitalism.14 
Its primary objective was to integrate the concepts of Islam into political life.
Basically, there are three Islamist approaches to the democratic system: 
1. Radicals reject it, and seek the immediate establishment of a sharia-based 
state. 2. Reformist fundamentalists also aim at a sharia-based state in the 
long run, but they intend to establish it without violence, gradually, relying 
on the support of voters. 3. Liberals accept a pluralist system where Muslim 
values are represented (as Christian values are represented in a Christian 
democracy).15
Turkey’s Islamist parties embraced different approaches to democracy. 
Radicals, who rejected the democratic framework itself were in the minority. 
The leaders of traditional Islamist parties (and Erbakan himself) belonged 
to the second category. They found the democratic institutional system 
acceptable, but only as a tool to ensure their coming to power and not as 
a goal or as an institution to be maintained at all costs. That is, they opted 
for majority democracy rather than for pluralist democracy.
In the Fazilet Party, established as a successor of the Refah, the focus 
shifted to the third approach. The Fazilet emphasised the ethical values of 
Islam, and attached less importance to the Islamisation of the political and 
economic system.16 Even Recai Kutan, the head of the party who preferred 
the traditional approach, thought that the concepts of national outlook and 
just order are liable to be misunderstood.17 In foreign politics, the Fazilet 
became more willing to view the West and the EU favourably; the democratic 
requirements of the EU standards, such as the Copenhagen criteria were 
13 Toprak 2006, 42.
14 Hale–Özbudun 2010, 9.
15 Hale–Özbudun 2010, 9.
16 Toprak 2006, 41.
17 Dai 2005, 25.
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regarded as objectives to be achieved. A reason for that was the ban on the 
Refah, as the restructuring of the legal system required by the EU would 
have made such actions by the military and the secular forces more difficult. 
Then, in 2001, the Fazilet was banned too; consequently, the ideology of 
the new party had to be reconsidered.
By 2000, among supporters of Islamic political forces, those emphasising 
the advantages of EU integration had become more powerful. The economic 
circles in the background of the Islamist parties were interested in the eco-
nomic reforms. The opening of the European markets broadened their export 
opportunities, while the EU requirements on democratisation constituted 
a political advantage for them. The limitation of the military’s opportunities 
for intervention, along with the respect for freedom of expression and for 
human rights allowed the Islamists to play a stronger role in public life.18 
As the number of Muslim entrepreneurs grew, the protectionist, pro-state 
approach (propagated formerly by Erbakan) gradually lost its popularity, 
and a market- and business-friendly approach came to the foreground.
Among Islamist forces, reorganised in 2001, there was an intensifying 
dispute between traditionalists and modernists, initially about organisational 
issues and campaign technique. During the campaign, those opting for 
a more modern approach (including Erdoğan) visited public spaces which 
the traditionalists did not regard as compatible with religion (e.g. nightclubs). 
Gradually, differences began to emerge in basic ideological and thematic 
issues, which was one of the reasons why Saadet and the AKP were estab-
lished as separate parties.
The AKP was successful, because it could recruit supporters from the 
winners and the losers of neoliberal globalisation alike. Mostly, it resembled 
a third-way modern social democratic party that emphasises the advantages 
of the market, calls for restructuring the state from a developing-interven-
ing state into a regulating one, and, at the same time, is concerned about 
social justice.
With AKP’s coming to power in 2002 a party which expressly declared 
itself to be Islam-based started to govern Turkey, which increased the 
18 Scepticism regarding Europe and globalisation was growing in the traditional secular 
elite, understandably, as the 19th-century nationalism and statism of Kemalism was 
not EU-compliant. Kemalists returned to Atatürk’s policy, governed by the concept 
of gaining economic independence of other countries, according to which Turkey had 
to withstand emerging globalisation, as globalisation is a form of colonisation where 
colonisers gain the power with the tools of economy instead of weapons.
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value attributed to religion. The chapters below analyse the role of Islam 
in Turkey’s society and economy.
2.1.2. Islam and modernisation
From the 1980s onwards (and more markedly in the 1990s), the moderni-
sation process of the previous years has been challenged in various areas. 
It emerged partly as a legitimation crisis of the “strong state”. In Turkey, 
the state had been the standard-bearer of modernisation since the establish-
ment of the republic, and it was performing its activities almost completely 
independent of the society. In the 1990s, the new actors introduced a new 
way of expression of modernisation in Turkey’s political life. The traditio-
nal state was less and less capable of meeting modern social and economic 
demands; its legitimacy was decreasing.
Opportunities for alternative ways of modernisation emerged, backed 
by theory and actual social processes alike, as evidenced by the return of 
Islam to public life. Such alternative approaches heavily criticised the secular- 
rational perspective of Kemalism, which, however, did not necessarily mean 
that they rejected capitalism.
As a sign of alternative modernisation, Islam gained strength in Turkey, 
but not in its radical fundamentalist form which rejects Western modern-
isation. The majority of Turks (unlike Iranians or Egyptians) do not view 
Islam as the reason for the glorious past. Among others, that is the reason 
why, while in Iran and Egypt Islam was and is present as a counterpoint 
of Western modernisation, an alternative and also a shield, the Turks view 
both Islam and Western modernisation as elements that enrich their sense 
of national identity.19
2.2. The AKP’s policy – Internal and external factors
The AKP’s convincing electoral victory was partly attributable to the 
growing conservative population, the majority of which lived in the outer, 
relatively poor urban districts. The number of AKP voters also grew in the 
19 Rothman 2007, 79.
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conservative middle class. Yet another factor was the initial support from 
the Kurds, who saw a chance for change in the AKP.20
In retrospect, governance by the AKP can be divided into three phases.21 
In many respects, the first phase (2002–2007) is the most successful, marked 
by rapid economic growth, democratisation, commencing negotiations with 
the EU, improving relations with neighbouring countries, i.e. positive factors 
that catalysed each other. The second period (2007–2011) was less of a suc-
cess story. The global economic crisis hit Turkey hard: the global economic 
environment was deteriorating, democratisation and internal reforms slowed 
down, the accession negotiations stalled, while foreign policy became more 
confrontational. After 2011, economic performance declined, and risks 
increased. In politics, the strengthening of an authoritarian approach, the 
recurring conflicts with the Kurds and, externally, the Arab Spring, the 
Syrian civil war and the refugees added to the complexity of the situation.
2.2.1. The AKP’s policy in 2002–2007
The elections of 2002 were determined by the crisis of 2001 and the sub-
sequent setback. Called as a result of the fall of Bülent Ecevit’s coalition, 
the elections were determined by the votes against the former governing 
forces: among the parties that had not held seats in the Parliament in the 
previous term, only two met the parliamentary threshold. The AKP, foun-
ded in 2001, won 34.3% of the votes (363 seats in a Parliament of 550 
seats), surpassing a two-thirds majority. The Kemalist CHP won 19.4% 
(178 seats),22 while former governing parties and opposition parties did not 
reach the 10% threshold.
In the first six months, Abdullah Gül was the head of government, 
as Erdoğan could not stand for election due to a ban imposed on him, and 
therefore could not become Prime Minister. He came to hold the post in 
March 2003, having taken over a seat which had fallen vacant.
The AKP identified itself as a conservative democratic party, i.e. it aban-
doned the approach of former Islamist parties. Ideologically, its programme 
hardly differed from those of other centre-right parties. Its programmes – the 
20 Sunier–Landman 2015, 35.
21 Öniş 2015.
22 Nine independent MPs were also elected.
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Development and Democracy Programme, the election programme of 2002, 
“Everything is for Turkey” (Herşey Türkiye İçin) and the programme of 
2007 “To Many Bright Years” (Nice Ak Yıllara) – affirmed its commitment 
to democracy, human rights, the rule of law, pluralism and respect for diversity. 
The republic was regarded as a key achievement of the nation and Atatürk’s 
reforms as positive measures that contributed to social development.23
The AKP regarded the will of the people as the single determinant 
power, but (as opposed to the Refah) embraced the pluralist approach to 
democracy rather than the majority approach. It also affirmed its commit-
ment to the freedom of expression and the free practice of religion, which 
differed markedly from the approach of the former Islamist parties.
The AKP’s approach was distinct from the religious concept with regard 
to secularism as well. It regarded Islam as a fundamental institution of social 
life, yet deemed that the free practice of religion – manifested in secular-
ism – is a basic element of democracy. It came up with a new interpretation 
of secularism when, instead of the assertive interpretation of Kemalism, it 
opted for a passive interpretation according to which the state should not 
interfere with religion and the role of the Presidency of Religious Affairs 
(Diyanet) should be reconsidered. But supporters of traditional secularism 
were concerned that the AKP differed from traditional Islamist parties only 
in its rhetoric, while its long-term (and, for the time being, concealed) goal 
was to introduce an Islam-based state and the sharia.
Initially, the AKP gave priority to the objectives of democratisation 
and the promotion of the EU accession, which were interrelated, given 
that the EU required democratic reforms, and external obligations made 
implementation easier for the AKP.
Democratisation entailed constitutional amendments. In 2002, a minor 
amendment was implemented with the cooperation of the CHP.24 In 2004, 
a major amendment was adopted: death penalty was abolished, the internal 
legal status of international agreements was strengthened, the State Security 
Courts (criticised by the European Court of Human Rights) were abolished, 
the Court of Auditors became entitled to supervise the military, and the 
23 Hale–Özbudun 2010, 21.
24 The Constitution stipulates that persons convicted of ideological and anarchistic 
activities shall not be elected representatives. This provision excluded Erdoğan as he 
had been convicted because of reciting a poem, which qualified as such an activity. 
An amendment ensured that this provision pertains to terrorism, which allowed for 
Erdoğan’s political rehabilitation (Hale–Özbudun 2010, 55).
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representatives of the army lost their right to control higher education. Though 
the equality of women had already been enshrined in the Constitution, the 
new amendment called on the state to implement it in practice.
To ensure compliance with the Copenhagen criteria, more packages of 
legal harmonisation were adopted between 2001 and 2004.25 The packages 
entailed the approximation of laws to the amended Constitution, and the 
implementation of many other reforms that were significant in themselves. 
Restrictions of the freedom of expression were eased, albeit in some cases 
this entailed only minor amendments (e.g. in case of a prison sentence for 
degrading the state or public institutions, a reduction of penalties). In case 
of incitation to hatred, the scope of the factual background was narrowed 
down: criticism, provided that it was not an insult, ceased to constitute 
a criminal offence.
Turkey’s anti-terror law has also been widely criticised in Europe for 
allowing severe penalties for acts interpreted very broadly. In that case, the 
reduction of penalties was accompanied by attempts to give a more exact 
definition of “terrorist activity”. As for measures restricting freedom of 
the press, the scope of judicial approval was extended, and the opportunity 
for keeping sources of information secret was introduced. The law on the 
establishment and operation of organisations was replaced with a much more 
liberal act. The opportunities to restrict freedom of assembly were reduced, 
too. Non-Muslim religious communities became entitled to acquire property 
and construct buildings for religious purposes (both subject to prior author-
isation). Turkey was often criticised for torture and inhumane treatment; in 
that area, an opportunity was created to sanction public officers who commit 
such acts. Another, yet more fundamental change was the authorisation of 
the use of minority languages in radio and television programmes, which 
affected, above all, the use of the Kurdish language. Teaching of the Kurdish 
language was authorised, albeit outside public education.
Another key area was the army’s role. The scope and influence of the 
National Security Council, a body dominated by the military, was signif-
icantly reduced. It became possible to appoint a civilian officer (not only 
a senior military officer) as Secretary General, and, from 2004 onwards, 
civilians have also been entitled to hold the post.
25 Some of the decisions were made by the coalition government, before the AKP’s coming 
to power.
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The new legislature, dominated by the AKP, compiled a new Civil 
Code and Criminal Code. The Civil Code provided for the equal rights of 
female spouses in marriage. The criminal acts of genocide, crime against 
humanity, trafficking in human beings and environmental crimes were 
included in the Criminal Code. The penalties for certain criminal acts (e.g. 
blood feud) were increased, while the penalty for insulting the president of 
the republic was reduced.26
The period from 2002 to 2005 was characterised by euphoria27 as the 
basic political changes were unfolding. The new government focussed on 
the economic problems, and, to ensure the success of the reforms, tried 
to counterbalance political polarisation. In 2005, accession negotiations 
started with the EU. The economy had recovered, and entered into a phase 
of dynamic growth. The Islamist takeover, which raised serious concerns in 
many, seemed to be a success story; Erdoğan won the trust of the majority of 
the secular citizens as well. However, by the end of 2005, the AKP had lost 
its momentum in the field of reforms and democratisation. There are several 
possible reasons for that. The accession negotiations started in 2005, which 
meant that there was no need for further urgent measures. Also, negotiations 
were faltering because of the Cyprus debate, while the ambivalent attitude 
of several European heads of states (Merkel, Sarkozy) towards Turkey’s 
accession also added to the emerging anti-EU sentiment in Turkey.
Besides the reforms called for by the EU, the AKP made attempts to 
implement its own plans as well. The measures related to the situation of 
Islam reflect, on the one hand, a re-interpretation of the Islam’s role in the 
society and, on the other hand, the AKP’s pragmatism. In 2004, the AKP 
tried to improve the situation of the citizens who graduated from Imam 
Hatip schools. Ahmet Sezer, President of the Republic,28 and the Chief of 
Staff of the Army made decisive moves against the initiative, and, eventu-
ally, the AKP decided to drop the initiative. The issue of the prosecution 
of adultery also generated a heated debate. Again, it was strong European 
pressure that made the decision-makers refrain from including adultery – an 
act included in the old Criminal Code – in the new Criminal Code. The 
26 Hale–Özbudun 2010, 62.
27 Sunier–Landman 2015, 34.
28 Formerly, Ahmet Sezer was the President of the Constitutional Court, and was determi-
ned to preserve the Kemalist secular model. As President of the Republic, he prevented 
the implementation of several AKP initiatives.
Islam in Turkey’s Policy 41
headscarf controversy was another highly politicised issue. It had been on the 
agenda since the 1980s; yet the ANAP’s attempts at liberalisation (allowing 
women to wear headscarves at universities) were rejected by the secular 
forces. In their interpretation, secularisation equalled the ban of wearing 
religious symbols in public. During its first term, the AKP did not initiate 
the abolition of the ban. As Erdoğan put it, there was a social consensus 
about the abolition, yet institutional consensus was lacking. As evidenced 
by surveys, more than 70% of the respondents supported the abolition of the 
ban, while the CHP, the army and the Constitutional Court were against it.29
As far as the Kurdish issue was concerned, the AKP adopted a more 
open and positive attitude towards the Kurds. However, due to institutional 
resistance (above all, on the part of the army) and the fear of losing the sup-
port of Turkish voters with a stronger sense of national identity, no radical 
changes took place. Yet even minor, symbolic gestures increased tensions 
between the government and the army.
The army is not a monolithic institution; the relations between the 
government and the army were highly dependent on the Chief of Staff. From 
2002 to 2006, General Hilmi Özkök took a moderate approach, and avoided 
conflicts with the government.30 Even so, delicate situations occurred. For 
instance, with regard to the Cyprus issue, the military was concerned about 
the potential dangers of the AKP’s more cooperative policy. Again, the army 
backed down.31 In 2006, General Yaşar Büyükanıt was appointed Chief of 
Staff. He represented the army’s traditional approach more markedly: he 
openly criticised the government’s policy, above all, regarding the Kurdish 
issue. The debate on the presidential elections also exacerbated the conflict.
The debate focussed on the presidential elections and on the reforms of the 
political regime started in Spring 2007. The AKP proposed that the President 
of the Republic be elected directly, by the people (and thus, the position of the 
President be strengthened). The establishment of a presidential republic based 
on the American model was not Erdoğan’s idea; it was supported formerly by 
Turgut Özal and Süleyman Demirel. It was not only the method of presiden-
tial elections that generated debates, but the person of the president as well 
29 Hale–Özbudun 2010, 72.
30 Hale–Özbudun 2010, 83.
31 In fact, as it became evident later, military officers planned a coup to prevent the imp-
lementation of the Annan Plan. The coup, however, was rendered unnecessary when 
Greek Cypriots rejected the plan (Hale–Özbudun 2010, 89).
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(the AKP nominated Abdullah Gül). The army strongly opposed the idea, 
and indicated that, if necessary, it was willing to intervene to ensure a secular 
state. The threat backfired: it provoked the disapproval of not only the public 
opinion and parties in Turkey, but of the EU as well. After the elections of 
July 2007, the AKP grew stronger. In August, Abdullah Gül was elected 
President of the Republic. The representatives of the army, in protest, did 
not participate in the inaugural ceremony, yet afterwards they voiced their 
opinion in political matters less frequently. Erdoğan’s visit to Washington 
in November 2007 improved the relations. He succeeded in ensuring that 
Turkish troops may take action against the PKK in northern Iraq, which 
had long been an aspiration of military leaders.32
The polarisation between the parties intensified; the headscarf debate 
and the debates over the person of the President of the Republic deepened 
divisions.
2.2.2. The AKP re-elected (2007–2011)
The elections of 2007 were pulled forward from November to July due to the 
crisis that evolved around the nomination of the President of the Republic. 
The AKP won 46.6% of the votes (341 seats), which meant another two-thirds 
majority in the legislature of 550 members. The CHP became the biggest 
opposition party (20.9%, 112 seats), while the right-wing MHP win 14.3% 
(71 seats). Moreover, 22 independent representatives were elected, the majo-
rity of whom were Kurdish and left-wing politicians. The AKP – despite 
losing some of its mandates – won a remarkable victory. Regardless of the 
political attacks, 46% of the population voted for the AKP, which demonst-
rated a support that was much higher than in 2002 (34%), and, therefore, 
was more convincing. In many respects, the AKP could feel secure, as it 
had managed to consolidate its position. Still, secular forces (above all, the 
army) viewed the AKP with suspicion, and a military intervention – similar 
to those that had taken place in the previous decades – could not be ruled 
out. Yet the probability of an intervention was lower given that it would 
have been an attempt to remove from power a stable governing force with 
32 Hale–Özbudun 2010, 92. In 2008, İlker Başbuğ was appointed Chief of Staff. He 
intended to re-establish the prestige of the army; to this end, he also avoided open 
conflicts with the government.
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wide legitimation rather than a political leadership plunging into chaos. 
Consequently, the AKP intended to reduce the army’s influence and put 
their own people in high positions.
To counteract military intervention, the AKP made attempts from the 
beginning of the parliamentary term to compromise the army. During the 
Ergenekon (the mythical Turkish place of origin) and Balyoz (Sledgehammer) 
cases, senior military officers (some retired, some active) were accused of 
attempting to stir up chaos to destabilise the political situation and seize 
power. The conspiracy theory “deep state” (derin devlet) had become pop-
ular in the society as early as in the 1980s. It holds that certain forces are 
embedded in the public administration and the economy and, to ensure 
that their goals are achieved, attempt to destabilise the political system.33 
Hundreds of persons – mainly military officers – were detained with such 
accusations, which evidenced that the military was no longer “untouchable”.
In the meantime, the secular forces were not standing idly by. In spring 
2008, they initiated a procedure against the AKP on charges of unconsti-
tutional activity in the context of the headscarf debate. The allegation had 
a number of shortcomings, as the AKP would have been banned for a meas-
ure it took in the Parliament, with a majority required for constitutional 
amendments, and in agreement with other parliamentary parties. Eventually, 
only 6 of the 11 judges of the Constitutional Court supported the ban of the 
AKP. The adoption of the ban would have required a qualified majority of 
60% (at least 7 judges); so the AKP avoided the ban, but its state subsidies 
were temporarily withdrawn, and some of its assets frozen.34
In the meantime, the AKP continued its constitutional reforms. The 
opposition party CHP regarded some reform measures as contradicting 
the principles of the republic, and appealed to the Constitutional Court. 
The Court, however, found that a substantial part of the measures were 
acceptable. No two-thirds majority was achieved in the Parliament (only 
60%); a referendum was called, where the amendment of the Constitution 
was adopted with a majority of 58%.
Pursuant to the amendment, the article providing for the immunity of 
the leaders of the previous coup was removed from the Constitution of 1980; 
therefore, the cases of military officers who performed or arranged the coup 
could be brought before a civilian court. As for trade union rights and 
33 Egeresi 2013.
34 Hale–Özbudun 2010, 75.
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the right to strike, several restrictions were abolished. Amendments were 
made concerning personal rights (e.g. the institution of the ombudsman 
was introduced, and the constitutional guarantee of equality before the law 
was strengthened). The Constitutional Court was restructured, the system 
of the judges’ election was modified, and the Court’s operation was made 
more democratic. To ensure the independence of the judiciary, other forums 
of the judicial system were also reformed: there remained less opportunity 
for the government to influence the judges’ work. Moreover, the consti-
tutional amendment served the AKP’s direct interests, making the ban of 
parties more difficult (a constant threat for Islamist parties) and reforming 
the powers of the Supreme Court (yet another threat).35
However, the impact of the 2009 ruling of the Constitutional Court 
was still tangible, as the AKP continued to see it as a threat of a possible 
strike from the traditional Kemalist elite. By the end of the 2010, the AKP 
had succeeded in “pacifying” the two biggest threats (the military and the 
judiciary36), making further steps to monopolise power.
2.2.3. The AKP in a hybrid democracy (2011–)
In the elections of 2011, the AKP boosted the support it received. It won 
49.8% of the votes; however, the 327 seats were not enough to secure a two-
thirds majority or even 60%, a majority required for certain decisions. The 
bigger opposition party (CHP) increased the number of its voters: it won 
26% of the votes (135 seats); the nationalist MHP party won 13% of the 
votes (53 seats). Thirty-five mandates were obtained by independent rep-
resentatives (mainly Kurdish members of the BDP). The growing support 
for the AKP was very much attributable to the economic recovery that 
followed the crisis of 2008.
By that time, it had become evident that the former democracy-oriented 
changes would not continue and that the AKP and its leader, Erdoğan had 
shifted towards a “hybrid democracy”, “illiberal democracy” or “competitive 
authoritarianism”.37 This was reflected by several elements in the Turkish 
political system. The AKP gradually monopolised power, offering but 
35 Waldman–Caliskan 2017, 102.
36 Esen–Gumuscu 2016, 1585.
37 Önis 2015, 25; Esen–Gumuscu 2016, 1582.
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few opportunities for the opposition to represent contrasting viewpoints, 
curbed the freedom of the media, put the judiciary system under pressure, 
and channelled public resources unilaterally to pro-government business 
groups. Although the electoral system was free, the government, again, 
modified the rules according to its own interests. It did not manipulate the 
results directly, yet during the election campaigns, the effects of unequal 
access to campaign funds and to media were becoming more distinct.38
The Gezi Park protests of 2013 constituted a new and surprising 
development. In a few days, the environmentally motivated action against 
construction works in the park transformed into a demonstration against the 
government with one million participants. A major cause of the escalation 
was that the government, over-reacting the situation, resorted to violent police 
action. Thus the protests developed into a demonstration against Erdoğan’s 
growing power and authoritarian style, marking a turning point in Turkey’s 
recent political history.39 On the one hand, it revealed a growing antipathy 
of the major part of the society to the activity of the government, which not 
only pertained to the evolving authoritarian methods, but also represented 
the discontent of pro-West young people with the AKP’s conservative 
programme. On the other hand, the protest was organised spontaneously, 
almost completely independent of official politics, and relied on the tools 
of social media. It was much later that the opposition parties attempted to 
join and draw political capital from the protest.40
December 2013 brought a new turn. Suspicions of corruption rose in 
connection with Erdoğan and some of his main allies, and evidence was 
found. Erdoğan attributed the attack to Fethullah Gülen and his adherents, 
and called for action against the “parallel state” and the Gulenists who, 
according to him, were embedded in public administration and served 
foreign interests.
The elections of 2015 were disappointing for the governing forces in many 
respects. The AKP – which by then had been in power for 13 years – won 
the elections of 7 June 2015 for the fourth time. Yet its victory was rather 
narrow. The result of 41% was significantly lower than four years before 
(50%), and brought only 268 seats in the Parliament of 550 members. This 
38 Esen–Gumuscu 2016, 1587.
39 Öniş 2015, 24.
40 In that regard, it resembled the Arab Spring, yet the environment – in spite of some 
similarities – was fundamentally different.
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meant that – as opposed to the previous elections – the AKP could not 
achieve even an absolute majority. For the first time in the history of the 
Turkish Republic, the left-wing HDP Party (representing the Kurds) could 
send representatives to the Parliament (13.1% of the votes, 80 seats). The 
two main opposition forces, the centre-left CHP and the national MHP 
won 25% of the votes (132 seats), and 16.3% (80 seats), respectively. Apart 
from the ailing economy, the AKP’s results were attributable to corruption 
scandals and the conflict with the Gulenist movement (initially a supporter 
of the AKP).
On the basis of the election results, the AKP would have needed to form 
a coalition. However, Turkey had rather unsettling experiences about coali-
tions, as the coalition governments of the 1990s had not been able to make 
efficient decisions, while Turkey had been lurching from crisis to crisis. 
Consequently, the AKP did not intend to share the power at all costs. It is 
no coincidence that the coalition negotiations proved to be unsuccessful 
in the end, and President Erdoğan41 called new elections for 1 November.
In the following months the AKP made attempts to get more support 
and gain absolute majority. Primarily, it wanted to achieve this goal through 
discrediting the HDP, when, after two years of calm, it made every effort to 
deteriorate the relations with the Kurds. Undoubtedly, equating the Kurds 
with terrorists was intended to sow uncertainty among the non-Kurd voters 
of the HDP and, thus, reduce the number of the seats of the HDP under the 
10% threshold. This was meant to increase the number of seats of the AKP 
and to attract some voters of the nationalist MHP. This policy, however, 
was rather risky as it re-opened one more front in a region already beset 
with many existing conflicts and contrasts.
Yet the elections repeated in November 2015 proved the success of the 
AKP’s policy. The AKP obtained 49.5% of the votes, which fell close to the 
record of 2011, yet the 317 seats won brought only a simple majority. The 
CHP, with its result of 25.4% (134 seats), maintained its position. The two 
other parties experienced a major drop: the MHP won 11.9% of the votes 
(40 seats), and the HDP 10.7% (59 seats).
The landmark event of 2016 was the unsuccessful coup attempt of 
15 July, followed by political cleansing. Some background factors of the 
coup are well-known; however, there are still some elements to be clarified. 
41 Erdoğan, in spite of being the President of the Republic, actively campaigned for the 
AKP.
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It is widely known that Turkey has a long-standing tradition of political 
intervention by the military: in the second half of the 20th century, there 
was a coup in almost every decade. The army, occasionally resorting to 
violence, undoubtedly played a stabilising role in the history of the modern 
Turkish statehood. But the coup attempt of 2016 was made in a relatively 
stable domestic situation, in the year after the elections where the governing 
AKP gained a convincing, stable majority. A military intervention may be 
due to instability or the endangered position of the secularised state – the 
latter happened in 1997, and many assumed the same in the initial phase of 
the current coup. Nevertheless, the official explanation clearly attributed the 
responsibility to the Gulenist movement which played a key role in public 
administration. According to the explanation, the Gulenist movement, in 
a reaction to the political actions made in the previous years to remove it 
from the political life, resorted, in a desperate attempt, to military takeover. 
Seemingly, scores were settled with the Gulenists in a planned manner, yet 
with unprecedented speed and thoroughness, making use of the unexpected 
option of an unsuccessful coup.
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Chapter 3  
Turkey’s Economy and the AKP’s Economic 
Policy
A success story of the last 15 years of the AKP, and a key to its long-lasting 
popularity was outstanding economic performance. The section below gives 
an insight into the background of the “Turkish miracle”, economic restruc-
turing and the AKP’s economic policy.
3.1. Crisis management and the economic “miracle”
In retrospect, the severity of the economic crisis of 2000–2001 proved to 
be an advantage as it gave the necessary impetus towards basic reforms. 
As a rule, previous crises had also been followed by plans for extensive 
reforms, but the implementation had been inefficient and the government 
had soon backed down.
The consequences of the crises of 2001 were addressed under Kemal 
Derviş, Minister for the Economy, after his visit to the World Bank, in the 
framework of the “Strong Economy Programme”.1 The Programme was 
intended to make Turkey’s economic governance transparent and rational. 
The AKP government continued to implement the plan elaborated in coop-
eration with the IMF; consequently, from a political perspective, the results 
pertained to them. And, in the first phase, the results were convincing.
The period from 2002 to 2007 was marked by an economic growth of 
more than 6% and dynamically expanding exports. The inflation rates, after 
a long time, had been normalised, the privatisation process was launched 
1 Strengthening the Turkish Economy. Turkey’s Transition Program (2001). Available: 
www.tcmb.gov.tr/wps/wcm/connect/c1e0d048-983a-4a2a-a2b5-a0c24089be91/streng-
teningecon.pdf?MOD=AJPERES&CACHEID=ROOTWORKSPACE-c1e0d048-983a-
4a2a-a2b5-a0c24089be91-m4ucbm9 (Accessed: 19 March 2020)
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and the FDI inflow was more than 10 billion dollars per year. All these 
developments indicated that at the beginning of the new millennium Turkey 
may finally be put on a stable growth path.
The success and the spectacular improvement of competitiveness are 
attributable to several reasons. The political environment had changed 
favourably: although the political institutional system had been strongly 
centralised in the previous years, the political divisions and the weak coa-
litions had undermined the consistent implementation of any economic 
programme. The new one-party government, set up in 2002 and backed by 
a two-thirds majority in the Parliament, could govern much more efficiently.
The strict fiscal and monetary policy, along with the flexible exchange rate 
regime boosted confidence in Turkey, which was reflected in the decreasing 
risk premium of government bonds. After the crisis of 1999, the stabilisation 
programme provided for a fixed exchange rate regime, which, however, 
lost its credibility in 2001, and was replaced with a floating exchange rate 
regime.2 This helped the Central Bank focus on price stability, which, again, 
produced positive results. After long decades of failed attempts, inflation 
was reduced to single-digit figures.
The implemented structural reforms (primarily, in the financial and 
the public sector) contributed much to the improvement of the operating 
conditions of the economy. An excessively costly bank resolution was 
performed; the public financial institutions were merged and streamlined, 
and, in part, privatised (e.g. Demirbank); increased reserve requirements 
were introduced for the banking sector, and other regulatory changes were 
implemented to urge the banks to merge and perform profile cleaning. Growth 
was generated by the private sector, while, due to a strict budgetary policy, 
consumption and investment decreased in the public sector.
Productivity increased significantly. Although the appreciation of 
the lira later eliminated the positive effects of the large-scale devaluation 
of 2001 on the export prices, the growth of productivity still ensured 
a favourable competitive position. Technology-intensive products of high 
added value (motor vehicles, electric and electronic products) became 
increasingly important in exports.
2 A gradual shift toward a more flexible exchange rate regime was planned, with the 
introduction of a progressively widening band, yet the financial crisis called for an 
immediate change. See Görmez–Yilmaz 2007, 25.
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After years of low levels of FDI inflow, 2005 brought about remarkably 
high rates. That year alone, an FDI of 19 billion dollars flowed to Turkey, 
primarily in the framework of the privatisation process;3 5 billion dollars 
of foreign capital was invested in Turkish private companies, in the banking 
sector or in the form of green-field investments. The relatively high level 
(approximately an annual 10 billion USD) of the capital flow persisted in 
the following years.4
The reforms were backed by an IMF Extended Credit Facility, and 
the growing political support from the EU was another key factor. In 2002, 
Turkey received assurance that its candidate status would be assessed within 
two years, which strengthened the EU’s position of influence and Turkey’s 
commitment to implement the reforms. The perspective of EU accession 
added to the strength of the reformist powers in Turkey, which was an 
achievement the IMF could never have secured, given that its requirements 
for reforms received less support and their effects were less permanent.
3.1.1. Economic restructuring
In recent decades, Turkey’s economic structure has undergone fundamental 
changes. The economic opening and the export-focussed strategy that rep-
laced import substitution industrialisation in the 1980s were based on the 
privately-owned manufacturing sector. By 2000, economic restructuring 
had mostly taken place. In the manufacturing sector, the rate of public added 
value decreased from 40% (in 1980) to 20% (in 2000). The share of the 
sector of large domestic corporations (mostly owned by cronies) decreased 
from 70% to 50%, while the share of SMEs and foreign-owned businesses 
was gradually increasing.
Nevertheless, no major growth took place in the 1990s. After a short 
period of acceleration, the rate of output and exports regularly slowed down 
and, due to the crises, decreased significantly.
3 It is to be noted that 72% of the FDI inflow was related to the privatisation process. 
55% of Türk Telekom was acquired for 6.6 billion dollars; the privatisation of TUPRAS 
(the public oil company) and Eregli Demir Celik (steel company) also generated 
exceedingly high revenues.
4 İzmen–Yilmaz 2009, 173.
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The post-2002 economic recovery was attributable to the improvement 
of the macroeconomic environment and, substantially, to the dynamic 
expansion of industrial production. Employment rates and real wages hardly 
increased, which led to growing productivity and improving competitive-
ness. Real depreciation and declining domestic demand (consequences of 
the crisis) also gave impetus to the dynamic expansion of exports. From 
2002 to 2007, the export to GDP ratio increased from 23.6% to 27.1%. The 
rate of exports was on the rise especially in the manufacturing sector; in 
2007, it was higher than 90% of the overall exports. The focus of exports 
shifted from low-technology products to medium/high-technology goods.
Traditionally, Turkish economy exported agricultural and textile prod-
ucts. The export rate in those sectors saw an impressive growth, especially 
after liberalisation in the 1980s. Turks residing in European countries played 
a key role in that regard, inasmuch as they took an active part in the estab-
lishment of trade relations and, quite frequently, with their capital taken 
back to Turkey, in the construction of manufacturing plants.
Though those traditional sectors remained a major factor in terms of 
exports, the most dynamic development of the previous years had occurred 
in the manufacturing of electronic devices and motor vehicles. Several mul-
tinational car manufacturers (Ford, Renault, Fiat, Hyundai, Toyota, Honda, 
Opel, Mercedes, MAN) relocated a part of their production capacity to 
Turkey, as the customs union agreement allowed them export their products 
to the European internal market freely. The production and export of buses 
were further determining factors; in that sector, domestic brands (Otokar, 
BMC, Temsa) were dominant. The annual growth rate of the automotive 
industry was 43% between 2002 and 2004 (four times higher than the average 
rate in the manufacturing industry), while its share in exports rose from 
9% to 14% in the same period. The automotive industry had become one 
of the main drivers of Turkey’s economy. In 2007, the number of workers 
employed directly in the sector was over 80,000. The industry was com-
pletely integrated into the production chains of the European automotive 
industry, which, again, was attributable to the customs union. The Turkish 
automotive sector could boast not only of its export performance, but also 
of the fact that its suppliers’ networks were getting closely linked to Turkey. 
It was one of the reasons for rapid increase in production after 2001.5
5 Taymaz–Voyvoda 2009, 165.
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In consumer electronics manufacturing, dynamic development took 
place especially in the home appliance sector, where domestic brands (Vestel, 
Beko) represented Turkish production. In the same period, a growth of 35% 
was measured in the sector of consumer electronic goods, while the share of 
exports rose to 5%. In that sector, big manufacturers tended to rely less on 
Turkish suppliers. In the 1990s, Turkey started producing colour television 
sets; in 2005, 65% of the television sets sold in Europe were manufactured in 
Turkey.6 That rate, however, is gradually decreasing as a result of the spread 
of LCDs and the deteriorating conditions in the sector. Due to dependence 
on imports, technological shift entails more difficulties.
3.1.2. The crisis of 2008–2009
Due to the reforms implemented in the previous years, Turkey’s economy 
was in a relatively good condition when the crisis hit. The growth rate had 
been high for years, the primary balance of the budget was positive and 
the public debt was low. Coupled with a moderate inflation rate, all these 
factors reflected a healthy economy. The first shock waves of the sub-prime 
crisis left the banking system unaffected.
At the end of 2008, the Turkish head of government informed the 
public that Turkey was strong enough, and a global crisis would, at most, 
have minor effects.7 Reality, however, did not fall in line with that. From 
October 2008 to March 2009, the lira depreciated by 25%, and the interest 
rate of government bonds increased to around 25%. By early 2009, the stock 
market had fallen to a level of 55% of its level in July 2007.8 Compared to 
the fast growth of the previous years, Turkey’s economic performance had 
slowed down as early as in 2007, but it did not turn negative until Q4 of 
2008 (–6.8%).A major decline, however, set in in Q1 of 2009, when the rate 
of shrinkage reached –14.3% compared to Q1 of 2008. In Q2, contraction 
6 It was easier to launch the manufacturing of products of tried and tested technology than 
of LCD- or plasma-screens, which represented a new technology. The anti-dumping 
measures taken by the EU against producers in the Far East also reinforced Turkey’s 
position. 
7 It was not until March 2009 that the GDP growth projection for 2009 (4%) was modi-
fied to –3.4%. See Uygur 2010, 48.
8 The rates were more or less similar on other emerging markets (e.g. Brazil, South 
Korea, Poland, Hungary).
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started to slow down, but the annual GDP contraction rate of 4.7% remained 
above the average contraction rate of developing countries with a similar 
level of development (2.4%).9 Recession set in with a decline in external 
demand.10 Later, internal demand started to decrease, too; consumption in 
the private sector and investments fell,11 and the increase of public spending 
was not sufficient to counterbalance the effects.
Unlike before, the banking system was hardly affected by the 2008 crisis, 
which was attributable to the consolidation of 2001–2002 and the introduction 
of strict regulations. The capital adequacy ratio of the Turkish banking 
system was 19%.12 The banks’ holdings of government bonds decreased, 
while the focus shifted to domestic corporate lending. Though the rate of 
outstanding loans increased slightly during the crisis,13 confidence in the 
banking system persisted, and the share prices of the Turkish banks, after 
a temporary fall, continued to rise even in the crisis years.
The government delayed in addressing the crisis. In fact, that type 
of crisis was unknown to the Turkish Government, which had previously 
experienced crises provoked by internal imbalances. By contrast, during 
the crisis of 2008–2009, the central problem was posed by the decline of 
external demand and diminished external funding opportunities.
The government, having taken some minor measures, launched two 
major economic recovery packages in June 2009. The budgetary implications 
of the intervention amounted to 2.1% and 1.6% of the GDP in 2009 and 
in 2010, respectively. The aim was to stimulate demand, but interventions 
were made on the supply side as well. On the demand side, measures were 
intended, above all, to boost consumption. Consumption taxes were reduced. 
Between March and September 2009, attempts were made to increase domestic 
demand through a reduction of consumption taxes on consumer durables; 
however, 70% of the purchased goods were imported products.14 Due to its 
budgetary implications, the measure was not sustainable in the long run.
9 Erzan 2010.
10 Exports fell by 34% in Q4 of 2008, then by another 20% in Q1 and Q2 of 2009, and 
then by 36%.
11 In Q1 of 2009, consumption and investments fell by 10% and 35%, respectively. See 
Yalcin 2012.
12 The ratio remained well above the Basel III level (12%).
13 Between 2007 and 2009, from 3.5% to 5.3%, which, however, is almost negligible if 
compared to the value in 2002 (21.2%).
14 Uygur 2010, 49.
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To generate demand, the government offered SMEs a credit support 
of 3–5% and two-year loan guarantees for 65% of the loan amount, thus 
contributing to the expansion of production and export opportunities. In 
addition, the corporate income tax was reduced,15 and, in certain sectors 
(chemical industry, automotive industry, the energy sector, transport, agricul-
ture), special incentives were introduced. Public expenditure was increased 
in the energy, transport and healthcare sectors. To encourage investment, 
public buildings were offered free of charge, and financial and regulatory 
tools were applied. It was also decided that the pace of privatisation should 
be accelerated in the banking, telecommunications and energy sectors. To 
counteract the loss of financial resources, tax amnesty was granted for assets 
located abroad, along with tax exemption for foreign income.
In parallel with fiscal expansion, monetary policy also became expansive 
in nature. From November 2008 to September 2009, the Central Bank base 
rate was reduced from 16.75% to 7.25%. The dividend payment opportu-
nities of the banks were reduced, which strengthened the capital structure 
of the banks.
To address the problems arising from the global economic crisis of 
2008–2009, the idea of applying for IMF financial assistance was consid-
ered, like in case of other emerging markets (such as Hungary) that faced 
problems. The Turkish Government, however, attempted to avoid seeking 
IMF assistance for various reasons. By 2008, Turkey had been in constant 
contact with the IMF for 10 years, and the last agreement of 10 billion 
dollars expired in May 2008. According to contemporary official Turkish 
comments, Turkey had grown up, and no longer needed help with sustaining 
the economic balance, because it had learned its lessons.16 The fact that 
Turkey coped without IMF assistance affected the perception of Turkey’s 
economy negatively in the short run, but its overall influence proved to be 
positive. Obviously, this required a strict fiscal policy that entailed austerity 
measures which were similar to those of the IMF package, although, in 
many cases, laid emphasis on other areas.
In terms of the impacts of the global economic crisis, countries can be 
divided into various categories, Turkey belonging to the group of countries 
that underwent a major decline, and bounced back to return to a fast pace 
of growth. The question arises as to whether Turkey, located on the fringes 
15 By 2–10%; the rates differed per region.
16 Turhan 2010.
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of Europe, has indeed “grown up” and is capable of a fast economic growth 
in a manner that sets it apart from crisis-hit Europe and resembles to the 
growth of countries of the Far East, or it will return to a path of develop-
ment which is dependent on the European centre and reflects the changes 
of Europe’s economy with major oscillations.
3.1.3. Perspectives
Despite its rapid growth in the 2000s, Turkey’s international competitive-
ness still falls short of expectations. With the integration of China and India 
into the global economy, Turkey could no longer rely on cheap labour force 
as a basis of its strategy to improve competitiveness. The improvement of 
competitiveness requires the introduction of efficient market mechanisms, 
an attractive investment climate and institutional structures.17
Although the growth prospective is still favourable (around 3%) if 
compared to the performance of the EU member states, some see in Turkey’s 
economy the signs of the “middle-income trap” of emerging countries. To 
escape the trap, Turkey will need to implement further major structural 
reforms and focus more on research development or on increasing the rate 
of export products of higher added value.
Turkey is very much aware of the danger. As Mehmet Şimşek, Turkey’s 
Minister of Economy pointed out in his article published in Wall Street 
Journal,18 Turkey, despite its rapid progress, still faces many challenges, 
and has a lot to do if it wishes to emerge from the group of middle-income 
countries. Success requires adequate economic policies, additional structural 
reforms and a supportive global economic environment. The top priority 
of the reforms is enhancing the quality of the workforce via improving 
the quality of education, increasing labour-market flexibility and boosting 
productivity through technological advancement.
The AKP’s popularity is closely tied to the economic successes of the 
2000s; therefore, upkeeping a high growth rate is a priority of Turkey’s 
economic policy. In the last decade, Turkish economy has made a spec-
tacular progress if compared either to its own former performance or the 
17 Turkish Industrial 2010.
18 Şimşek 2014.
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performance of other countries in the region.19 While from 2002 to 2007 the 
average GDP growth was 6.8%, it slowed down to 3.2% between 2008 and 
2014 due to the crisis and the post-2012 deceleration of growth.20 However, 
changes in the methodology of GDP calculation (introduced at the end of 
2016) changed data retroactively, defining, as a rule, much higher values for 
the post-2012 period. Consequently, the average annual economic growth 
between 2012 and 2015 grew from 3.3% to 6.1%, which made Turkey one of 
the most dynamically developing countries of the world.
Yet even when calculated with the new method, the GDP growth rate of 
2016 fell to 2.1%. The official unemployment rate was 11.3%, which shows 
an increase. The current account deficit was 6–8%, which reflects Turkey’s 
excessive demand for external funds and, consequently, its vulnerability. In 
2016, the lira was depreciated against the dollar by 20%. To generate growth, 
before the elections Erdoğan attempted to exert political pressure on Turkey’s 
Central Bank to reduce the interest rate and thus boost economy. Though 
Erdem Başçi, President of the Central Bank resisted the pressures to impose 
measures of monetary easing, investors did not particularly welcome the 
attempts to exert political influence.
In 2016, Turkey, with its GDP of 860 billion dollars, was the 17th biggest 
economy (or the 15th, if measured in purchasing power parities). Its exports 
amounted to 150 billion dollars, putting it to the 28th place in global ranking. 
As per development plans, by 2023 (the 100th anniversary of the establishment 
of the Republic), Turkey would generate a GDP of 2,000 billion dollars and 
rank as the 10th biggest economy of the world, and its exports would reach 
500 billion dollars. By now, it is evident that these goals are not realistic.
The long-term vision of the Turkish Industrial Strategy Document is 
becoming the production base of Eurasia in high-tech products, a country 
which produces and exports vehicles, airplanes, ships and satellites at the 
national level. Furthermore, the strategy sets out the general objective of 
“increasing the competitiveness and efficiency of Turkish industry and expe-
diting the transformation to an industry structure which has more share in 
world exports, where mainly high-tech products with high added value are 
produced, which has qualified labor and which at the same time is sensitive 
19 Öniş–Kutlay 2013, 1415.
20 For more details on the reasons, see Yilmaz et al. 2017. The underlying reason for the 
changes was that Turkey applied the UN and EU recommendations on calculation more 
consistently, and introduced more exact data collection methods.
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to the environment and the society.”21 Strategic goals include increasing the 
weight of enterprises and high-tech sectors and transition to high added value 
products in low-tech sectors.
The strategy defined eight industrial policy areas: investment and business 
environment; international trade; human resources development; extending 
the financial opportunities of SMEs; the technological development of com-
panies; infrastructure sectors (telecommunications, energy or transport); 
environmental protection; and regional development. Priority sectors include 
the automotive industry, machine manufacturing, household appliances, the 
electronics sector, the textiles and clothing sector, food industry, and iron 
and steel industry.
The development of relations with the EU may play a key role in that 
regard. In the early 2000s, the EU was the engine of Turkey’s economic 
reforms. Turkey, “opening to the West”, has recently intensified its commercial 
and economic contacts with countries in the region (e.g. Russia, Iraq, Syria), 
but the developments of recent years have had an unfavourable effect on the 
relations, which means that Turkey may again attach a high value on the EU.
In the meantime, Turkey’s geopolitical weight and role was also growing. 
It is a hub in the energy sector (especially with regard to the gas supply of 
Europe) and “the epitome of the Muslim state”, whose economic success and 
democratic structures may serve as a positive example for other countries 
in the region. The big question is how the outcomes of the recent elections 
will transform Turkey’s political life in the next few years and whether the 
weakened governing force will be able to respond to the challenges efficiently.
Severe problems may arise with regard to capital flows. Turkey’s rapid 
economic growth of the last 15 years has mostly been attributable to the 
inflow of foreign capital. The deficit of the current account was persistently 
above 5%. FDI used to play a key role in funding the deficit, as in the early 
2000s – partly due to the start of the EU accession negotiations – Turkey 
became an attractive location for investment for multinational corporations. 
By contrast, in recent years, due to the crises of the European economies and 
the deteriorating political and economic conditions in Turkey, FDI has gradu-
ally been replaced by “hot capital” type of portfolio investments, which was 
made possible by the fact that Turkey kept the interest rates high. This form 
of funding, however, is rather insecure and volatile; the fall of the currency 
rate and negative credit rating may affect the cost of funding unfavourably.
21 TISD 2010, 49.
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3.2. The AKP’s economic concept
To what extent did the AKP’s economic policy fall in line with the Islam 
and what are the considerations that determine the economic approach of 
Turkey’s governing forces?
It is difficult to give a concise summary of the economic theory of Islam. 
Firstly, because Islam is a very complex phenomenon and secondly, because 
its experts of theory often fail to come to agreement even in terms of basic 
principles. In the modern era, only a few attempts were made to put theory 
into practice. Pakistan and some Arab states of the Persian Gulf made such 
attempts, and Iran tried to set its economy completely on the foundation of Islam.
From the very beginning, Islam has not acted as a mere religion, but 
intended to be an extensive organising principle of society and regulate the 
operating principles of the economy as well. Fundamentalist movements, 
which promote the rebirth of Islam, the restoration of its original, pure state 
and cleansing it from external additions, derive the principles of right econ-
omy from the theory of Islam. Yet as works on the subject are mainly written 
by experts of Islamic law and religion, they normally discuss the legal and 
ethical system, but do not offer a coherent economic model.
Islamic fundamentalism itself is a possible response to the challenge 
posed by European civilisation. In the 19th-century Islamic world, two main 
reform movements evolved: modernism and fundamentalism. Modernism 
adopted Western models (democracy, capitalism, socialism) in an attempt to 
make the region – which had been “stagnating” for centuries – prosper again.
As for Islamic fundamentalism, it is not a conservative movement inas-
much as it proposes urgent social and economic changes. Undoubtedly, it is 
a tradition-focussed reform movement that sees reforms as measures to be 
implemented through returning to the original principles.
Islamic theory of economy defines itself as a third way besides capita-
lism and Marxism. As fundamentalist authors often point out,22 capitalism 
and Marxism push “the human factor” into the background. When criticising 
capitalism, such authors rely on Marxist criticism, claiming that property 
rights are unrestricted, and the individual’s interests overrule the commu-
nity’s interests, etc., yet they also reject the overemphasised materialism of 
22 A key work is Ma’rakat al-Islam wa’l-Ra’s Maliyya (The Battle between Islam and 
Capitalism), written in 1951 by Sayyid Qutb, the most influential ideologist of Islamic 
fundamentalism.
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Marxism. Their key counterargument is that neither capitalism nor Marxism 
could be implemented in the Islamic world, as neither of them fall in line with 
the development of Islam.
The economic theory of Islam is a set of social and economic principles 
required for the establishment of a just society; many of them have been 
formulated as a reaction against modern Western economic policies. They 
include, but are not limited to the followings.
Property rights are recognised as justified23 and are strongly protected. 
But there is more to property rights than that, as property must be used in 
a manner that ensures benefit not only for the owner but for the whole com-
munity as well. Property must not be destroyed or abused.
Production is determined by consumption. There are three main cate-
gories of consumption: basic consumption, consumption to improve living 
conditions and luxury consumption. The latter is shunned: “He does not love 
the wasteful.”24
Redistribution and the state play an important role in ensuring social 
equality and justice.
As evident from the above, the principles resemble to the Keynesian 
concepts: the state has an active role to play in the economy, and it can (and, 
in certain cases, must) intervene to ensure public good. Economy is basically 
determined by demand, and efforts are made to achieve full employment.
Yet, as far as the active role of the state is concerned, opinions differ. 
Tradition holds that when the Prophet Muhammad was asked to set prices for 
overpriced products, he refused, as “only Allah governs the market”.25 However, 
in the 1960s and 1970s, most developing countries attributed significance to 
active state intervention, and the ideology of socialism was popular in Muslim 
countries as well. As social justice indeed plays a prominent role in the Quran, 
many modernist Muslim intellectuals identify it with the promises of social-
ism. In fact, the Quran does not corroborate the idea of Islamic socialism: it 
accepts the differences between the rich and the poor, and supports the right 
to property and inheritance of property. Rather, it emphasises the requirement 
to support those in need, which, at the institutional level, does not necessarily 
take the form of redistribution by the state, but rather of zakat, or giving to 
charity a certain part of one’s property.
23 With the exception of natural resources, e.g. forests, rivers or mineral reserves.
24 Quran 6, 141.
25 Akyol 2006.
Turkey’s Economy and the AKP’s Economic Policy 61
Still, there is strong resistance against the free market and capitalism 
in the Islamic world. Anti-capitalist rhetoric, which is popular in radical 
Muslim circles, criticises, above all, sexual libertinage, prostitution, drug 
abuse, crime and, in general, the selfishness of Western societies. Doing 
so, however, it does not attack the foundations of capitalism, but a “cultural 
mechanism” that is a growing feature of developed capitalist states. In this 
sense, Muslims regard capitalism and materialism as synonyms.
Islam in Turkey assumes distinct characteristics. More specifically, 
the AKP – as opposed to the attitude of former Turkish Islamist parties 
towards economy – put increased emphasis on strengthening the private 
sector (and, within that, businesses) and claimed that state intervention 
should seek, above all, the establishment of conditions and environments 
that are conducive to competitiveness.
Another new factor was that the AKP did not envisage a protectionist 
policy that protects domestic entrepreneurs from external competition at 
all costs, but regarded economic integration as a key to the future.
In contrast with many radical Islamist movements, the AKP does not 
reject a Western-type path of modernisation and retains several elements 
of the Kemalist heritage (e.g. Turkish nationalism) as decisive factors of 
its ideology. Given that a big majority of AKP voters are beneficiaries of 
globalisation, the AKP regards globalisation as an opportunity rather than 
a process that threatens its identity. This was reflected in the economic 
policy of the Islamist forces as well.
The AKP’s programme prioritised economic growth and restructuration 
entailing, among others, the enhancement of investment environment, so it 
may be concluded that the new Turkish policy focussed on competitiveness.
Ünay examines the previous era of Turkish development from the 
perspective of the competition state,26 which entails shifts from inflationary 
expansionism to neoliberal monetarism, from macroeconomic to microe-
conomic governance, from extensive interventionism to strategic targeting, 
from the maximisation of welfare to innovation and profitability, and from 
geostrategy and national security to economic diplomacy and market share.
After the 2000s, the post-Washington competition factors became 
stronger. The reforms of the 1980s failed as a result of a premature financial 
liberalisation and the lack of fiscal discipline. The reforms of the Özal era were 
often based on direct governmental intervention to bypass the legislature, 
26 Ünay 2012.
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which exerted a negative influence on financial discipline. To ensure growth, 
even monetary easing was regarded as acceptable, but high inflation rates 
dramatically deteriorated growth potential in the long run. From the second 
half of the 1990s onwards, the double external pressure exerted by the EU 
and the IMF forced the implementation of several institutional reforms in 
Turkey, under which the Central Bank became independent, and the control 
of banks and competition was strengthened.
Microeconomic interventions were most spectacular in the fields of 
regulation, industrial policy and employment policy. Initially, there was 
a lack of a clear industrial policy vision. Besides external influence (EU, 
IMF, WTO), this was another reason why economic aid was mainly based 
on a sectorally neutral, horizontal policy. As Ünay puts it, the targeting of 
the industrial development strategy is still in an initial phase, albeit recent 
years have seen a shift in that regard.27 According to Yilmaz, an industrial 
policy is successful only if it is selective and supports specific sectors.28 
That is the basis of the economic success of Japan, South Korea and Brazil; 
moreover, that was the former strategy of developed countries, and is gaining 
popularity again. Yilmaz finds nonselective or neutral industrial policies 
(propagated by the neoliberal economic policy) inefficient. Economic 
fundamentals (macroeconomic stability, well-functioning markets) do not 
necessarily ensure economic restructuration; a prerequisite of industrial 
development is an adequate and supportive industrial policy. Rodrick 
confirms this argument,29 although he focuses on the state involvement to 
actively promote the process of industrialisation rather than on a classical 
selective industrial policy based on direct state support.
Instead of the populist policy and programme of the maximisation 
of the national welfare (full employment, broad access to public services), 
entrepreneurship and innovation are promoted. Regardless of former state 
involvement, the establishment of a European-type welfare state did not 
take place. Rather, an indirect and minimalist welfare regime was in oper-
ation, depending mainly on the contributions collected from employers 
and employees, with a minimal state contribution.30 The growing deficit 
of the social security system (and especially of the pension schemes) posed 
27 Ünay 2012.
28 Yilmaz 2011.
29 Rodrik 2007, 23.
30 Özdemir–Yücesan-Özdemir 2008, 470.
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increasingly severe problems, and the crises of the 1990s regularly called 
for systemic reforms. The AKP’s social security reform reflected the party’s 
neoliberal/conservative approach and the requirements of external actors 
(EU, IMF), and were based on the promotion of self-support and the intro-
duction of market-based systems (e.g. the fully-funded pension pillar) rather 
than on state involvement. Having come to power, the AKP followed the 
post-Washington consensus, which attempts to meet the demands of the 
business sector and the needs of larger groups of society. However, Öniş 
highlights that, in general, Turkey prioritises business considerations over 
welfare considerations.31 Evidently, the AKP – in line with its Islam-based 
ideology – promotes a social policy that relies on the traditional social model 
(with a focus on the family and on the breadwinner role of the husband); 
and, along with direct state intervention, more value is attached to the role 
of state-supported religious charities.32
If compared to the previous era, challenges posed by globalisation and 
by preparing for the EU accession brought about changes. The changes in 
Turkey’s post-Cold War position also contributed to the new developments. 
Formerly, Turkey had been a country on the fringes of the Western alliance; 
in its new geopolitical situation it gained regional power in its relations with 
the Balkans, the Caucasus, the Middle East and Central Asia. The focus 
was shifting very visibly to economic and trade considerations about setting 
priorities; in parallel, the re-evaluation of Turkey’s geopolitical position 
came to the foreground. For the AKP, globalisation and nationalism are 
not contradicting concepts; rather, they denote the promotion of national 
interests at the level of global relations.33
The business association MÜSIAD34 clearly demonstrates the com-
patibility of Islamic values with modern Western economic rationality and 
the harmonious coexistence of free trade capitalism and Islamic identity. 
Its objectives are not exclusively economic in nature, but also have a broad 
social and moral aspect. MÜSIAD claims that economic and technological 
31 Öniş 2011.
32 Grütjen 2008, 112.
33 Öniş 2012.
34 MÜSIAD is the abbreviation of “Müstakil Iş Adanleri Derneği” (Independent 
Industrialists’ and Businessmen’s Association), but many think that it stands for 
“Müslüman” (Muslim) rather than for Müstakil (“independent”). The Association relies 
strongly on Islamic values, and there is a strong trust between its member companies 
which form a network within Turkey’s economy.
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progress should be coupled with progress of the human spirit, as Western-
type capitalism and Kemalist modernisation both ignored that aspect of 
development. It builds on the values of Islam, e.g. trust, solidarity and the 
priority of the community’s interests over individual interests.
Erol Yarar, President of MÜSIAD, opines that the success of the economic 
models of the Far East relied very much on local traditions and community 
values, and did not try to copy the individualist approach of the West.35 As 
Yarar points out, it is no coincidence that at the threshold of the 21st century the 
centre of the global economy is shifting to the Far East. He deems that this 
is due to the interaction of three factors: the growing significance of SMEs; 
the importance of family values; and religion. It was strong cultural identity 
that gave those countries the confidence and strength that was necessary for 
success and for transcending the Western civilisation strongly criticised by 
Yarar. He is convinced that the Western world, based on Cartesian rationalist 
philosophy, plunged personal and social life into chaos by rejecting the val-
ues that it finds insignificant, and overwrote religious values with a secular 
morality, which leads necessarily to unjust capitalism. Fight against unjust 
capitalism requires strong morality and economic strength.
MÜSIAD supports Turkey’s accession to the EU, mainly with a view 
to economic rationality. It also attaches value to the positive impacts of 
globalisation (e.g. economic openness and better opportunities in external 
trade), because those serve as a basis for the development of Islamic econ-
omy as well. Business companies with Islamic basis are highly active in 
the Balkans and Central Asia alike.
Turkey is changing. The Kemalist model, based on secular fundaments 
and seeking to adopt the Western pattern, is being augmented or replaced 
by an emerging Islam-based ideology of modernisation that – as opposed 
to Islamist fundamentalist ideas – does not basically reject the Western 
model. Among Turkish entrepreneurs (especially the “Anatolian Tigers”) 
a kind of Muslim Calvinism is on the rise which emphasises worldly eco-
nomic successes and the importance of taking advantage of the benefits of 
globalisation, yet remains in the framework of Islam, observing the ethical 
rules of Islam, which is a vivid illustration of the compatibility of Islam 
and modern capitalism.
35 Buğra 1998, 531.
Chapter 4  
Foreign Policy and External Economic Relations
4.1. The AKP’s foreign policy
Traditionally, Turkish foreign policy was influenced by five factors:1 Turkey’s 
historical experience; its specific geopolitical and geostrategic position; its 
vulnerability; Kemalism; and external relations. Yet the developments of the 
1990s necessitated a reconsideration of these factors. Historical experience 
and Turkey’s geostrategic role were re-evaluated as the new situation called 
for an active approach instead of the former defensive, status quo-focussed 
attitude. Initially, the previous security-oriented approach persisted, but, 
gradually, southern and eastern neighbouring countries (Iraq, Iran, Syria) 
came to be viewed as a primary threat rather than the Soviet Union. By the 
2000s, security had gradually ceased to be a top priority. The Kemalist eli-
te’s loss of power was one of the factors that gave rise to the gradual change 
of the foreign policy attitude of the previous decades.
A traditional element of the former foreign policy was a pro-West 
attitude; Kemalism claims that, for Turkey, the way to civilisation was to 
join the Western world. The Cold War contributed to the achievement of 
that objective as it promoted NATO membership and the connections to 
the European institutions. Still, distrust of the West was a part of historical 
experience in the form of the traumatic memories of capitulations and being 
subjected to economic influence during the era of the Ottoman Empire, the 
partition of the Ottoman Empire and the injustice of the Treaty of Sèvres. 
The security-oriented foreign policy was therefore based on the sense of 
being exposed to external threats; the conflicts with the neighbouring 
countries – rooted in history and then exacerbated by the Cold War – also 
contributed to a realist approach to external relations.
1 Tür–Han 2011, 7.
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The changes of the 1990s gradually transformed Turkey’s attitude to 
foreign policy. The environment of Turkey changed, too. New conflicts 
emerged in the Caucasus (between Azeris and Armenians) and in the 
Balkans (the dissolution of Yugoslavia), while the Middle East peace process 
failed soon after it was launched. Exposure to external threat contributed 
to the persistence of the security-based approach. The National Security 
Policy Document of 1992 referred to Kurdish separatism as the primary 
threat and to Iraq, Iran and Syria (as external supporters of the PKK) as 
further national security threats.2 Conflicts persisted with Greece, another 
NATO member. For these reasons, in the 1990s Turkey held on to its real-
ist, security-focussed approach in a post-Cold War international political 
environment determined by democratisation, political liberalisation and, 
in general, idealism. During the 1990s, Turkey’s foreign policy turned 
from defensive into increasingly offensive, although continued to refrain 
from expansionist or aggressive approaches. It was not the government’s 
privilege to shape foreign policy; the National Security Council (and, thus, 
the military) had a considerable say.
A new development was that in security policy Turkey increasingly 
confronted the United States, its former main ally. It regarded the measures 
introduced in Iraq after 1991 to protect the Kurds as measures to support 
attempts at Kurdish autonomy and as a threat to its own territorial sover-
eignty. Turkey deemed that its NATO membership alone would not suffice 
to guarantee security, and that it must take active steps to promote security. 
In the 1990s, the EU’s attitude towards Turkey’s accession strengthened 
the feeling of “being left to its own devices”. While the EU welcomed the 
states of the Eastern bloc with open arms, Turkey was rejected repeatedly.
It was the neighbouring regions (mostly former Ottoman areas or states 
with Turkish population) that offered an opportunity for strengthening the 
new “regional identity”. Turgut Özal also talked about “the Turkish cen-
tury” and Turkey having an area of influence stretching from “the Adriatic 
Sea to the Great Wall of China”.3 Turkey was among the first countries to 
establish diplomatic relations with the countries of the region, and made 
highly publicised attempts to deepen its diplomatic, economic and cultural 
relations. A kind of a Eurasian identity started to evolve.
2 Tür–Han 2011, 11.
3 Zürcher 2004, 328.
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The United States found the new identity attractive, trying to set 
Turkey, a secularised country with a Muslim majority, as a good example 
for the Islamic states in the region. The Turkish example was important 
as it represented an alternative to Iran; in the countries of Central Asia, 
the vacuum created by the dissolution of the Soviet Union was dangerous.
In the early 1990s, Turkey, attracted to Pan-Turkism, endeavoured to 
be more active in the countries of Central Asia, assuming the role of the 
“elder brother”; however, it was not welcomed with particular warmth. 
Turkey did not have enough strength to ensure a permanent and active 
political or economic presence. The external reactions to Turkey’s active 
foreign policy were ambiguous elsewhere as well. With regard to Turgut 
Özal’s tour in the Balkans in 1993, Greece and the then Yugoslavia per-
ceived this intensifying activity as a manifestation of neo-Ottomanism.4 
In the Arab–Islamic world, Turkish foreign policy was traditionally viewed 
unfavourably, primarily because of its close relations with the West (NATO 
membership, good relations with Israel).
Foreign policy activity was also influenced by internal political dis-
putes, economic crises and problems. Lobby interests shaped foreign policy, 
too, as representatives of ethnic groups (Balkan, Chechens) and economic 
interest groups sought to influence foreign policy. As a consequence of the 
economic liberalisation and the export-oriented economic policy, economic 
relations had become increasingly determinant factors of foreign policy.
Turkey’s traditional foreign policy started to undergo fundamental 
transformation during İsmail Cem’s term of ministerial office (1997–2002). 
The process was greatly contributed by the capture of Kurdish leader Öcalan 
and the military successes against the PKK, which was partly attributable to 
the agreement with Syria.5 There was an improvement in the relations not 
only with Syria, but with the two other regional rivals, Greece and Iran as 
well. The September 11 attacks in the United States created a new situation 
in the region. Balance in the Middle East was transformed; the regional 
importance of non-Arab countries (Iran, Israel, Turkey) increased.6 A higher 
value was attached to the position of Muslim Turkey; again, attention turned 
to the Turkish model.
4 Tür–Han 2011, 15.
5 Tür–Han 2011, 15.
6 Tür–Han 2011, 19.
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When the AKP came to power, the direction of foreign policy under-
went further changes. The first distinct signs appeared during the American 
intervention in Iraq in 2003, when Turkey refused to allow the United States 
to use Turkish airspace and bases for military action. Thus, it indicated 
clearly that it was no longer willing to embrace American and Western 
strategy in the region at any cost. “Resistance” was facilitated by the fact 
that the NATO states themselves were divided over the issue and that Turkish 
military leaders did not show a clear support for active involvement. After 
the intervention in Iraq, the aspirations of the Kurds to achieve autonomy 
gained momentum, which added to the relevance of the traditional secu-
rity-based approach.
The AKP’s foreign policy endeavoured to get closer to Europe, which 
was understandable given that the invasion of Iraq provoked tensions 
between the United States and Turkey, and the different approaches to the 
solution of the conflict brought Turkey closer to European countries. The 
policy that supported drawing closer to the EU was popular in the early 
2000s. In 2002, Turkey deemed that it had a good chance to start accession 
negotiations, so the AKP quickly embraced the approach.
Meanwhile, the concept of looking for an independent regional role 
gradually came to the foreground. Ahmet Davutoğlu, who had become the 
main foreign policy ideologist of the AKP, set forth his ideas about Turkey’s 
future in his work Strategic Depth.7 He criticises Fukuyama’s theory 
that foresees the final victory of liberal democracy and the hypothesis of 
Samuel Huntington about the clash of civilisations, as both regard Islam 
as a threat to the Western world.8 The Muslim world, Davutoğlu opines, 
is not capable of acting as a counterforce at the global level. The history of 
civilisations, he adds, goes beyond their clashes; therefore, both theories are 
oversimplifications. He claims that Turkey should take a more active part 
in shaping the regional processes rather than following a defensive, status 
quo-focussed foreign policy approach. Its role as a bridge between the East 
and the West will not suffice; rather, it must turn into a central country that 
fosters global and regional peace. Turkey’s history and geographical position 
has a “strategic depth”, and Turkey can assume a central role pursuing an 
active foreign policy in the region.
7 See Davutoğlu 2001. Chief advisor to the Prime Minister, then Minister of Foreign 
Affairs (2009–2014) and Prime Minister (2014–2016).
8 Hale–Özbudun 2010, 119.
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The concepts of Strategic Depth had their precedents. In the 1970s, 
Bülent Ecevit and then in the 1980s Turgut Özal preferred active political 
initiatives (that showed many similarities with those of Strategic Depth) over 
a defensive foreign policy. However, the international environment was not 
favourable at that time. Another difference is that in the 1970s and 1980s 
the concept of opening was based on strengthening the links that attached 
Turkey to the West and on economic rationality, and it was dominated by 
the significance of Turkey’s role as a bridge. By contrast, the foreign policy 
derived from Strategic Depth stressed Turkey’s central role. This means that 
Turkey does not need to be a bridge but a factor that is significant in itself 
and establishes relations with neighbouring and remote regions accordingly. 
However, the most distinct characteristic of the new foreign policy was 
not a break with former Western allies, but the attempts to normalise and 
intensify relations with the neighbouring countries.
It was not until the end of the elections of 2007 that Turkey’s foreign 
policy changed significantly. The political turn became even more evident 
after Davutoğlu was elected Minister of Foreign Affairs in 2009. The objective 
was to improve bilateral relations with neighbouring countries; in 2008–2009, 
positive steps were taken towards Armenia, the most hostile country in the 
region. In the debate about the Iranian nuclear programme, Turkey took 
a position opposed to that of the great powers; in 2010, in the UN Security 
Council it voted against the imposition of sanctions. In the Arab–Israeli issue, 
Turkey took the side of the Palestinian party more decisively; this process 
culminated in the Gaza incident, which made Turkey – and Erdoğan per-
sonally – a hero of the Arab world. Turkey started to pursue a more active 
policy in the Western Balkans, again, with the aim to reduce hostility.
The concept of “zero problems” was introduced as a basic principle: 
Ankara sought to normalise its relations with even those countries it had 
tended to confront previously (e.g. Armenia, Greece).9 As Davutoğlu put 
it, Turkey is a regional power that has been forgetting its neighbours for too 
long.10 The new policy attempted to assume a proactive character. Turkey’s 
activity manifested not only in the neighbouring regions, but in global issues 
as well, such as intensified peacekeeping activity (e.g. in Afghanistan), 
membership in the UN Security Council, or participation in G20 summits. 
Falling in line with its new policy, Turkey took an active part in the mediation 
9 Davutoğlu 2012.
10 Davutoğlu 2010.
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of international conflicts, e.g. with regard to the agreement between Serbia, 
Croatia and Bosnia (signed in Istanbul) or in the conflict between Syria and 
Israel. It also mediated between Afghanistan and Pakistan.
The new foreign policy, however, was not always undiluted. The issue 
of national security was frequently raised and was influenced by the power 
relations within the AKP and by the external situation. Many deemed that 
the activity of Turkey in foreign politics was a sign of “neo-Ottomanism”.11 
Although Turkey officially rejected this claim, perceiving a negative overtone 
to it,12 it is indeed a fact that Turkey is performing most of its activity in 
regions that were once parts of the Ottoman Empire: the Balkans, the Caucasus 
and the Middle East. As a sign of growing confidence, Turkey is willing to 
confront even its former allies, as it did with the United States with regard 
to the American military action against Iraq, and with Israel with regard to 
the Gaza War.
A key aspect of the changes in the 2000s was a growing emphasis on 
“soft power” and the rise of multidimensional diplomacy. “Soft power”, 
a concept introduced in foreign policy theory by Nye in 1980s, refers to an 
alternative form of asserting interests.13 In Nye’s interpretation, soft power, 
as opposed to threat (military power) and buy-out (economic power), is in 
operation when a party makes other parties regard what it wants them to do 
as an attractive option. In other words, “soft power” rests on those factors 
which make a country able to exert influence over others via making itself 
attractive. The main elements of “soft power” are culture, education, art 
(primarily films or literature), but they also include tourism and NGOs; 
in general, a successful social and political system may strengthen “soft 
power” materially.
In the 2000s, several factors added to Turkey’s soft power. One of 
them was the democratic system which had been operating more or less 
successfully since the 1950s and compared to the systems of most neigh-
bouring countries, fell much closer to the Western ideal of democracy; 
due to constitutional amendments of the 2000s, it continued to develop in 
that direction. Another factor was economy, which, relying on the changes 
11 Neo-Ottomanism is widely discussed in technical literature; many recognised its signs 
in foreign policy as early as in the Özal era. For its growing popularity see e.g. Çolak 
2006.
12 See Çamlibel 2011.
13 Nye 2004.
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which started in the 1980s, integrated successfully into the global economy. 
Yet another factor was the social vibration based on a young and dynamic 
Turkish society and on a relatively strong and active civil society. Another 
aspect to be mentioned was the vibrant cultural life as evidenced, among 
others, by the unprecedented popularity of Turkish films.
All these factors defined a new narrative for Turkey, making it an 
attractive model for other countries. Turkey’s foreign policy and diplomacy 
could tap into this, partly through emphasising the positive elements of 
the Ottoman–Turkish historical and cultural tradition, and partly through 
building on the success of its modern socio-economic development.14 
Implementation – and the propagation of a favourable image – was promoted 
greatly by the institutional system that, on the one hand, had been existing 
for a long time and was being reinvigorated, and, on the other hand, was 
being set up. The Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency or TIKA 
(established in 1992) operates 50 offices in 46 countries to coordinate Turkish 
development programmes. The Yunus Emre network of cultural institutions 
was operating 44 institutes in 36 countries 10 years after it had been set up 
in 2007. The Turkish Red Crescent (Türk Kızılayı) organises humanitarian 
actions in Turkey and abroad.15
By contrast, Kirişci opines that the concept of “trading state” is the key 
underlying factor of changes in foreign policy.16 He argues that the economic 
factor behind the attitude change of Turkish foreign policy should not be 
underestimated. The liberalisation process, launched in 1980, added to the 
significance of exports, which, in turn, necessitated harmonious external 
relations, but until the end of the 1990s, political considerations overwrote 
economic interests. In the early 2000s, the correlations between politics 
and economy became even clearer as political developments (e.g. with the 
declarations of political and military leaders) had an immediate effect on 
the stock market. Nowadays, in global politics more importance is placed 
on economic interdependence than on military capabilities.
The concept of the trading state was introduced by Rosencrance in the 
mid-1980s.17 He argued that, after the Cold War, economic factors would 
14 Kalin 2011, 11.
15 The data were collected from the organisations’ webpages, and reflect the status as of 
April 2017.
16 Kirişci 2009.
17 Rosencrance 1986.
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affect the developments in foreign policy, the gradually intensifying economic 
interconnection would force the states to cooperate, and the states would be 
interested in resolving conflicts as soon as possible instead of prolonging 
or triggering them. As he pointed out, just as war offers an opportunity 
to increase a nation’s influence, so does peace. Obviously, he added, the 
protection of territorial integrity would remain a priority, but the influence 
of economic interests would increase.
Kirişci calls attention to yet another important factor: Putnam’s model 
of two-level diplomatic games.18 The model claims that in a democracy 
foreign policy entails not only negotiations between states but also the 
“selling” of foreign policy to the domestic public. That is, society (and, 
within that, interest groups) needs to be convinced of the usefulness of 
a given decision in foreign policy. This means that foreign policy is a game 
to be played in two directions (not just outside, but also inside), and foreign 
policy decisions are no longer made exclusively in the highest political 
circles, as social interest groups exert an increasing influence over them. 
Consequently, businessmen and representatives of the civil society play an 
active role in shaping foreign policy.
Therefore, Kirişci claims that the AKP’s zero-problem policy is attrib-
utable to the growing emphasis on economic interests.19 He notes that 
in Strategic Depth Davutoğlu hardly deals with the economic factor at 
all, and does not link it directly to his five principles of foreign policy. 
However, when discussing the foreign policy options of other countries, 
even Davutoğlu remarks that a prerequisite of a successful export-oriented 
model of external economy is that the representation of economic interests 
be a part of foreign policy.
In the 1980s and 1990s, Özal himself made attempts to advocate Turkey’s 
economic interests in foreign policy decision-making more strongly, yet at 
that time the prevailing doctrine of security (and its main representative, the 
military) did not allow that, and pressure from the business sector was less 
powerful then. Yet many of Özal’s initiatives – e.g. the attempt to improve 
relations with Greece and with Arab countries, the Black Sea Economic 
Cooperation (BSEC) or opening towards the former socialist bloc to ensure 
new business opportunities – were attempts in that direction.
18 Kirişci 2009, 41.
19 Kirişci 2009, 42.
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As for the foreign policy of the AKP era, Kirişci underlines the impor-
tance of “social learning”: economic operators perceive the positive trends 
related to improving opportunities in external economy and, hence, exert 
growing pressure to sustain them. By the 2000s, due to the rise of the 
“Anatolian Tigers” or domestic export-oriented businesses, business inter-
ests had started to shape the representation of economic interests more 
decisively. The process heightened after the AKP came to power, as many 
AKP voters belonged to the social group on which AKP relied on for social 
and economic support. The interest of businesses is represented by many 
trade associations, the major ones being MÜSİAD, TÜSİAD, TOBB and 
ISO (Istanbul Chamber of Commerce). These associations took an active 
role, among others, in the transformation of Turkey’s foreign policy on 
Cyprus in 2004. In the intervention in northern Iraq in 2008, they pressed 
the government to take into consideration Turkish economic interests in Iraqi 
Kurdistan. They were also interested in the attempts to improve relations 
with Armenia and in the mediation efforts made to enhance Arab–Israeli 
relations.20
The period from 2007 to 2010 was the “golden age” of the new Turkish 
foreign policy; afterwards, some aspects started to reveal the weaknesses 
of this well-functioning policy.21 The controversial decisions taken about 
the Arab Spring and the Syrian civil war (e.g. with regard to Libya, sup-
ported by the increasingly radicalised Islamist organisations) considerably 
reduced the “attractiveness” of Turkey and, personally, of Erdoğan.22 As 
the situation in the Middle East grew more complex, Turkish foreign policy 
found it difficult to identify a policy that fell in line with its principles in 
the highest possible degree. Economic factors were overshadowed as the 
traditional security consideration came to the foreground; in parallel, the 
Kurdish issue came into focus again. Turkey confronted the United States 
(about the support of the Kurdish forces in Syria) and Russia and Iran 
(about supporting Assad). Allegations about supporting ISIS were also very 
detrimental to Turkey’s image.
The conflict between President Erdoğan and Prime Minister Davutoğlu 
culminated in the latter’s resignation in May 2016. Thus, the main theorist 
20 Kirişci 2009, 47.
21 Coşkun 2016.
22 In 2012, 84% of the Egyptians found Turkey appealing; by 2013, their rate had fallen 
to 38%. In Syria, this rate is only 22%. See OxGAPS 2015, 12.
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of the new foreign policy quit power. The question is whether the foreign 
policy approach represented by him will persist in the years to come.23
It is quite evident that the challenges posed by recent years call for 
a new approach. While Turkey’s former foreign policy adopted a proactive 
attitude, but, above all, was built on soft power and was imbued with the 
ideology of the diversity of civilisations, today’s foreign policy – albeit 
retains its proactivity – relies strongly on “hard-power” military force. To 
some extent, circumstances called for that, as with regard to the Syrian 
civil war, Turkey came to play a strategic role in stopping ISIS, and many 
see similar tasks with regard to stopping Iran’s expansion. Tasks assumed 
by Turkey in the context of the humanitarian catastrophe in Syria must not 
be ignored either. This is why Fuat Keyman calls the new foreign policy 
“moral realism”, a mixture of a hard-power-type military approach and 
elements of a humanitarian approach.24
4.2. Changes in the structure of external economy
4.2.1. Trade in goods
The EU member states are traditionally the key trading partners of Turkey. 
After the conclusion of the Customs Union Treaty in 1996, Turkey removed 
the tariffs on industrial products made in the EU, which substantially 
increased the quantity of European products flowing in Turkey. Tariff dis-
mantlement also exerted a major influence on Turkey’s capability to attract 
capital, while Turkey’s enhanced competitiveness had a favourable effect 
on exports. From 2001 to 2006, exports rose from 31 billion dollars to 85 
billion dollars, and then in 2012, to 152 billion. However, it has been stag-
nating since then.
Turkish exports underwent massive changes in terms of structure and 
relations. In parallel with the economic restructuration, the rate of textile 
products (which used to dominate exports) fell, while the share of mechanical 
and electronic products and vehicles grew. The export rate of agricultural 
and food products remained significant, but their ratio did not grow. Overall, 
the rate of high-tech products in the exports remained low (less than 5%).
23 Coşkun 2016.
24 Keyman 2017, 63.
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Table 1.
Target regions of Turkish exports
2007 2012 2016
million 
USD
%
million 
USD
%
million 
USD
%
Total 107,271 100 152,560 100 142,557 100
EU 60,754 56.6 59,240 39.0 68,357 48.0
Other regions 
in Europe
10,487 9.8 14,167 9.3 9,378 6.8
Middle East 15,081 14.1 42,476 27.8 31,311 22.0
Other regions 
in Asia
5,227 4.9 10,581  6.9  9,685 6.8
North Africa 4,030 3.8 9,443  6.2  7,756 5.4
Sub-Saharan 
Africa
1,947 1.8 3,913  2.6 3,652 2.6
North America 4,541 4.2 6,673  4.3  7,405 5.2
Latin America 1,062 1.0 2,961 1.9 1,941 1.4
Source: TurkStat
The EU was the primary market of Turkish exports; its share had exceeded 
50% for a long time. After 2007, the quantity of exports to the EU member 
states continued to increase, yet its dynamics fell far behind those of other 
regions, mainly as a consequence of the protracted crisis. The EU’s share in 
Turkish exports declined to below 50% and, in 2012, below 40%. Parallelly, 
the share of the Middle East increased by the same degree in the same period: 
from 14% to 27.8%. Overall, the growing demand of emerging markets that 
were performing well even during the crisis provided a good alternative 
for Turkey, and so did those regions (e.g. the Balkans) where the activity of 
European countries (Italy, Austria, Greece) declined. After 2012, the trend 
reversed, partly due to the fact that the European crisis was abating, and 
partly due to the escalation of the situation in the Middle East. In 2016, the 
EU’s share grew to 48% again, while that of the Middle East fell to 22%.
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Table 2.
Turkey’s imports by region
2007 2012 2016
million 
USD %
million 
USD %
million 
USD %
Total 170,062 100 236,545 100 198,610 100
EU 68,472 40.3 87,657 37.1 77,496 39
Other regions 
in Europe
34,176 20.1 37,206 15.7 21,905 11
Middle East 10,148 6 21,410 8.5 13,760 6.9
Other regions 
in Asia
33,658 19.8 49,602 21 54,226 27.3
North Africa 2,285 1.3 3,308 1.4 3,201 1.6
Sub-Saharan 
Africa
2,821 1.7 2,613 1.1 2,154 1.1
North America 9,033 5.3 15,084 6.4 11,930 6
Latin America 3,121 1.9 5,149 2.2 5,159 2.6
Source: TurkStat
In the customs union, Turkey applied the EU’s community customs policy, 
which, for Turkey, entailed a significant tariff reduction and a major increase 
of imports. From 1996 to 2014, Turkey’s imports grew by 242% if compared 
to the EU15, and by 470% if compared to other countries. The EU’s share in 
imports decreased from above 50% in the late 1990s to 40% in 2007; since 
then it has basically been stagnating. The rise of natural gas and oil prices 
resulted in the growth of the share of supplier countries (e.g. Russia, Iraq) 
in imports. After 2008, the share of other Asian imports (from China, South 
Korea, India) grew.
Table 3.
Turkey’s major export partners (million USD)
2001 2006 2012 2016
1. Germany 5,367 9,686 13,132 14,001
2. UK 2,175 6,814 8,700 11,687
3. Iraq n/a 2,589 10,830 7,639
4. Italy 2,342 6,752 6,375 7,582
5. USA 3,126 5,061 5,614 6,623
6. France 1,895 4,604 6,805 6,023
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2001 2006 2012 2016
7. UAE 380 1,986 8,177 5,407
8. Spain 950 3,720 3,721 4,991
9. Iran 361 1,067 9,922 4,967
10. Netherlands 892 2,539 3,244 3,590
Source: TurkStat
An analysis of the changes of export and import values in the last decade, 
broken down by country, also illustrates recent changes vividly. While in 
2001, the EU’s bigger member states and the United States were the main 
targets for Turkish exports, in 2012 Iraq and Iran followed Germany on 
the ranking list, while the United Arab Emirates ranked 5th. However, 
2016 brought an increase for traditional European partners again, while 
countries of the Middle East and Russia faced a considerable downturn.
Table 4.
Turkey’s major import partners (million USD)
2001 2006 2012 2016
1. China 925 9,669 21,295 25,440
2. Germany 5,335 14,768 21,399 21,474
3. Russia 3,453 17,806 26,619 15,161
4. USA 3,261 6,260 14,131 10,868
5. Italy 3,484 8,650 13,344 10,219
6. France 2,284 7,240 8,589 7,365
7. South Korea 759 3,556 5,660 6,384
8. India 355 1,579 5,843 5,757
9. Spain 1,066 3,834 6,022 5,679
10. UK 1,914 5,138 5,629 5,320
Source: TurkStat
With regard to imports, there is a rapid rise in Russia and China. Russia 
took the lead from Germany partly due to the increasing Turkish demand 
for energy and the high oil prices. After the fall of the oil prices, China 
became the major importer for Turkey. In case of most partners, Turkey’s 
balance of trade shows deficit; in case of countries of the Middle East, 
there is a Turkish surplus. Iraq gives an outstanding example, where there 
is practically nothing to offset Turkish exports.
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In the services sector, representatives of the telecommunications and 
the financial/banking sectors started to operate in neighbouring countries. 
Other sectors, e.g. healthcare, education, culture (Turkish soap operas) and 
tourism, are also important elements of the exports of services.
4.2.2. Contracting in the construction sector
Turkish construction companies are outstandingly active in foreign count-
ries. In the 1970s, they started to expand in Libya and other countries of the 
Middle East; currently, they are globally significant actors in the construction 
sector. From 1972 to 2017, Turkish contractors undertook 9,000 projects in 
115 countries, with a total value of 350 billion dollars.25 While in the 1990s, 
Russia was the main scene of operation (35%), followed by Libya (14%) and 
Kazakhstan (8%), in the first decade of the 2000s Russia’s share was decli-
ning (15%), and Libya (12%) and Turkmenistan (11%) rose as major partners. 
From 2010 to 2016 Turkmenistan (18%) overtook Russia (17%), while Iraq 
(9%) ranked third. From 1972 to 2015, Russia was the key partner (19.6%; 
1,929 projects implemented by Turkish companies for 67 billion USD), fol-
lowed by Turkmenistan (13.8%) and Libya (8.4%). The regional overview 
shows that in the same period Eurasian countries took the lead (47.6%), 
followed by the Middle East (26.1%), Africa (17.5%), Europe (5.1%), other 
Asian countries (3.2%), and North and South American countries (0.5%).
In 2016, the impact of the political developments became tangible. The 
annual volume of international business undertaken by Turkish contractors 
amounted to 20–30 billion dollars a year from 2006 to 2015; in 2016, it fell 
to 12.5 billion dollars. Russia, which in 2015 was a 6 billion dollars market, 
became insignificant as a consequence of the sanctions. Due to the fall of 
the oil prices, several traditional partners (Algeria, Azerbaijan, Kuwait and 
Saudi Arabia) gave commissions of significantly lower values.
There are more than a hundred Turkish construction companies that 
are active in international projects, the most important ones being Öztürk 
Holding (revenues of 7 billion USD in 2014) and Rönesans (3 billion USD). 
In 2015, 40 Turkish construction companies ranked among the world’s top 
25 TCA 2017, 1.
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250 international contractors list. With this number, Turkey ranked second 
after China (65), overtaking the USA (38), Italy (15) and Japan (14).26
4.2.3. Capital flow
With regard to FDI, the last decade has seen a significant growth of capi-
tal inflow. FDI grew from an annual 1–2 billion dollars to 10–20 billion, 
the majority of which was flowing into the export-focussed sectors of the 
manufacturing industry.27 The amount of foreign capital f lowing into 
Turkey was 140 billion dollars in 2016. Turkish capital in foreign countries 
exceeded 40 billion dollars.28 75% of the FDI flowing to Turkey came from 
EU states; the biggest investors are the Netherlands (15.8%), Austria (7%) 
and the UK (6.8%). A major non-EU investor is the USA (8%). Gulf states 
(the United Arab Emirates, Qatar and Saudi Arabia together accounting 
for 7%) or Russia (4%) – in spite of their growing investments – are still 
lagging behind European countries.
Table 5.
FDI in Turkey (2002–2016)
Country Capital invested, billion USD %
1. Netherlands 22,104 15.8
2. USA 11,214 8.0
3. Austria 9,809 7.0
4. UK 9,548 6.8
5. Luxembourg 9,005 6.4
6. Germany 8,901 6.4
7. Belgium 8,212 5.9
8. Spain 6,998 5.5
9. Greece 6,873 4.9
10. France 6,856 4.9
Other 40,408 28.9
Total 139,928 100
Source: Turkish Ministry of Economics
26 TCA 2017, 1.
27 Taymaz–Voyvoda 2009.
28 UNCTAD database.
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The distribution of the capital between the sectors is as follows: 25.6% 
flowed into the manufacturing industry, 23.4% into the financial and insu-
rance sector, 9.1% into trade, 8.9% into transport and warehousing, and 
4.9% into construction.
In recent years, Turkish capital investments in foreign countries have 
emerged and started to grow dynamically; their total amount was above 40 
billion dollars in 2016, which is about one-fourth of the amount of foreign 
investments in Turkey. Recently, foreign investments of developing countries 
have been increasing significantly at the global level. In 2000, the total regis-
tered amount of capital invested in foreign countries by developing countries 
was 742 billion dollars; by 2014, it had increased to 4,833 billion dollars.29 In 
the same period, Turkey’s share grew from 0.5% (3.6 billion USD) to 0.8% 
(40 billion USD).30 In 2012, the 29 biggest Turkish multinational companies 
employed 115,000 persons abroad,31 about a half of them in the EU. After 
Europe, the most popular country was Azerbaijan (4.5 billion USD). Important 
locations for investment included some other countries of the former Soviet 
Union (Kazakhstan, Russia, Georgia; 1.4 billion USD), the USA (1 billion 
USD), Latin America (800 million USD, mostly in the Caribbean tax havens), 
North Africa (460 million USD), the Western Balkans (400 million USD) 
and Iran (260 million USD). Obviously, the reasons for and the composi-
tion of capital investments were highly diverse. While capital export to the 
Caribbean mostly entailed the offshore transactions of some major operators, 
investments in Germany, the Balkans or Iran involved – besides some big 
banks or telecommunications firms – many SMEs.
The most popular form of investment was acquisition. From 2002 to 
2014, out of the 115 transactions 56 took place in Western Europe, 32 in 
Eastern Europe (mainly in Russia), 20 in the Balkans; the Middle East, 
with its 4 transactions was lagging much behind Central Asia and the Far 
East (16 transactions).32 56% of the Turkish acquisition transactions were 
made in the manufacturing industry, and 37% in the services sector. In the 
Balkans, acquisition activity was intense: businesses hit by the crisis and 
state-owned properties (steelworks, airports) were acquired.
29 In 2000, this amounted to 10% of the total FDI; in 2014, to 19% (Yildiriz 2017, 281).
30 The biggest foreign investors were China (730 billion), Russia (431 billion) and Brazil 
(316 billion). The foreign investments of South Korea, India, Malaysia or Mexico also 
exceeded those of Turkey considerably.
31 Demir–Moiz 2017, 249.
32 Yildiriz 2017, 286.
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The total amount of Turkey’s FDI outflow, however, shows a less 
comfortable picture: the financial services sector has the biggest share 
(55%), followed by oil extraction (21%), while the amount flowing into 
manufacturing industries is less than one-fourth.
4.2.4. Development aid
Another key factor of the intensification of Turkey’s activity in external 
economy is development aid. Recently, there has been a massive increase 
in the amount targeted to neighbouring countries, Central Asia and Africa. 
In 2003, the amount of development aid was only 76 million dollars; then 
it gradually increased and, by 2011, had exceeded 1.2 billion dollars. As 
a consequence of the crisis in Syria, the aid amount had been growing 
rapidly since 2012. Since 2013, it has exceeded 3 billion dollars every year.33
In 2015, the total amount of development aid exceeded 5 billion dollars, 
out of which 4 billion came from public resources (ODA) and 1 billion from 
private resources (primarily, NGOs). A significant part of development 
aid (2.7 billion USD) was humanitarian emergency aid (mainly for Syrian 
refuges), and 1.3 billion was classified as development aid. Turkey, with its 
ODA of 4 billion dollars, ranked 10th among donor countries (overtaking 
even Italy). The amount of the assistance offered by Turkey is 0.5% of the 
Turkish GNI, which makes Turkey, again, rank 10th (overtaking Belgium and 
France). In terms of humanitarian aid alone, Turkey with a ratio of 0.37% of 
its national income reached the highest ratio in the world. The remaining part 
mostly covers the funding of development programmes (287 million USD), 
international educational programmes (266 million USD) and concessional 
loans (217 million USD). However, analysis shows that without the support 
given to Syrian refugees the rate of development aid is not particularly high 
(0.12%), and falls much below the OECD average. Yet if the development 
status of Turkey’s economy is taken into consideration in the form of per 
capita income, even this amount is significant.
Evidently, development programmes focussed on education very much. 
Projects related to education (e.g. schools) received significant support; in 
international educational programmes, funding was given to promote the 
studies of researchers and students in Turkey. Besides education, projects 
33 Source of data on aid assistance (except where indicated otherwise): TIKA 2017.
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which intended to enhance good governance and women’s social empow-
erment also received support.34
In terms of territorial distribution, in 2015 the top beneficiary was Syria 
(2.7 billion USD), overtaking (as in every year since 2012) Somalia (314 
million), Kyrgyzstan (98 million) and Albania (85 million). Further major 
beneficiaries included Bosnia and Macedonia (36 million USD) in Europe; 
Sudan (22 million) in Africa; the West Bank and Gaza (30 million) in the 
Middle East, and Afghanistan (57 million) in Asia.
4.2.5. Visa waiver
Turkey’s intensifying international activity is clearly reflected in the growing 
number of visa waiver agreements, which also contributed to the increase 
in the value of Turkey’s regional and global position.35 An explicit goal of 
Turkey’s liberal visa policy was to enhance business relations and tourism 
to Turkey, and, as evidenced by the data of the recent years, it proved to be 
successful.36 Currently, citizens of 78 countries enjoy visa-free travel to 
Turkey. So far, the EU has not granted visa-free entry for Turkish citizens, 
and Turkey also employs a policy of selective visa waiver with regard to 
the member states. German, French, Italian, Greek and Swiss citizens can 
enter Turkey without a passport (with their ID cards). Citizens of some EU 
member states (e.g. Hungary) enjoy a complete visa waiver, while others 
(e.g. citizens of Slovakia or Romania) can enter without a visa only if they 
are travelling as tourists. Citizens of Austria, the UK, Spain, the Netherlands 
and Poland need a visa, but the application procedure is simple: visas can 
be applied for on entry to Turkey and are granted immediately. Recently, 
exemption from the visa requirement has been granted to several countries 
with which Turkey endeavoured to enhance relations. These countries 
include all states in the Balkans and Central Asia (Georgia, Ukraine, Russia, 
Morocco, Tunisia, Iran, Azerbaijan) as well as South Korea, Japan and 
countries of South America. The visa waiver does not apply to citizens of 
the USA, Canada, Australia, China, Iraq and Saudi Arabia, among others. 
The citizens of most African countries are granted a Turkish visa with 
34 Kirişci 2013b, 208.
35 Kirişci 2013b, 211.
36 Balli et al. 2013.
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a simplified procedure only if they already have a Schengen visa or a US 
visa. Most visa applications were submitted in the UK (4.6 million), Iraq 
(2 million) and the Netherlands (1.8 million).
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Chapter 5 
The EU and Its Member States
With regard to Turkey’s economic development, its relations with the EU 
and its capacity to tap into the benefits of integration are paramount. For 
the EU, Turkey’s significance stands on a par with that of Russia in the 
neighbourhood, and only a step down from that of the USA and China on 
the global scene.1
Since the very beginnings, the EU–Turkey relations have been contradic-
tory: even today, they are characterised by a unique mixture of conflicts and 
cooperation. The relations can be interpreted against various backgrounds.2 
These narratives include: Westernisation or neo-Ottomanism at the national 
level; Europeanisation at the EU level; enlargement, partnership or economic 
cooperation at the relationship level; Turkey as geostrategic partner at the 
systemic level; and with regard to identity, Turkey as a bridge or as “the 
Other”. In the last 60 years of the EU–Turkey relations, cooperation has 
been the most intense when the key actors shared positive narratives. By 
contrast, when negative and competing narratives emerged, relations were 
beset with conflicts.3
The plan of Turkey’s integration to Europe looks back upon a history 
of over 50 years, yet for Turkey there is still a long way to go. The Customs 
Union Agreement of 1995 created unprecedentedly close economic cooper-
ative ties, but, by its very nature, brought about only a temporary change. 
The future is still uncertain; the decade-long accession negotiations stalled, 
and Turkey’s accession remains an open question.
1 Tocci 2016, 3.
2 Hauge et al. 2016, 9.
3 Hauge et al. 2016, 21.
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5.1. Turkey’s affinity with Europe and its economic 
integration until the end of the 20th century
As discussed above, the attraction to Western civilisation became increa-
singly stronger, making the Ottoman Empire take European-type steps of 
modernisation in several areas. Internal motivation was coupled with exter-
nal motivating (or, rather, compelling) forces. In the Empire, influence of 
the great European powers strengthened. By the end of the 19th century, 
the indebted Empire had become vulnerable, which allowed for growing 
control over, and sometimes even direct intervention in, its domestic affairs. 
By the early 20th century, European ideals, nationalism, parliamentarism 
and secularism had taken root in the Ottoman Empire, the most important 
power of the Muslim world.
Established as a nation state after World War I on the ruins of the 
Ottoman Empire, Turkey continued to rely on these new values as an 
ideological basis. Under the leadership of Kemal Atatürk, the new state 
regarded Westernisation and radical reforms of social, political, economic 
and cultural life as the way forward. Civilisation, by definition, was Western 
civilisation, while Islam came to represent backwardness. Turkey adopted 
solutions from European states, primarily from France, Germany and Italy, 
and, in the 1920s and 1930s, even from the Soviet Union.
Yet – in spite of the fundamental social changes – only the educated 
elite was clearly pro-European; the masses encountered merely the super-
ficial effects of European civilisation and culture.
In 1945, Turkey, having given up its officially neutral policy, estab-
lished strong ties with the Western alliance and institutional system. In 
1948, it became member of the OEEC, the organisation responsible for 
administering the Marshall Plan. In 1949, Turkey became a member of 
the Council of Europe and then, in 1952, of NATO. For Turkey’s lead-
ers, membership in Euro-Atlantic organisations was the fulfilment of the 
Kemalist dream and the culmination of belonging to Europe – or at least 
an important step in Turkey’s progress towards Europe.
On 30 July 1959, Turkey applied for associate membership of the 
European Economic Community (EEC; established less than one and a half 
years before). The factors of the process included, for Turkey, drawing closer 
to the West and economic considerations, although Turkey at the time had 
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a low rate of exports, dominated by agricultural products. The economic 
boom of the 1950s in Europe promised favourable opportunities for exter-
nal trade and Turkish labour force alike. Most probably, Turkey would have 
delayed its application for association had Greece not applied for accession in 
mid-July 1959. Turkey, fearing that Greece would tap into its closer relations 
with the EC to Turkey’s detriment, submitted its application to the Six almost 
immediately. The EC accepted both applications, unwilling to discriminate 
between its two strategically important allies and trying to avoid further 
conflicts between them. As due to their level economic development neither 
Greece nor Turkey could become full members, the Community offered them 
the opportunity of an Association Agreement which establishes integration 
in certain areas, but not in all.
In 1963, the European Economic Community and Turkey signed an 
Association Agreement, known as the Ankara Agreement. The Ankara 
Agreement, similarly to the agreement concluded with Greece two years 
before, envisioned – after a gradual liberalisation process – customs union 
and the free movement of labour as final goals. Practically, this left open the 
possibility of accession to the EEC in the future. During the implementation, 
it soon transpired that Turkey signed the agreement for political reasons 
(to counterbalance the aspirations of Greece) rather than due to economic 
necessity, when Turkey, opting for a strategy of import substitution industrial-
isation, protected its own internal market with strong protectionist measures.
The preparatory phase, provided for the Ankara Agreement as the first 
phase of the process, commenced after ratification, on 1 January 1964 and 
lasted 6 years. On 1 December 1969, Turkey initiated negotiations about 
the measures to be taken during the preparatory phase; the negotiations 
began on 1 January 1970, and centred on three main subjects: the status of 
Turkish agricultural and industrial products on the EC markets; Turkish 
labour force in the EC; and financial assistance in the preparatory phase.
By the end of the 1960s, it became evident that the extensive and rapid 
liberalisation of trade in goods as envisioned by the Agreement was not 
possible. The Additional Protocol of 1970 set the goal of establishing the 
customs union later, by 31 December 1995. It also provided for the immediate 
tariff-free import of Turkish industrial products, with the exception of textile 
and oil products, i.e. those very products that Turkey could export at the 
time. The customs tariffs on the imports from the EC states were removed 
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asymmetrically, in two phases (creating two product categories).4 The 
parties agreed on a financial assistance process broken down to four-year 
periods.5 Turkey was committed to introduce the EC’s Common External 
Tariffs (CET), while the EC allowed the free movement of the Turkish 
labour force. Pursuant to Article 36 of the Agreement, the EC would have 
established the free movement of labour (a key element of the Treaty of 
Rome) in two phases, from 1976 to 1986. The Agreement gave priority to 
Turkish labour force over the labour force of other non-EU states as early 
as in the first phase.
Yet the economic setback of the EC economies resulted in restrictions 
related to foreign labour force. In November 1973, West Germany intro-
duced Anwerbestop to restrict the employment of workers from non-EC 
countries. In 1974, the EC implemented unified measures to decrease the 
massive inflow of labour force.6
With the accession of the UK, Ireland and Denmark on 1 January 1973, 
the Community was enlarged to nine members. Therefore, on 30 June 
1973, the EC and Turkey signed a Harmonisation Protocol which extended 
the scope of the commitments of the previous agreements to the three new 
member states.7 Yet the enlargement had other effects on the Turkey–EU 
relations, too. For new Northern member states, the enhancement of the 
cooperation with Turkey had less prominence. Another negative outcome for 
Turkey was that – via the UK – Commonwealth states enjoyed preferential 
treatment, which devalued the benefits offered by the EC to Turkey. The free 
4 The first list contained 55% of industrial products for which a tariff dismantlement 
period of 12 years was defined. The other list contained 45% of the products, and 
a period of 22 years applied to it. For agricultural products, the EC introduced zero 
tariff for 37% of Turkish export products and a preferential tariff for another 23%; in 
return, agricultural products from the EC were also granted tariff concessions.
5 As per the Ankara Agreement, the following loan amounts were added to the loan of 
175 million units of account of the first period (1964–1969): 220 million units of account 
by the Second Protocol (1973–1976), 47 million units of account by the Additional 
Protocol, and 310 million units of account by the Third Protocol (1977–1981). The 
fourth financial protocol (planned to amount to 600 million units of account) was not 
signed due to the deteriorating relations.
6 Although demand decreased in the EC, the willingness of Turkish workers to be emp-
loyed abroad persisted. As the data of Turkey’s Employment Agency (IIBK) show, in 
1977 more than 1 million citizens applied for employment abroad.
7 A similar Agreement of Harmonisation was concluded with Portugal and Spain in 
1987, and with Greece in 1989 (!). 
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trade between the EC and EFTA, the Association Agreements concluded 
with Mediterranean countries (in North Africa and the Middle East) and 
the GSP system offered for developing countries also had an adverse effect 
on Turkey’s preferential status.
In 1974, Turkey, invoking its right of intervention, invaded the north 
part of Cyprus populated by Turks. The act was condemned not only by 
Greece, but by the UK and the whole international community as well, which 
deteriorated Turkey’s relations with the EC. In 1978, Turkey suspended the 
further reduction of tariffs, and initiated the revision of the agreement.8 
In terms of the principles set out in the Association Agreement and the 
performance of the tasks specified later, both parties were lagging behind 
their commitments.
In that context, Turkey unexpectedly – in response to signing the 
Treaty of Accession with Greece in May 1979 – announced its intention 
to become a member, and scheduled its application for autumn 1980. The 
coup in September, however, prevented it. Turkey–EC relations froze. 
On 12 January 1982, the European Parliament officially suspended the 
Association Agreement until the improvement of the Turkish political and 
human rights situation.
The strained relations between the Community and Turkey started 
to improve in 1986, with the ambassador-level meeting of the Association 
Council. The new Turkish Government, led by Turgut Özal, a technocratic 
politician, urged the enhancement of relations with the EC and clearly set 
the aim of making Turkey a member of the EC, preferably by 1992. Turkey 
submitted its application for accession in Brussels on 14 April 1987.
The application was based on Article 237 of the Treaty of Rome instead 
of the Association Agreement. Article 237 stipulates that any democratic 
European state may apply to become a member; thus, Turkey circumvented 
the schedule which was defined in the Association Agreement and in later 
ancillary contracts, but whose implementation stalled in the meantime.
From the 1980s onwards, during Prime Minister Özal’s term of office, 
a process of radical economic liberalisation was launched in Turkey. In 
economic policy, the emphasis was shifting from the import substitution 
strategy to competitive export sectors; access to European markets was 
prioritised. The accession of the three Mediterranean countries (Greece, 
Spain and Portugal) to the EC also had an adverse effect on Turkey’s 
8 Yeşilada 2013, 10.
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position. Consequently, as political tension abated, priority was given to 
strengthening relations; that was one of the reasons why Turkey applied 
for membership in 1987.
In December 1989, the Commission rejected the application, albeit 
temporarily (as it did in the case of Morocco, which also submitted its appli-
cation in 1987), on the grounds that it did not deem the situation suitable for 
accession. The reply stated that the key objective of the EC was to establish 
the single internal market and, consequently, would not enter accession 
negotiations until 1993. It also highlighted several aspects that, for the time 
being, made Turkey’s accession impossible (democratic deficits, the issue 
of human rights, the persistent conflict with Greece, the unsolved Cyprus 
problem). With regard to the economic and social situation, it declared that 
Turkey would find it difficult to implement changes that would be required 
in the medium term in case of a potential accession.
During the decision-making, the cost implications on the EC were also 
taken into account. Analyses estimated that the direct additional costs of 
the accession would be 7–9 billion ECU, which amounted to one-fourth of 
the community budget, while payment by Turkey would have amounted 
only to one-tenth of it.9 An additional problem would have been posed 
by the fact that the Mediterranean member states of a similar product and 
exports structure would have lost some of their advantages and would have 
demanded compensation.10
The EC did not intend to reject the application permanently. A promise 
was made that the application would be reviewed at regular intervals (to 
be defined later), and referred the further developments of relations to the 
foundations laid down in the Association Agreement.
In June 1990, the Commission presented to the Council a document 
on cooperation in which the EC undertook to accelerate meeting its com-
mitments set out in the Association Agreement. The EC approved of the 
customs union, but rejected the plan which would have involved Turkey 
in certain other areas of the acquis communautaire (e.g. political coopera-
tion). Nevertheless, in 1992 Turkey could become a member of the Western 
European Union (WEU).
9 Musto 1989.
10 At the time of Spain’s accession, the EC disbursed 6.6 billion ECU in the form of 
assistance (an integrated development programme in the Mediterranean).
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A consensus was reached soon about the CU, yet conclusion and ratifi-
cation of the agreement was uncertain for a long a time. Obviously, one of the 
obstacles was posed by Greece, which in the meantime had become an EC 
member, and opposed all forms of convergence of or cooperation between 
the Community and Turkey in almost every field. At the Association Council 
meeting of December 1994 it was pointed out that “most of the negotiating 
points on the customs union had been settled. Owing to the opposition of one 
Member State, however, the Association Council was unable to finalize the 
customs union.”11 Finally, in March 1995 the Association Council, making 
a compromise with Greece, adopted the agenda of the establishment of the 
CU with Turkey. Greece ensured that the Union, contrary to its original 
intention, opened accession negotiations with a divided Cyprus. The issue 
of the CU remained open until December 1995, as the agreement needed to 
be ratified not only by all EU member states, but the European Parliament 
as well. The European Parliament, delaying the signature of the document, 
attempted to make Turkey introduce internal reforms, among others, to 
improve the human rights situation – and it did achieve some success.
The customs union between the EU and Turkey entered into force on 1 
January 1996. It covered 90% of bilateral trade. With regard to some sectors 
(e.g. agriculture, coal and steel products) special bilateral agreements were 
concluded. In the framework of the CU, Turkey unilaterally adopted the EU’s 
Common External Tariffs (CET), and undertook to harmonise economic 
policy measures and to approximate the standards of competition policy, 
the protection of intellectual property rights and technical standards to the 
EU regulations.12
In trade, the elimination of the quota scheme in the textiles and clothing 
sector offered Turkish exporters a major advantage, given that the EU had 
already abolished tariffs on Turkish industrial products.13 Another advan-
tage was that – on condition that competition law reforms are introduced 
in Turkey – the EU would not implement its anti-dumping measures, a tool 
it had used regularly against Turkey. Yet Turkey’s decision on the customs 
union was basically political in nature: a demonstration that it belongs to 
11 Bulletin der Europäischen Union, 1994/12, 131.
12 Togan 2012.
13 This advantage eroded soon, as the textile trade agreement adopted in the framework 
of GATT removed restrictions towards other countries as well, which was very advan-
tageous for China.
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Europe and is ready for accession. As for economy, actual positive effects 
occurred only in the long run, as a consequence of economic modernisation 
and integration into global economy.
The customs union with Turkey is a special form of integration. Albeit 
the EU set the objective of customs union as the final goal to achieve with 
the Association Agreements signed with Greece, Malta and Cyprus, for 
these countries, the establishment of the customs union coincided with their 
accession as full members. As for other acceding countries, the EU con-
cluded free trade agreements (FTA) with them before their accession; such 
agreements are frequently concluded as parts of the neighbourhood policy. 
As Krugman and Obstfeld put it, the difference between a free trade area 
and a customs union is that the implementation of the former is politically 
easy, but administratively difficult, while the opposite is true for the latter.14 
A free trade agreement is much easier to conclude, but due to the required 
proofs of origin entails a considerable administrative burden, which may 
turn into an obstacle to trade. By contrast, the establishment of a customs 
union is much more difficult, as agreement needs to be reached about the 
tariffs on the products of third countries in case of each import tariff, but 
after the conclusion of the agreements, bilateral trade becomes much simpler.
In the customs union, the average Turkish tariff levels decreased. In 
the EU and EFTA states, the average tariff level for some industrial and 
processed agricultural products decreased from 9% in 1995 to zero. The 
average tariff level towards third states was reduced from 14.28% to 5.8%. 
Yet in case of several food products, the tariff level increased considerably.15 
As the EU abolished tariffs for most Turkish industrial products as early as 
in the 1971, most of the costs of the new tariff reductions and the required 
legal harmonisation were covered by Turkey. Moreover, as per the Customs 
Union Agreement, Turkey had to adopt continuously to the changes in the 
EU’s trade policy, for example, to the tax reductions for third countries or 
to free trade agreements, but did not have much control over such decisions.
The fact that Turkey, in spite of the costs and the asymmetry in deci-
sion-making, entered the customs union shows that it regarded European 
integration as an issue of identity rather than of economy. It had always 
made attempts to belong to Europe, even if the intention of the “European 
family” about its integration was ambiguous. Above all, it was the strategic 
14 Krugman–Obstfeld 2003, 242.
15 World Bank 2014, 19.
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interests of the USA that helped Turkey join the European/Euro-Atlantic 
institutional system.16 Europe’s attitude towards Turkey was ambiguous, 
especially after Greece’s accession to the EC. Turkey found the rejection 
of its application of 1987 understandable, as the EC had just embarked on 
a process of deepening. Turkey saw the customs union as a sacrifice to 
make for accession, so it was deeply disappointed when in 1997 it was not 
included in the group of candidate countries. Seemingly, its sacrifice had 
been useless.17
In parallel with the adoption of the Customs Union Agreement, polit-
ical relations became increasingly strained. The Greek–Turkish relations 
were worsened by the Aegean Border Dispute, and Greece blocked the 
financial programme related to the customs union. In a declaration of 1997, 
Christian Democrat leaders saw Europe as a “Christian club” with no room 
for Turkey.18 As per Agenda 2000, a Commission document published in 
July 1997, the EU would not enter into negotiations with Turkey, but would 
continue to prioritise bilateral relations. The Luxembourg Decision of 
December 1997 of the European Council corroborated that approach. The 
European Conference, set up in an attempt to offer “compensation”, would 
have been a pre-accession institution accessible for Turkey. Turkey regarded 
it even more outrageous, and suspended all political dialogue with the EU.19
Later, the relations started to improve, and in 1999 Turkey was offi-
cially recognised as a candidate state at the Helsinki summit. Although the 
Turkish economic crises of 1999 and 2001 hindered the process, friendlier 
Greek–Turkish relations and the more supportive attitude of the new Social 
Democrat leaders of Germany improved the chances of the commencement 
of accession negotiations.
5.2. Accession negotiations and doubts
The AKP Government came to power in November 2002. The European Council 
was to pass a decision about the commencement of negotiations about 
Turkey’s full membership on 13 December 2002, in Copenhagen. Erdoğan, 
16 Eralp 2009, 151.
17 Faucompret–Konings 2008, 37.
18 LaGro–Jørgensen 2007, 5.
19 Saatçioğlu 2013, 8.
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who, at the time being, could not become Prime Minister, embarked on 
a European tour to get support. He received support from the UK, Italy, 
Spain, Belgium and, what is more, from Greece, but Germany and France, 
the two most influential member states, decided to wait. Finally, the parties 
agreed on a transitional period of two years during which Turkey had to 
comply with the Copenhagen criteria.20
The EU made it clear that it would not be bound to enter the negotia-
tions, i.e. Turkey’s compliance with all criteria in itself would not suffice, and 
accession as a full member would depend on the EU’s absorption capacity 
as well. Indeed, Turkey is not an average candidate country. In 2016, its 
population was 80 million, which means that, in case of its accession, in 
a few years’ time it would become the most popular member state overtaking 
Germany, where the current population is also 80 million, but is in decline. 
That is a decisive factor in many respects. In the current decision-making 
mechanism of the EU, decisions made by a qualified majority are weighted 
as per population, which would give Turkey a significant political influence. 
Recent years have seen a remarkable economic growth in Turkey; still, the 
per capita GDP rate is below 50% of the EU average, which is a relevant 
factor for the distribution of the EU’s structural and cohesion funding (i.e. 
Turkey would be a net beneficiary). Moreover, Turkey has a significant 
agricultural sector, which, should Turkey accede, would make Turkey 
a beneficiary of agricultural funding, too.
Albeit Turkey complied with the political conditions of constitutional 
and legal amendments, the political forces which opposed its accession 
gained momentum in mid-2004 in the EU. Wolfgang Schüssel, Chancellor 
of Austria voiced this opinion expressly, while Angela Merkel, the then 
head of the opposition party CDU supported the concept of an alternative 
opportunity rather than full membership. The UMP, the then governing 
party in France opposed the negotiations, while Jacques Chirac, the head of 
state, found them acceptable. In October 2005 Turkey (and Croatia) entered 
the accession negotiations with the EU.
In 2013, Croatia became an EU member, while accession remains 
an open question for Turkey – and by now, probably, a receding option. 
Currently, the concept of enlargement is not particularly popular in Europe, 
especially when it comes to the accession of Turkey.
20 Hale–Özbudun 2010, 121.
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In the course of the accession negotiations, Turkey is obliged to adopt the 
acquis, the body of the EU’s community law, broken down into 35 chapters. 
The negotiations, however, stalled in 2010. In 2006, the European Council 
stopped negotiations on 8 chapters, as Turkey failed to comply with its 
obligations of extending the customs union to Cyprus. Three other chapters 
were vetoed by France in 2007. In 2009, Cyprus blocked the opening of 
negotiations on 6 chapters. Finally, 14 negotiating chapters had been opened 
by 2010 (out of which only one was closed provisionally). As other chapters 
were mainly blocked, there were no new areas to negotiate about.
In an attempt to revitalise relations that had stalled in 2010, the European 
Commission launched a “positive agenda” approach, which, however, did 
not serve as a substitution of accession negotiations but was intended to start 
negotiations in those areas where mutually favourable agreements could be 
reached (trade, visas, migration, foreign policy dialogues, energy).21 It was 
partly a result of that process that in 2013 (after France waived its veto) the 
chapter on regional policy was opened. However, the brutality of the action 
taken by the Turkish Government in response to the Gezi Park events in 
the same year exerted a negative influence again.
Turkey has been complaining for long that accession negotiations are 
in fact unilateral processes whereby the state seeking to accede implements 
the EU law in its own legal system. This approach is acceptable in the case 
of smaller countries, given the weight of the negotiating parties; Turkey, 
however, deems that due to its economic and political significance it deserves 
to be treated differently. It aspires to be a full member, but increasingly 
expects to be treated with due respect.
The official reason for the faltering of the process is Turkey’s policy 
towards Cyprus, yet, in fact, it was the opposition of some member states 
(primarily Germany) that hindered the acceleration of the accession. While 
in the 1960s, decisions about Turkey’s European integration were motivated 
mainly by political reasons and were affected by the Cold War interests of 
the USA, in the 1990s European reservations came into the foreground, 
which was one of the reasons why Turkey was denied the candidate status. 
For a long time, the main reasons against accession were summarised as 
follows: Turkey “is too big, too poor, and too Muslim”.22 The EU’s attitude 
21 Szigetvári 2014.
22 Akçapar–Chaibi 2006, 53.
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was and is basically ambivalent. The sections below discuss the factors 
that hinder Turkey’s accession or give rise to fear in the European party.
5.2.1. Cyprus settlement
The Cyprus debate has been a major obstacle in the accession negotiations for 
a long time. After its coming into power, the AKP followed a more relaxed 
policy regarding Cyprus, which, however, was opposed by the Turkish leaders 
in Cyprus (Rauf Denktash) and the military alike. The Annan Plan, aiming 
at the establishment of a federal state of two parts, was acceptable for the 
AKP, yet was rejected by the Turkish leaders in Cyprus and the military.
At the Helsinki summit of 1999, the EU decided that Cyprus could 
become a member state even in the absence of an agreement. The basic 
assumption was that Greek Cypriots would accept the Plan, while pressure 
should be exerted on the Turks.
As per the Plan, a federal state based on the Swiss model would have 
been created of the two parts of the country, which means that the new state 
would have had acted in unified manner externally, but its two constituent 
states would have enjoyed broad autonomy internally. The international-
ly-aided establishment of a new state resembles the events that took place 
in the former Yugoslav republics, where external intervention failed. Yet, 
by contrast to Bosnia, in Cyprus the parties could rely on decades-long 
negotiations which, albeit did not lead to results, served as a basis for the 
Plan. The proposal of more than 200 pages discussed the aspects of the 
federal state and conflict settlement (e.g. territorial division, refugees, real 
estates that would remain in the territory of the other constituent state, the 
citizenship of non-Cypriots, i.e. Greek and Turkish citizens who had settled 
in Cyprus, power structure, etc.). The Annan Plan would have entailed 
compromises for both parties. Albeit it gave more guarantees of security 
for the Turks (who formed a minority), it proposed solutions that would 
have been realistically acceptable for both parties.
In January 2004, a new coalition (led by Mehmet Ali Talat) came to 
power in Turkish Cyprus. It supported the Annan Plan of settlement, because 
it would have secured EU membership. Erdoğan succeeded in convincing 
the military to accept the agreement proposal, elaborated under the auspices 
of the UN. However, the majority of Greek Cypriots – under the leader-
ship of President Tassos Papadopoulos – opposed it, as Cyprus (or more 
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specifically, its part inhabited by Greek population) could become an EU 
member even in absence of an agreement. Consequently, in the referendum 
of 24 April 2004, the majority of the population voted down the proposal 
(75% of Greek Cypriots voted against it, while 65% of Turkish Cypriots 
voted for it). In addition, in the Security Council of the UN, Russia vetoed 
the lifting of the UN sanctions against Turkish Cyprus.23
In the European Council, Papadopoulos made attempts to utilise the 
new membership to ensure that a settlement which favours Greek Cypriots 
be a pre-condition of the accession negotiations with Turkey. However, even 
the Greek Government decided not to support his proposal, so accession 
negotiations started in October 2005.
Turkey denied the recognition of Cyprus until a satisfactory settlement 
of the Cyprus debate is reached. The Additional Protocol – attached to the 
Customs Union Agreement between the EU and Turkey in 2004, at the time 
of the enlargement – extended the scope of the customs union to the ten new 
member states, including Cyprus.24 To implement the agreement, Turkey 
would have been obliged to lift its decades-long ban that prohibits Cypriot 
ships and aeroplanes from using its ports and airports (currently in force as 
a consequence of the non-recognition of Cyprus by Turkey). Turkey, however, 
will not lift the ban until Cyprus lifts the sanctions on Northern Cyprus.
In December 2006, the EU, resorting to a “tougher policy”, blocked 8 
negotiating chapters in an attempt to force Turkey to make a compromise. 
In 2009, Cyprus vetoed the opening of yet another 6 chapters. In 2014, 
negotiations started (for the umpteenth time) between the two parties in 
Geneva. The process reached a promising stage at the end of 2016, yet the 
parties have failed to arrive at a concrete agreement so far.
5.2.2. Migration
For a long time, an argument against Turkey’s integration has been the 
fear that accession would provoke a migration of Turkish citizens. Among 
the European states, Turkey had the highest population growth rate, while 
its per capita income was among the lowest. Turkish labour force started 
to flow massively to Europe in the early 1960s; there were years when 
23 Hale–Özbudun 2010, 124.
24 Talmon 2006.
Turkey’s Dilemmas in Foreign Policy and External Economy…100
EEC countries received 80,000 Turkish foreign workers. The migration 
of Turkish labour force to Germany was allowed by the German–Turkish 
agreement of 1961. Initially, qualified technicians migrated, but later they 
were joined by a growing number of unqualified workers who settled in 
big cities. Afterwards, recruitment started in smaller towns, too. By 1970, 
480,000 Turkish workers had migrated to Germany; by 1974, their number 
had grown to 800,000. Belgium, the Netherlands, France, Switzerland and 
the UK were popular destinations, too. Though Turkish foreign workers had 
originally intended to return to Turkey in a few years’ time, the deterioration 
of the Turkish economic and political situation made them stay. Although 
official recruitment ended when in Europe stagnation set in and the mig-
ration of Turkish labour force slowed down, a growing number of family 
members (40–60,000 persons per year) settled in Western Europe, almost 
exclusively on the basis of family reunification. Currently, approximately 3 
million Turks live in the EU (80% of them in Germany), representing 25% 
of non-EU foreign citizens residing in the EU.
In the 1980s and 1990s, several projections were made on the subject, 
and up to 2030 they forecast the migration of 0.5–4.4 million Turkish 
persons. Obviously, the estimated value was highly dependent not only 
on the demographic trends of Turkey and the EU, but also on the pace of 
economic convergence, job opportunities in Turkey and the developments 
of EU demands and labour market regulations. Though as a consequence 
of the dynamic growth of Turkey’s economy, the migration trend turned 
in the 2000s (as illustrated vividly by the example of Spain and Portugal, 
both of which are more representative of Turkey’s case than Central Eastern 
European countries are), a potential massive inflow of Turkish labour force 
gave rise to fears in many European countries. Currently, the free movement 
of labour is a long way off; for Turkish citizens, even a simple entry to the 
EU is rather difficult due to the visa requirement. Turkey strongly criticises 
the visa regime given that the EU has granted (Schengen) visa waiver to 
all candidate countries and, moreover, to several non-candidate Eastern 
European countries. Turkey regards this situation as highly unsatisfactory, 
pointing out that while Turkish products can enter the EU freely, the regime 
poses serious obstacles for businessmen and tourists. Negotiations on visa 
waiver were launched, but were progressing slowly due to the large number 
of the criteria to comply with.
Since 2012, Turkey has received more than 2 million refugees fleeing 
from the Syrian civil war. In 2015, during the refugee crisis which evolved 
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as the situation in Syria deteriorated, Syrian refugees headed to the EU in 
large numbers. The European asylum system found the situation increas-
ingly difficult to handle. In addressing the refugee crisis that provoked 
political conflicts within the EU, Turkey came to play a key role, given that 
as a buffer state it was the only country that was in the position to stop the 
further influx of refugees. In March 2016, the EU and Turkey agreed that 
Turkey would prevent the massive influx of refugees into Europe and would 
take back those refugees who entered the EU. In return, in the following 
two years the EU would disburse 3 billion euros for the purpose of pro-
viding basic services for the refugees, would accept legal asylum seekers 
in an organised structure, and, as a further commitment, would accelerate 
accession negotiations and introduce visa waiver for Turkey.
5.2.3. Democratic deficit
Europe has been concerned about democracy in Turkey almost since the 
beginnings. Albeit after World War II, Turkey’s political system was democ-
ratised and a multi-party system evolved, the operation of institutions fre-
quently fell short of European norms. In particular, military intervention in 
political life was regarded as unacceptable, even if it was evident that it was 
intended to preserve stability and the secular, Western-type state structure. 
Still, it did not fall in line with the democratic rules of the game. Actions 
taken against terrorists and, sometimes, opposition forces, frequently entai-
led infringements of human rights and fundamental freedoms.
From the 1990s onwards, increasing emphasis has been laid on the 
EU’s requirements of democratisation, and Turkey’s intention to accede 
the EU offered a good opportunity to force compliance. The Copenhagen 
criteria (preconditions of the accession) entail democratic institutions, the 
rule of law and respect for minority rights. The AKP was interested in the 
implementation of the constitutional and legal amendments required for 
compliance with the Copenhagen criteria, as such amendments ensured 
that the military would lose its capacity to intervene in political processes 
or to overturn or ban the governing AKP party, claiming to protect the 
interests of the secular state. The successful reform of the political sys-
tem was appreciated by the EU, which allowed for the commencement of 
accession negotiations.
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After 2006, Erdoğan started to intensify his efforts to concentrate 
power. The rule of law and freedom of the press suffered setbacks. The ref-
erendum of April 2017 endorsed the reforms of the Turkish political system 
and conferred practically full powers on the President of the Republic. As 
a consequence of the political developments contradicting EU intentions, 
concerns have been raised about compliance with the Copenhagen criteria 
and, thus, about whether Turkey is entitled to accede.
5.2.4. The perception of Islam
Though the official positions of the EU do not make any reference to it, 
religion is a major concern about Turkey’s accession. The EU is unwilling 
to integrate an entity that is culturally so different, and is not prepared 
mentally to be enlarged with Turkey, a country of 80 million citizens the 
majority of whom are Muslims.
The way Europeans perceive Islam is basically influenced by two 
factors. Firstly, the behaviour of Muslim communities living in Europe 
and the conflicts arising in the course of coexistence; secondly, by the 
generally negative image created primarily through the media, which has 
been further deteriorated by the terrorist activities in Europe that can be 
linked to radical Islamists.
The large number of Muslims residing in Europe (which often appears 
to be higher than it actually is because of the differences in culture and atti-
tudes) provokes fear about the potential effects the expansion of Islam may 
have on Europe’s social and political life. The question is raised whether 
Muslims are capable of integrating into the world of European society and 
culture, or whether Islam is to be regarded as an element that is “unrelated 
to the system” and will not be assimilated.
Islam attracts attention to several consensuses that had evolved in 
European societies over time, and raises the question of religion’s role in the 
society. Many feel that the concept of secularism is compromised by the fact 
that Islam does not separate church and state strictly, and regards religion as 
a public matter. This is especially problematic in republican France, which 
lacks Christian Democratic traditions and, thus, its political and social public 
life is completely secularised. The French society almost demonises certain 
issues; if, for instance, Muslim schoolgirls wear headscarves at school, it is 
regarded as a serious break with the secular traditions.
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Due to media influence, Islam is linked to terrorism and fanaticism. 
The image has been nurtured by numerous tragic events. In general, the 
movements and groups which have radicalised since the 1970s and came 
under the sway of the extremist forms of Islam had a negative effect on the 
way Islam is perceived. It did not help either that the other side of the coin 
was mostly ignored. Most probably, Muslim victims were portrayed only 
in the case of Bosnia. In other cases, even the attacks against Muslims may 
strengthen the notion of the extremism of Islam.
Turkey’s image, however, is different. Over the last 80 years, Turkish 
political leaders have done everything (sometimes even resorting to overly 
harsh measures) to establish a secularised modern state and society. Moreover, 
in Turkey one of the most moderate and tolerant forms of Islam is prevalent; 
radical expressions of religion are very rare.
The situation is greatly complicated by the fact that the majority of 
Turkish immigrants who arrived in Europe in the 1960s and 1970s were 
uneducated people from rural regions (mostly, from Anatolia), who had 
to cope not only with the problems of moving abroad but also with the 
challenges of moving into a city, which hampered their social integration. 
Social exclusion brought them closer to each other, and nourished their 
strong attachment to their traditions. However, the second and, above all, the 
third generation was very willing to integrate, as evidenced by their better 
language skills, better educational achievement and higher social status, by 
the growing number of mixed marriages and by a declining emphasis on 
religion. Yet the perception of the majority society is different. The emphasis 
laid on the negative examples increases aversion towards foreigners, and, 
recently, specifically against Muslims.
5.3. The EU member states’ relations with Turkey
Examining the political relations between the member states and Turkey, it 
is conspicuous that the member states have differing priorities which shape 
their respective policies. Some countries have traditionally rejected Turkey’s 
accession, while others take an essentially positive stand. The opinion of the 
more important member states including Germany carries particular weight.
The past quarter century has seen a gradual erosion of the formerly rel-
atively close German–Turkish relations. The memory of the German–Turkish 
“comradery in arms” dating from before World War I and prevalent in the 
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interwar years remained strong among the Turks. The myth of German-
friendliness was not limited to politics; large masses of Turks appreciated 
the Germans as an industrious, disciplined and soldierly people. Conversely, 
Germans had a different perception of the Turks: Turkish migrant workers 
relegated to undertake the most menial jobs and, accordingly, were held in 
low esteem. Close political relations were driven by economic and foreign 
policy interests rather than relying on the emotional myth of friendship.
The 1997 Luxembourg decision led to a souring of German–Turkish 
relations, which returned to normal only after the change of government in 
Germany. While the Social Democrats and the Greens governing between 
1998 and 2005 supported Turkey’s accession, the Christian Democrats in 
opposition voiced their concerns. Although Chancellor Merkel’s position 
on the issue was more positive compared to her predecessors, the German 
support to Turkish accession tangibly weakened (or rather disappeared) 
after 2005.
Because of the three million Turkish migrant workers living in Germany, 
Turkey policy and the accession of Turkey is a cardinal issue in German 
political and social discourse.25 Debates are variously based on values 
or interests and are occasionally related to group identity. In recent years 
value-based components (such as human rights and democracy) have come 
into the foreground, although the need to solve the migration crisis put 
greater emphasis on interests. Political differences affect economic relations: 
German keenness and willingness to invest have noticeably ebbed.26 The 
Turkish political showdown after the 2016 coup attempt and the campaign 
preceding the 2017 referendum on constitutional amendments shifting 
the country from parliamentary democracy to a presidential system made 
bilateral political relations particularly tense.
About 70–80% of public opinion in Austria are opposed to Turkish 
accession. Opponents include not only the right-wing Austrian People’s 
Party or the ultra-right populist Freedom Party of Austria; even the Social 
Democratic Party is not particularly eager to support the accession process. 
As a net payer, Austria is wary of Turkish membership because of its high 
costs and possible labour market impacts. Moreover, the presence of over 
250,000 Turks in Austria has strengthened fears of “cultural diversity”27 
25 Hauge 2017.
26 Hauge 2017.
27 Gavenda 2017, 2–3.
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floated mainly in ultra-right rhetoric. While Austrian foreign policy is 
basically in favour of a dialogue in terms of democracy and human right 
issues, the authoritarian turn in recent years has bolstered hard liners’ 
Turkey position within the EU. Turkey’s response to all that was, inter alia, 
to obstruct cooperation between Austria and the NATO.
Motivated by domestic policy, France’s opposition is relatively recent. 
Islamic advancement (for instance in public education) presents a serious 
challenge for a strongly secularised French public life, which has led to 
political emotions running high. In 2006, the Turkish accession issue was 
a factor in the negative outcome of the referendum on the ratification of the 
EU constitution despite President Chirac’s promise, made in an effort to 
appease French public opinion, to have a referendum on Turkey’s accession. 
After his election President Nicolas Sarkozy also actively tried to hinder 
the accession process. Conversely, François Hollande’s socialist presidency 
was marked by a more positive stand, albeit the issue did not evoke massive 
support due to the resistance of French public opinion. At least accession 
negotiations of several pre-accession chapters, earlier vetoed by France, 
could be opened.
There is a sizeable Turkish minority in the Benelux countries and recently 
rising xenophobia has turned public opinion against Turkey’s accession. The 
Dutch presidency in 2004 helped open negotiations but the Dutch ‘no’ to the 
European constitution in 2005 was an indicator of the Dutch public opinion’s 
opposition. Politically, the intensifying autocratic trends in Turkey were regarded 
with repugnance, which culminated in the 2017 referendum campaign for the 
introduction of a presidential system, when the Dutch Government blocked 
Turkish ministers from campaigning in the Netherlands.28
As a stalwart supporter of Atlantic policy and also an advocate for 
a looser EU structure, the United Kingdom traditionally advocated for Turkey’s 
accession. Another reason for British support to enlargement is that it was 
seen as the Union’s political success by propagating stability and European 
values, which also brought along strategic advantages. However, the British 
political atmosphere has changed in recent years, and in the pre-Brexit vote 
campaign Turkish accession emerged as a negative factor. Brexit supporters 
felt threatened by Turkish migration, and even those campaigning to stay 
28 Wiersma 2017, 3.
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put Turkey’s accession into the distant future.29 Still, UK’s exit will reduce 
the number of member states in favour of Turkey’s accession.
The Nordic countries’ main concern regarding Turkey is human rights 
and infringing the rules of democracy. Sweden and Denmark had been at the 
vanguard to criticise the antidemocratic Turkish political system, and Turkey 
retaliated by excluding Swedish and Danish companies from arms import. 
In the early 2000s, Sweden began to support Turkey’s integration efforts and 
welcomed the political reforms occurring in the country. However, in the past 
few years, Nordic criticism of the Turkish Government has become sharper, 
especially because of the measures following the defeated 2016 coup.30
Turkey’s relations are best with the Mediterranean member states. Spain 
is regarded as a friendly state sympathetic to Turkey’s cause, and relations 
with Italy are equally good. Mediterranean solidarity has been manifest 
mainly since the second half of the 1990s, when the European enlargement 
comprised only two small Mediterranean states (Cyprus and Malta) besides 
the ten CEE countries. True enough, Turkey’s accession would have obvious 
disadvantages for the current Mediterranean member states due to a similar 
product structure (primarily in agriculture), and their allocated share of 
EU funds would also be significantly less, yet similarities and the related 
common problems would often result in shared interests and a common 
stand. Close economic relations are the main reason for Italy’s support, 
although the Lega Nord is against Turkey’s accession on an identity basis.31 
Spanish parties, on the other hand, show unfailing support irrespective of 
their differing ideologies, right-wing parties emphasising geostrategic and 
economic factors, and the Socialists pointing at the advantage of European 
integration as a vehicle of modernisation and democratic development.32 
The Spanish public have tended not to reject Turkey’s accession, but some 
doubts have been voiced in the wake of the autocratic changes in recent years.
The public in the new member states takes a less negative view of further 
enlargement, and this is also true for Turkey’s accession. One reason for 
lesser rejection is the absence of Muslim minorities; nevertheless, the migrant 
crisis after 2015 unequivocally highlighted concerns in the Visegrád Group 
about Muslim immigrants, which could boost the opposition to accession. 
29 Tocci 2016, 6.
30 Lindh 2017, 2.
31 Benvenuti 2017, 2.
32 Sökmen – Soler i Lecha 2017, 3.
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However, the official policy of many of the countries (including Hungary) is 
dominated by a value-based approach working towards developing economic 
cooperation and backing Turkey’s accession efforts.33
5.4. EU–Turkey economic relations
Since its inception (1961), Turkey has been a member of the OECD, the orga-
nisation assembling the most developed countries, albeit the Turkish economy 
was the least developed. In 1987, economic problems were stated to be the 
main reason for declaring Turkey not yet ready for accession. In the early 
2000s, Turkey’s GDP per capita was still only around 30% of the EU average.
The rapid growth achieved over the past two decades has changed 
the perception of the Turkish economy. GDP per capita rose above 50% of 
the EU average, ahead of Bulgaria and Romania. No longer a poor looked-
down-upon neighbour, Turkey is also a member of the G20 encompassing the 
world’s strongest economies, and has grown to become one of Europe’s most 
dynamic economies with excellent prospects. This chapter is an overview of 
the EU–Turkey economic relations over the past period.
The 2008 crisis was a turning point in trade. Before the crisis, 50–60% 
of Turkish exports went to the EU; this rate plummeted below 40%, and in 
recent years climbed back to approximately 45%. From the EU’s perspective, 
Turkey’s 1% share of imports and 0.5% share of exports realised in the 1980s 
tripled by 1996. Today 5% of the EU’s exports and over 3% of imports is real-
ised with Turkey, which makes the country the EU’s 4th largest export market 
and 5th largest provider of imports.
The main goods of Turkish exports to the EU, rising in the 1980s, were 
textile and apparel. This, however, has declined due to a changing European 
regulatory environment and mounting Chinese competition: the contri-
bution of this category of products is still 20 billion dollars, but its share 
within Turkish exports to the EU dropped from approximately 50% to 25%. 
Conversely, the export of machinery and transport products has surged. The 
value of transport material exports was around 1 billion dollars in the early 
2000s and soared above 15 billion dollars in 2014. Machine exports grew 
33 Egeresi–Szigetvári 2017, 2–3.
Turkey’s Dilemmas in Foreign Policy and External Economy…108
to 12–13 billion dollars. There has been a lesser rise in the amount of fruit and 
other foodstuffs exported, but their contribution has drastically declined.34
Table 6.
Turkey’s trade with the main EU trade partners (excluding Balkan states)
Exports Imports
2001 2006 2011 2016 2001 2006 2011 2016
Austria 341 710 1,053 1,046 418 1,077 1,736 1,521
Belgium 688 1381 2,451 2,548 985 2,277 3,959 3,201
Czech Republic 109 377 888 804 127 682 1,755 2,561
Denmark 272 827 881 947 196 446 733 910
France 1,895 4,604 6,805 6,023 2,283 7,240 9,230 7,365
Netherlands 892 2,539 3,244 3,590 1,041 2,160 4,005 3,000
Poland 241 1,066 1,758 2,651 168 1,437 3,496 3,244
Hungary 170 486 509 831 187 1,286 1,494 1,301
UK 2,175 6,814 8,151 11,687 1,914 5,158 5,840 5,321
Germany 5,367 9,686 13,951 14,001 5,335 14,768 22,986 21,474
Italy 2,342 6,752 7,851 7,582 3,484 8,650 13,450 10,219
Spain 950 3,720 3,918 4,991 1,066 3,834 6,196 5,679
Sweden 214 787 1,183 1,216 544 1,488 2,284 1,478
Source: TurkStat
Despite the customs union agreement, the EU’s contribution to Turkish 
imports has dropped drastically, from over 50% to below 40%. It was not 
a quantitative drop though; rather slower dynamism, affected by rising 
energy prices as well as the swelling popularity of production locations in 
the Far East.
Germany is Turkey’s main trade partner from among the EU member 
states with a total trade value of over 35 billion dollars, exceeding the com-
bined trade value of second ranking Italy and third UK. Over the past few 
years, trade flows with several traditional partners have stagnated or declined 
(Germany, Italy, Austria, Belgium and Sweden); on the other hand, other 
countries have dynamically increased their share: exports to Poland, the UK 
and Spain have been rising fast. There has been a similar transformation in 
34 European Commission 2016, 31.
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imports: the contribution of traditional partners have lagged or stagnated, 
while that of the Czech Republic, for instance, has greatly increased.
Turkey has a significant, though decreasing trade deficit with the 
European Union: in 2011 the deficit was approximately 30 billion dollars, 
dropping below 10 billion dollars by 2016. The deficit is significant (though 
shrinking) with Germany, Italy, France and Spain while there was a positive 
trade balance with the UK and the Netherlands.
Regarding trade in services, Turkish exports are 16 billion dollars against 
12 billion dollars imports, somewhat offsetting the deficit of trading in goods. 
The main European partners have been Germany and the UK. More than half 
of the inbound tourists come from the EU: 15% from Germany, 7% from the 
UK, 5% from Bulgaria and 4% from the Netherlands.35 However, after the 
terror attacks inbound tourism from the EU plunged 30% in 2016. Compared 
to 5.5 million German tourists customary in previous years, their number 
was only 3.9 million, and the number of British tourists also plummeted 
from 2.2 million to 1.7 million.
Tourism is the most important and most dynamically growing sector 
of Turkish exports of services, contributing with 85%. Some production 
related branches have also expanded in recent years (insurance and infor-
mation technology).36
As mentioned earlier, the EU’s share in FDI in Turkey is 75%, the 
main investors being the Netherlands (15.8%), Austria (7%), the UK (6.8%), 
Luxemburg (6.4%), Germany (6.4%), Belgium (5.9%), Spain (5.5%), Greece 
(4.9%) and France (4.9%). The Dutch dominance is not really attributed to big 
multinational companies (such as Philips, Unilever, Shell, ING and Aegon). 
These big players have been present for a long time but have deployed no 
significant investment in the past few years. New FDI came from other 
Dutch firms, e.g. in 2007 the pharmaceutical company Zentiva acquired 
a 75% stake in Eczacibasi for 460 million euros. Other important investors 
include C&A and Hunkemoller in retail, and Corio, Redevco and Vastned 
in real estate investment. Added to them are investments of numerous big 
multinational companies (Vodafone, Carrefour, IKEA, Ericsson, BAT, GE, 
Alcatel, Bosch, Siemens) deployed through their establishments registered 
in the Netherlands, and even some large Turkish companies (Enka, Vestel, 
Uzel) invest in Turkey through their Dutch subsidiaries.
35 Data from 2015. Source: TurkStat.
36 World Bank 2014, 69.
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Recently Turkish companies have also appeared in the EU as inves-
tors, although capital export is only about a quarter of the incoming FDI 
(in 2015 approximately USD 7 billion). Between 2002 and 2014, 65% of the 
total number of Turkish acquisitions (115) occurred in EU member states, 
the most in Germany (14), Italy (11), the Netherlands (7), Romania (6) and 
France (5).37
5.4.1. Effects of the customs union on Turkey
Despite the disappointments accompanying its conclusion, the customs 
union had in fact a positive effect on the Turkish economy. Foreign trade 
skyrocketed from 57 billion dollars in 1995 to over 390 billion dollars in 
2012 (followed by a slight decline). Turkish exports to the EU started to rise 
especially after the 2001 crisis, when the devaluation of the lira coupled 
with falling domestic demand turned producers towards foreign markets.38 
With the transformation of trade and competition policies, the customs 
union has become a catalyst of the European and global integration of 
Turkey’s economy.39
Yet the perception of the customs union is not univocally positive. 
Turkey’s competitive position improved in textiles, iron and steel and 
automotive exports, and deteriorated in technologically more advanced 
manufacturing exports.40 The growing importance of bilateral free trade 
agreements in the trade policy of the European Union makes the sustainability 
of the customs union even more questionable.41 Turkish Economy Minister 
Zafer Çağlayan said: “I would like to express that if the current situation 
continues, we may have to put the customs union with the EU on the table 
for reassessment, as it is now working against Turkey.”42 He was even more 
categorical when he declared: “Let’s dump the customs union in a trash bin 
and instead conclude a free trade agreement with the European Union.”43
37 Yildirim 2017, 287.
38 İzmen–Yilmaz 2009, 177.
39 Togan 2012.
40 Akkemik 2011.
41 Woolcock 2007, 2.
42 Today’s Zaman 2013.
43 Ozerkan 2013.
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In what follows, we examine the problems arising in conjunction with 
the customs union. The agreement is unique in that no other country entered 
into a customs union agreement with the EU prior to accession. With the 
customs union, Ankara has given up a large portion of its sovereignty to 
shape its own trade policy as it now has to adopt the EU’s trade agreements 
with third countries without adequate participation in the decision-making 
process. While the European Economic Area (EEA) member countries 
(Norway, Iceland, Liechtenstein) also have a limited economic sovereignty 
in exchange for inclusion in the single market, prospective EU membership 
shows a major difference: the EEA countries’ decision to stay outside the 
European Union was mainly their own political choice; but this is not the 
case with Turkey.
Since the introduction of the customs union, the EU has signed free 
trade agreements with a number of third countries. These countries now 
have open access to Turkish markets. Yet Turkish exports do not benefit, as 
the agreements only concern EU products. This asymmetry leaves Turkish 
exporters at a disadvantage and may result in trade deflection. Nevertheless, 
the introduction of origin controls to prevent trade deflection would jeopard-
ise the advantages of the customs union.44 Furthermore, the proliferation 
of FTAs with the EU undercuts the advantages Turkey has traditionally 
enjoyed in EU markets.
As long as the EU signed FTAs with smaller and weaker economies 
(e.g. the Southern Mediterranean and Western Balkan countries), the nega-
tive effect on Turkey was negligible; and Turkey could also sign FTAs with 
these countries, with similar conditions. But the EU started negotiating 
and concluding agreements with more developed countries in growing 
numbers: Mexico (2000), South Africa (2000), Chile (2003), South Korea 
(2011), Canada (2014). FTAs involving countries competing with Turkish 
exports in European and global markets (e.g. Mexico and South Korea) are 
particularly unfavourable for Turkey. Moreover, not all of these countries 
want to engage in free trade with Turkey; they are under no obligation to do 
so, and Turkey is not necessarily able to negotiate agreements with similar 
terms and conditions to those of the EU.45
44 World Bank 2014, 25.
45 Togan 2012, 21.
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The envisioned Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) 
agreement, i.e. the EU–USA free trade agreement whose negotiations started 
in 2013 is an even greater threat to Turkish interests. Estimates put Turkey to 
be the biggest loser, should a TTIP agreement be concluded.46 According to 
the World Bank’s calculations, a TTIP agreement not involving Turkey would 
cause the country a welfare loss of 120–160 million dollars. However, if Turkey 
were also able to conclude an FTA with the US alongside the TTIP agreement, 
then Turkey experiences a welfare gain of 130 million dollars.47 Interestingly 
enough, neither the European Commission’s impact assessment of the TTIP 
nor the CEPR’s paper commissioned by the EC mention Turkey or the effects 
on the customs union.48
How to improve the customs union? In the short term, the best solution 
would be a joint EU–Turkey representation at the free trade negotiations. This 
could guarantee the integrity of the common trade policy and could help eliminate 
eventual future trade distortions.49 The second best solution for Turkey would 
be if the EU concluded FTAs also on behalf of Turkey – given its stronger trade 
positions, the EU could obviously negotiate more favourable terms.
Whether involving Turkey in the negotiations would be beneficial for 
bilateral EU–Turkey relations is only a distant promise.50 All Ankara can 
currently do is to follow in the wake of the EU in negotiating and signing bilat-
eral FTAs with the third countries concerned. At the end of 2016, Turkey had 
17 FTAs running (involving the EFTA countries, the West Balkan countries, 
seven Southern Mediterranean states as well as Georgia, South Korea, Chile, 
Malaysia and Mauritius), and talks are underway with Japan, Mexico, Ukraine 
and several Latin American and African countries. Moreover, Turkey has ini-
tiated free trade negotiations to begin with other countries as well (including 
South Africa, Canada, the USA, India and Indonesia).51
Although the FTAs recently concluded by the EU include a “Turkish 
clause” whereby the third country indicates its intention to also start free trade 
negotiations with Turkey, in its current form the clause has no binding effect.52 
46 Felbermayr et al., 2013.
47 World Bank 2014, 27.
48 European Commission 2013a; François et al. 2013.
49 World Bank 2014, 28.
50 Szigetvári 2016.
51 European Commission 2016, 296.
52 World Bank 2014, 29. 
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A stricter clause, specifying a time frame for signing such an agreement, would 
work better for Turkey.
On the other hand, it is not only a drawback that Turkey’s FTAs with third 
countries do not entirely have to coincide with those concluded by the EU – it 
gives Turkey an opportunity to reach agreements that are better suited to its 
own priorities.
Another disadvantage of the customs union is its relatively limited scope: it 
only concerns industrial and processed agricultural products. However, the EU’s 
so-called Deep and Comprehensive FTAs, already signed in 2014 with three 
Eastern Partnership states (Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia) are considerably 
more comprehensive, comprising agriculture and services. Besides, a wider 
legislative alignment helps integrate these countries into the single market. But 
even “simple” FTAs (for instance those with the RSA and Chile) offer better 
access to the internal market of the EU than the customs union with Turkey.
The expansion of the customs union would thus be necessary, yet its 
implementation is cumbersome. An agreement had been signed regarding 
agricultural products as early as in 1998 and was expanded to include new 
member states in 2006, but it has remained limited mainly because of the Turkish 
import limitation imposed on some food products.53 There were talks between 
2001 and 2004 to include trade in services but they were unsuccessful because 
of the contention over the free movement of people, public procurement and 
recognition of qualifications.
At the end of 2016, the European Commission asked for a mandate to 
launch talks with Turkey to modernise the EU–Turkey customs union. The 
EC’s analysis formulated two proposals: the current customs union could 
be supplemented by an FTA pertaining to trade in services and agricultural 
products; alternatively, the EU–Turkey customs union could be replaced by 
a DCFTA-type agreement.54 It is not clear which of the two options would be 
more beneficial for Ankara. Abandoning the customs union and negotiating 
a new FTA is a costly option: according to World Bank estimates, exports to 
the EU would decline by 3–7%.55 In addition, such a decision would be a neg-
ative projection in respect of Turkey’s prospective EU accession. On the other 
hand, these downsides could be to some extent offset by the trade policy 
freedom regained.
53 World Bank 2014, 57.
54 European Commission 2016.
55 World Bank 2014, 22.
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5.5. The future of relations – possible scenarios
As Turkey is located in Southeast Europe, in the coming decades geopolitical, 
economic and security relations will continue to be of cardinal importance 
for both Turkey and the EU. One of the crucial questions for the future is 
how the EU will develop over the next decades: will it develop into a closer 
federative union or a looser alliance presenting a Europe of nations? Will it 
become a single-speed or a multi-speed integration, or will it disintegrate? 
This book cannot possibly endeavour to address this issue in great depth, 
even though it is paramount for the future of Turkey–EU relations, more 
so than the Turkish political or economic changes.
Basically, the EU–Turkey relations can follow one of three scenarios: 
the enlargement will continue and Turkey will become a full member; an 
alternative possibility of close relations but without full membership; or 
gradual distancing from the EU, which could lead to Turkey abandoning 
the customs union and seeking integration elsewhere.
5.5.1. Full membership
It is difficult to accurately forecast the future regarding Turkey’s accession. 
It is a relatively lengthy process with many imponderables, and radical 
changes can occur along the road in both the EU and Turkey. Every scena-
rio generally has an optimistic, a pessimistic, and somewhere between the 
two, a realistic future vision.56
According to the optimistic version, the accession negotiations will 
continue, every chapter will be closed with some areas subject to temporary 
derogation, but Turkey can join the EU as a full member. This scenario also 
presupposes changes of the EU mechanisms to allow Turkey’s integration: 
transformation and improving the efficiency of the decision-making struc-
ture, a fundamental budget reform, and the rationalisation of some of the 
policies. It also assumes a shift of emphasis from solidarity to efficiency and 
competitiveness. This would create the conditions for growth in Turkey, and 
with an annual economic growth rate exceeding 5% over the long term, the 
country would become a driving force of European development.
56 Tocci 2016, 5.
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The events of recent years have made the above scenario less and less 
realistic. The enlargement policy has been one of the strongest foreign policy 
tools of the EU, allowing the Union to effectively influence economic and 
political processes in neighbouring countries. In the past years, however, 
the transformative strength of the EU has fallen away spectacularly.57 
Despite the EU’s official commitment to enlargement, the member states 
are increasingly against it on a national level due, to some extent, to the 
EU’s economic and political problems, the long-delayed reforms (with their 
institutional impacts and financial consequences, etc.), as well as to concerns 
related to the labour market and the European identity.58 As a result, the EC 
officially accepted the fact that the EU has taken a break from enlargement, 
which for decades had been the European success story.59
Notwithstanding these processes, in 2013 Croatia joined as the 28th 
member state and currently there are six official candidates for membership. 
Iceland’s application process was halted by its own reservations regarding 
the common fisheries policy. The smooth accession of the West Balkans 
countries is hindered by the applicants’ politics, legal system and insufficient 
economic preparation. However, accession is an unquestionable priority for 
these countries, and geopolitical realities also predestine them to become 
EU member states – if not in the near future, at least in the long run.
Turkey’s case is less obvious as only 3% of its territory is situated in 
Europe. While accession would be the ultimate realisation of a dream of 
the past nine decades, full membership is not vital for Turkey. Nevertheless, 
Ankara has not given up their accession plans.
One of the most significant obstacles barring the progress of negotiations 
is the intractable Cyprus issue; it is the reason why the EU, or Cyprus, blocks 
the opening of most chapters. Still, even if the Cyprus peace negotiations 
renewed in 2014 were successful, continuing with the Turkish accession 
process would not be simple. It would require the key countries (Germany 
and France) to unequivocally line up in support of the Turkish accession. 
Based on the development of recent years, this seems hardly likely.
Conversely, it is also palpable that neither party is interested in discon-
tinuing the accession process as each regard the other as a special partner. 
The idea of discontinuing the negotiations was raised after the crackdown 
57 Öniş–Kutlay 2013, 1409.
58 Archick–Morelli 2014.
59 Juncker 2014.
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following the failed coup attempt in 2016 and the 2017 constitutional 
amendment,60 but the EU heads disagreed. As Sigmar Gabriel, the German 
Foreign Minister put it: “Breaking off the accession talks, it would be the 
completely wrong reaction […]. In NATO, we did not even exclude Turkey 
even during the times of military dictatorship (there). Why should we now 
have an interest in pushing it in the direction of Russia?”61 Positive state-
ments come regularly from the Turkish side too. Egemen Bağis, Turkey’s 
Minister for EU Affairs said: “The EU is the grandest peace project in the 
history of mankind […] Turkey, being the most eastern part of the West, 
and the most western part of the East, can turn this continental project into 
a global peace project.”62 In spite of all this, the chance of freezing the 
accession process has increased: a move such as, for instance, the restoration 
of the death penalty – as indicated by President Erdoğan earlier – would 
expectably force the EU to take this step.
5.5.2. Privileged partnership
This is the realistic scenario. The basic institutional reforms of the European 
Union are only partially carried through, which means that Turkey should 
be joining an EU similar to its current form; alternatively, the EU may opt 
for a multi-speed integration. This brings back uncertainty into Turkish 
political life; economic and social reforms decelerate or come to a stands-
till. Accession negotiations have been closed but in some areas special 
conditions prevail. Turkey is therefore accorded partial integration instead 
of full member status.
The idea of “privileged partnership” offered to Turkey as an alternative 
of full membership has been around in German politics for a long time.63 
Other authors also contemplate the idea of “something more than the 
EEA but less than full membership”,64 or of a virtual membership some-
where between strategic partnership and the bilateral Swiss agreements.65 
60 Austria and also the European Parliament called for a freeze on membership talks.
61 Idiz 2017. French Foreign Minister Jean-Marc Ayrault and High Representative of the 
EU for Foreign Affairs Federica Mogherini made similar statements.
62 Quoted by: Abbas 2013.
63 Saatçioğlu 2013, 14.
64 Duff 2013.
65 Ülgen 2012.
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At present, Turkish politics rejects any alternative – understandably, as 
a second class membership would be humiliating for Turkey. So the ques-
tion remains: What would be the best solution to keep Turkey without fully 
integrating it?
Much depends on how the future of the European integration develops: 
to what extent will the Union remain homogeneous, or to what extent will 
it mutate into a multi-speed Europe with member states at differing levels 
of integration. In this respect Brexit could have a significant impact not 
only because Turkey has lost one of its key supporters but also because the 
UK–EU relationship would definitely make a set of special terms tailored 
specifically for Turkey more palatable.
Although Ankara has been committed to the accession negotiations, the 
inequity of positions has always been considered a problem. Currently the 
accession negotiations practically mean the unilateral adoption of the acquis 
communautaire. Thus they are not negotiations in the real sense of the word 
as they are not about the contents but only about the method and itinerary 
of harmonisation. Aware of its growing economic and political strength, 
Turkey has been increasingly apprehensive of this procedure. Moreover, 
the EU’s credibility and consistency has recently suffered a severe blow.66 
At the same time, notwithstanding the absence of official talks, Turkey 
goes on with harmonisation in many areas, since the adoption of European 
standards and legislation bring forward-looking changes in many areas of 
economic and social life.
In 2012 a new “positive agenda” was launched with the intention to 
bring fresh dynamics and a new momentum into the accession talks.67 The 
main intent was to bring positions closer together in areas that are mutually 
important to the two parties. This approach was more to Turkey’s liking, 
as at last they were handled as an equal partner.
One of the key areas was foreign policy, especially in the period 
following the Arab Spring. If the EU intends to become a global player or 
strives to exercise a greater influence on processes in its neighbourhood, 
due to its strategic position Turkey can be a key partner here. Irrespective 
of the accession talks, the idea of an expanded political cooperation with 
66 Zihnioğlu 2014, 154.
67 European Commission 2012.
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enhanced Turkish involvement in the common foreign and security policy 
should be given more serious consideration.68
Energy is another important area for both the EU and Turkey. The EU’s 
dependence on imported energy is significant and is expected to increase 
in the near future despite dropping usage and growing amounts of energy 
generated domestically from renewable sources. Turkey has assumed a key 
position in this respect as an alternative route to pipe Russian natural gas to 
Europe (TurkStream), and also as a transit route for gas acquired from alter-
native sources (via the Nabucco, then later the TANAP pipeline), but Turkey 
would also be a transit route for gas for the European markets coming from 
the recently explored Mediterranean gas fields. Turkey has been consciously 
building its standing in energy diplomacy, securing a special position in 
terms of EU interests whatever the future holds for the accession process.69
The future of trade relations is equally crucial. Without full membership 
or involvement into the EU decision-making institutional system, maintaining 
the customs union is becoming increasingly expensive for Turkey. Turkish 
interests, therefore, require the revamping of the customs union. Talks 
have been started but there is still a long way to go until their conclusion.
5.5.3. Outside the EU
According to a pessimistic scenario, the basic institutional reforms of the 
European Union are not only partially carried through but only a fraction 
of them is implemented, which means that Turkey should be joining an EU 
very similar to its current form. The internal reform of the member states is 
equally slow, and the EU’s global position is gradually slipping. In Turkey 
reforms are halted. The country becomes uncertain ground for investors, 
the economic output is declining, and domestic tensions are rising. Ankara 
is unable and unwilling to comply with the EU’s conditions; the accession 
talks reach a dead end and are definitively terminated.
As the negative scenario unfolds, EU–Turkey relations are charac-
terised by growing alienation and conflicts in the coming years. This sce-
nario is underscored by numerous events that occurred over the past few 
years. Internal EU phenomena (crisis of the European integration project, 
68 Fagersten et al. 2013.
69 Okumus 2012.
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the rise of populism, xenophobia and Euroscepticism, etc.), as well as 
changes within Turkey (authoritarian tendencies, search for internal ene-
mies) foreshadow increasing conflicts. As can be seen, the member states’ 
support of the Turkish accession is on the wane. The floundering accession 
talks and critical, often hostile, manifestations on the EU side are met with 
mounting impatience. President Erdoğan said in 2013 that the EU will lose 
Turkey if the country has not joined by 2023 (the centenary of the Republic 
of Turkey).70 Some say the real surprise is that Turkey is still interested in 
the “European project” at all.71 It has also been raised in the context of the 
FTA negotiations between the EU and the United States (TTIP) that unless 
involved, Turkey is at a crossroads of choosing whether to remain anchored 
in the West, or fundamentally shift its axis eastward toward Eurasia.72
Ankara has several options to seek integration outside the EU. One is the 
Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC) signed by 11 states in Istanbul in 
1992 and transformed into an Organisation in 1999. Its members are Turkey, 
Russia, Ukraine, and several Balkan and South Caucasus states.73 The pri-
mary goal of the cooperation is to improve unreasonably scarce trade and 
economic relations between the Black Sea countries. In many respects the 
BSEC has not fulfilled expectations, partly due to a lack of interest by some 
members, and also because of the conflicts arising between them. Russia has 
been particularly active within the organisation, therefore Turkey tried to raise 
the EU’s interest through Greece in order to create a possibility of involving 
EU funds, and in general, to shift EU interest towards the region. However, 
the BSEC was unable to act as an effective vehicle to promote multilateral 
synergy: conflicts between Russia and Georgia, and those involving Romania 
caused the unanimous votes required for decisions to run aground.74
The Shanghai Cooperation Organisation was created in 2001 by Russia, 
China and four Central Asian republics.75 Focusing initially on security 
issues (common action against terrorism, separatism, extremist movements, 
drug trafficking and crime), the organisation’s scope has been expanded to 
70 Euractiv 2013.
71 Abbas 2013.
72 Lin 2014.
73 In addition to countries with a Black Sea coastline, members include Albania, Armenia, 
Azerbaijan, Greece and Serbia. The accession of Cyprus and Macedonia was vetoed 
by Turkey and Greece respectively.
74 Tanrisever 2012, 14–15.
75 The Shanghai Five was established in 1996. Uzbekistan joined in 2001.
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include common infrastructure projects in the field of energy, transport 
and telecommunications, and coordination is also regular in economic 
and cultural issues. In 2010 the possibility of enlarging the organisation 
was accepted, although no new members have joined to date. Several 
countries (including India, Pakistan, Iran and Mongolia) have observer 
status, and Turkey has been a so-called “dialogue partner” since 2012. Mr. 
Erdoğan, then Prime Minister, declared: “If we get into the SCO, we will 
say good-bye to the European Union. The Shanghai Five is better – much 
more powerful.”76 But there is little chance for affiliation: although Russia 
and some of the Central Asian states would be in favour, China is not 
committed to the idea.77 What is more, if Turkey were to join, this would 
undermine its relationship not only with the EU but also with NATO. 
Admittedly, the SCO’s goals are positive regarding the region’s security 
and prosperity, the organisation is blatantly anti-NATO and, more gen-
erally, intends to curb the spreading of western and universal democratic 
values over its “territory.”
The Eurasian Economic Union is also a possible framework for coop-
eration. The Eurasian Customs Union formed in 2010 by Russia, Belarus 
and Kazakhstan and the Eurasian Economic Space created in 2013 (with 
Ukraine among its members) was transformed into an Economic Union 
as of 1 January 2015. Most of the former Soviet republics were offered 
membership. Armenia and Kirgizstan joined, while Georgia, Moldova and 
Ukraine have signed FTAs with the EU.
President Nazarbayev of Kazakhstan proposed the admission of Turkey, 
India and Syria in the EAEU. Ankara is potentially interested but affiliation 
would only be possible if Turkey terminated the customs union with the 
EU. The economic rationale does not support the idea of swapping the EU 
for the EAEU as Turkish export to the EU is almost four times bigger than 
to Eurasia.78 In addition, there would be “insider” opponents to Turkey’s 
EAEU affiliation, for instance Armenia aspiring at membership, whose 
main trading partner is Russia but its borders with Turkey are closed, and 
there is practically no trading between the two countries.
If Turkish accession to the Eurasian Economic Union is not on the 
agenda, Ankara raised the idea to sign a free trade agreement with the 
76 Pantucci–Petersen 2013.
77 Sakaoğlu 2013.
78 Veliyev 2013, 97.
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EAEU. But currently even this is not possible, because Turkey is bound 
by EU trade policy whereby unless the EU sings an FTA with Russia, in 
theory Turkey cannot do so either.
Economically not quite so relevant as yet, the Economic Cooperation 
Forum (ECO) is another existing formation. Established in 1985 by Turkey, 
Iran and Pakistan, the ECO was enlarged in 1992 by the five Central Asian 
post-Soviet republics, as well as Azerbaijan and Afghanistan, and assembles 
the non-Arab Muslim states of the region. While the organisation’s goal 
is to improve intra-organisation trade and economic relations, the imple-
mentation is fraught with difficulties caused by missing infrastructure. 
Trade is controlled by bilateral agreements, and no comprehensive regional 
cooperation exists.
D-8 is an inception initiated by Turkey and comprises the largest Muslim 
countries (Turkey, Bangladesh, Egypt, Indonesia, Iran, Malaysia, Nigeria 
and Pakistan). It is based on the idea of Necmettin Erbakan, leader of the 
Turkish Islamist movement, who started to organise cooperation in 1996, 
during his brief period as Prime Minister. D-8 was eventually created after 
his fall from power. D-8 represents a greater economic strength compared 
to ECO79 and offers cooperation in a number of areas; however, its real 
economic potential is not very great as the member countries are scattered 
rather than forming a contiguous bloc.
Assessing alternatives outside the EU, a possible way for Turkey seems 
to be the “opening up to the East”, given the country’s geographical position 
and cultural ties. The economic problems and declining demand of the 
EU coupled by a faltering accession process have pushed Turkey towards 
diversifying its external economic relations and seeking new markets. The 
next chapters will explore to what extent these emerging relations could be 
an alternative to the European Union.
79 While ECO represents a combined population of 460 million and 1,600 billion dollars 
in GDP (or 4,700 billion dollars on purchasing power parity), D-8 has a combined 
population of 1.1 billion and approximately 4,000 billion dollars GDP (10,800 billion 
dollars on PPP).
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Chapter 6  
Neighbouring Regions
This chapter addresses the three neighbouring regions and the states in 
these regions. Most of them earlier belonged to the Ottoman Empire. 
Regarding the Balkans not only the Western Balkans is analysed, but also 
the relations with the Balkan countries which are already members of the 
EU. North Africa is examined together with the Middle East, and Ukraine 
together with the Caucasus.
6.1. The Balkans1
Most of the area belonged to the Ottoman Empire from the 15th to the late 
19th century. In most countries the Ottoman past still has an impact, it evo-
kes positive historical memories in some countries and regions (Albania, 
Bosnia, Kosovo, part of Macedonia and the Serbian Sandzak), while elsewhere 
it evokes negative ones. For many decades Turkey had a passive attitude 
towards the Balkans, relations were complicated by historical and ideolo-
gical differences. Economic opening-up in the eighties and nineties proved 
to be insufficient to revitalise relations, but changes in Turkey’s internal and 
foreign policy after 2002 dramatically altered the country’s relations with 
the surrounding regions including also the Balkans.
Many thought that a certain kind of “neo-Ottomanism” could be iden-
tified in the foreign policy activism of Turkey.2 Ahmet Davutoğlu, former 
Foreign Minister of Turkey detailed his position during his visit to Bosnia 
in 2009: “The Ottoman centuries of the Balkans were success stories. Now 
1 In the framework of subsections about the Balkans, we will also analyse the four EU 
member states, Bulgaria (member of the EU since 2007), Croatia (2013), Greece (1981) 
and Romania (2007).
2 See for example Taspinar 2008; Rüma 2010; Somun 2011.
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we have to reinvent this. Turkey has returned.”3 Turkish foreign policy 
concerning the Balkans is based on three elements. The first element is 
strengthening relations with traditional partners. These partners include 
the Muslim-majority Albania, Bosnia and Macedonia, the latter two with 
significant Muslim populations, also Kosovo and Bulgaria where Turkish 
minority is around 10%. The second element is the opening-up towards 
countries with which relations are not settled: primarily Greece, Serbia and 
partly Montenegro. The third element is promoting stability in the region by 
mediation and supporting multilateral initiatives. The Istanbul Declaration 
initiated by Turkey and aimed at the reconciliation between Serbia, Croatia 
and Bosnia is part of this element.
Historically and geographically the Balkans is situated in the intersec-
tion of three regional powers: Europe, Russia and Turkey, also reflected in 
the religious division: Western Christianity, Eastern Orthodoxy and Islam 
are equally part of tradition and everyday life. In recent years “struggle” 
for the Balkans has intensified both in the economic and political fields, 
also indicated by high-ranking state officials visiting the region including 
Angela Merkel, Vladimir Putin or Recep Tayyip Erdoğan.
While Europe can enhance its appeal by promising integration, and 
Russia can do the same by promising cheap energy and the opportunity of 
switching on to the gas network under construction, Turkey has become 
popular through its development model which is promising also for the less 
developed countries and through its increasing investments in the region. 
Furthermore, religious and cultural similarity forms part of Turkey’s “soft 
power” for the Muslim population of the area.4 Although some consider only 
the rhetoric side of Turkey’s presence significant and not the economic help 
and perspective,5 Turkey is present in almost every country of the region 
and expands its interests dynamically.
Greek–Turkish relations were traditionally characterised by hostilities 
or rivalry. The most acute problems were the Cyprus issue and the Aegean 
border dispute. Despite the NATO membership of the two countries, armed 
conflicts were imminent many times. Following its 1981 EU accession, 
3 See Cain 2010.
4 See Idriz 2011. This was an obligation relating to the EU customs union because the 
Stabilisation and Association Agreement between the EU and the Balkan countries 
included the free trade agreement.
5 See The Economist 2011.
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Greece prevented Turkey’s integration steps, the 1995 Ankara Agreement 
could only be reached in exchange for serious political concessions (inte-
gration perspective of the divided Cyprus).
However, relations with Greece have improved dramatically over the 
last two decades. After the 1999 Istanbul earthquake the two countries signed 
bilateral agreements. Although the Greek opposition protested against the 
start of accession negotiations with Turkey, the Greek Government now 
supports Turkey’s accession to the EU, which is surprising after the past 
decades. The Greek society is divided, however, support of further enlarge-
ment is highest in the country (56%); among the old member states, Greeks 
are less enthusiastic about Turkey’s accession.
Macedonia was scarcely included in Turkey’s trade and investment 
destinations for a long time. This is interesting because Macedonia is 
one of Turkey’s closest allies in the region. In addition to memories of the 
past – Kemal Atatürk, whose museum is in Bitola, studied in the town – the 
two countries were linked by the opposition to the Greeks.6
6.1.1. Turkey’s economic influence in the Balkans
Turkey’s return to the Balkans is indicated also by the intensifying econo-
mic relations. Turkey has concluded free trade agreements with all Western 
Balkan countries; in addition, it has also signed visa waiver agreements 
with the states of the region. Turkey’s economic growth in respect of the 
EU member states was even more convincing.7 Turkey had previously 
low-level relations with these countries because of ideological (Bulgaria, 
Romania) or historical (Greece) differences. However, the 2000s have 
brought radical changes here.
6 Turkey was one of the most enthusiastic states about Macedonia’s accession to NATO. 
Turkey recognises the name Macedonia in contrast to the United Nations and other 
countries which use the name FYROM (the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia) 
due to Greek protests.
7 Szigetvári 2015.
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6.1.2. Trade relations
After the 2000s, Turkey’s trade with the Balkans increased from 2.9 billion 
(2000) to 17.7 billion dollars (2007). Following a minor recession after the 
economic crisis, trade peaked in 2013 at 19 billion dollars, then dropped to 
15 billion dollars by 2016. Nevertheless, the importance of the Balkans in 
Turkey’s foreign trade is still not significant, its share is 6–7% in exports 
and 3–4% in imports.
Turkey’s most important partners are Greece, Bulgaria and Romania. 
Croatia, which joined the EU in 2013, has a much smaller economic weight, 
but it has large growth potentials. These countries represent 80–90% of 
Turkey’s trade with the Balkans, at the same time these countries account 
for 85% of the region’s GDP, so the share of non-EU Western Balkan coun-
tries is not too significant.
The largest trade volume has emerged with Romania; Turkey was for 
years Romania’s fourth most significant export partner and the most important 
among the non-EU countries, although recent years brought decline also 
in this field, 7.5 billion dollars turnover fell below 5 billion. Bilateral trade 
is diversified and is dominated by manufactured products, but Romanian 
export of raw materials is also significant. However, Romanian trade surplus 
has favoured Turkey in recent years.
The value of bilateral trade with Greece increased from 600 million 
dollars in 2001 to 5.6 billion in 2013, but while bilateral trade had been 
characterised by Turkish surplus for a long time, in 2013 a 2 billion dol-
lars Greek surplus was generated. Greek exports consist mainly of raw 
materials (oil, cotton), while Turkish export is more diversified (primary 
agricultural products, clothing, machinery and metals). Trade slumped to 
2.6 billion dollars by 2016 mainly due to a decline in Greek exports, and 
Turkish surplus became regular.
Similarly to Greece, in Bulgaria historical aversions were overridden 
by economic interests. Bilateral trade developed dynamically in the 2000s; 
Turkey became Bulgaria’s most important partner with over 4 billion dol-
lars turnover. While Bulgaria exports primarily raw materials and heavy 
industry, Turkey’s export consists mainly of machinery products, vehicles 
and electronic products.
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Table 7.
Turkey’s foreign trade with the Balkan countries (million dollars)
Exports Imports
2001 2006 2011 2016 2001 2006 2011 2016
Bulgaria 299 1,568 1,623 2,384 394 1,663 2,475 2,140
Greece 476 1,603 1,553 1,428 266 1,045 2,569 1,185
Croatia 30 214 242 278 17 61 311 134
Romania 392 2,350 2,879 2,671 481 2,669 3,801 2,196
Albania 73 214 271 305 4 13 126 21
Bosnia 28 151 268 309 5 9 90 288
Kosovo n/a 76 265 261 n/a 2 10 9
Macedonia 89 173 299 378 9 56 92 83
Montenegro n/a 8 27 52 n/a 1 15 23
Serbia 81 279 355 582 7 49 213 288
Source: TurkStat
Although Turkish–Croatian relations started to develop relatively late, 
Croatia’s importance is appreciated by its 2013 EU accession, even if it is 
less reflected in trade flows. Turkey exported over 200 million dollars per 
year in the recent period (automotive goods, electric devices, steel and tex-
tile industry products), but the country’s imports, which consist mainly of 
oil industry products, ore and fertilizer, are rather volatile.
As a result of improving political relations, Serbia is becoming an 
increasingly significant Balkan partner for Turkey. The free trade agreement 
signed between Ankara and Belgrade in 2010 and the introduction of visa-
free regime in January 2011 contributed to the development of relations: 
in January–February 2011, bilateral trade was 10% higher year-on-year. 
Bilateral trade in 2016 already exceeded 850 million dollars which included 
582 million dollars exports from Turkey (textile fibres, fruit and vegetable, 
electronic devices) and 288 million dollars imports (products of oil industry, 
iron and steel, cereals).
From among the non-EU Balkan countries Albania and Bosnia were 
Turkey’s main partners previously, but trade has become more intense with 
Macedonia and Kosovo.
Many bilateral agreements were concluded with Bosnia including the 
1998 free trade agreement, entered into force in 2002. Ankara also singed 
an FTA with Albania in 2006.
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Bilateral trade with Bosnia reached 600 million dollars in 2016; Turkey 
had a slight export surplus. From among the Western Balkan countries 
Bosnia has the most balanced trade relations with Turkey.
Import increased dynamically to Albania, but Turkish products (steel 
products, textile articles, grains, electronic devices), exceeding 300 million 
dollars, are hardly compensated by Albanian products; Albanian export 
(mainly iron and steel products) which was previously around 100 million 
dollars declined significantly in recent years.
We can experience increasing trade with Macedonia. Signed in 1999, 
the FTA eliminated all customs duties by 2008, but resulted primarily in 
the expansion of Turkish exports, trade in the opposite direction was much 
lower. Compared to Turkish political relations, paradoxically, Macedonia’s 
economic relations are closer to hostile Greece.
Turkey concluded an FTA with Kosovo in 2013, ahead of the EU.8 
Bilateral trade increased asymmetrically, Turkish exports amounting to 
250–300 million dollars were hardly matched by Kosovan products. Turkey 
is currently Kosovo’s fourth most important trading partner after Macedonia, 
Serbia and Germany.
Montenegro is not a priority destination for Turkish products and 
investment, however, the 2008 FTA and lifting the visa requirement boosted 
bilateral relations. Turkey’s exports amounted to 52 million dollars and 
imports, to 23 million dollars in 2016 – not a high value, but a dynamic 
expansion over previous years.
6.1.3. Investment
The Balkans’ share in Turkey’s foreign investment is higher compared to 
trade. In 2009, 4.6 billion (16%) of Turkey’s 28 billion capital export was 
deployed in the region in 2009, mainly in infrastructure investments (com-
munication, banking, road construction, retail).9 Regarding the volume of 
investment, EU member states were the most important partners also in 
this case.
8 The conclusion of the agreement between the EU and Kosovo was hindered by the fact 
that five EU member states do not recognise Kosovo’s independence. Finally the EU 
signed the agreement in 2015.
9 See Turkish–Balkan Commercial Ties 2011.
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Turkish companies invested more than 6 billion dollars in Romania, 
primarily in banking and insurance,10 chemical industry, textile industry, 
logistics and tourism.11 Turkish construction enterprises are also important 
contractors in Romania’s construction sector, with projects implemented 
exceeding 6 billion dollars.
Turkey is a remarkable investor also in Bulgaria, where two Turkish 
banks and over a thousand Turkish companies are operating with almost 2 
billion dollars capital investment. Besides the financial sector, the following 
sectors are prominent: glass manufacturing, tourism, textile and petrochem-
ical industry, vehicle electronics manufacturing and food industry. Şişecam 
established 5 glass manufacturing plants with 400 million dollars capital 
employed, Alcomet is a dominant actor in aluminium production, Doğuş 
Group is a key player in the construction sector. Bulgaria, Turkey and Qatar 
agreed on the development of the Bulgarian motorway network in 2012; in 
the framework of the agreement a 300-kilometre-long motorway section 
will be built between Svilengrad (Turkish border) and Ruse (Romanian 
border) for 800 million dollars in a public–private partnership scheme.12
Greece was the only significant investor in Turkey from the region. 
Over the past decade, approximately 7 billion dollars Greek FDI was 
deployed in Turkey, mainly in the banking sector (two Greek banks were 
launched), but telecommunications, food industry and tourism were also 
favourite investment targets.13 Turkish investors also appeared in Greece; 
currently the value of their capital investment is about 500 million dollars. 
Ziraat Bank opened many branches, but infrastructure, real estate market 
and tourism are also popular with Turkish investors. The Greek financial 
crisis starting in 2010 and privatisation plans in response to the debt crisis 
offered new opportunities: the 23 Aegean ports offered for sale aroused the 
interest of the Turkish Limak Holding.
After Italy and Greece, Turkey is the third most important investor 
in Albania with more than 80 Turkish companies operating in the coun-
try. The most important one is Çalik Holding which, jointly with Türk 
Telekom, has acquired through privatisation 76% of the shares of Albtelecom 
10 Two Turkish-owned banks are the Credit Europe and Garanti Bank Romania.
11 See Posirca 2012.
12 See Tokyay 2012.
13 The financial crisis affected Greek investment, the National Bank of Greece sold its 
99.81% share in Turkish Finansbank to Qataris (Republic of Turkey Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs s. a.).
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national telephone service provider for 120 million euros in 2007. Currently, 
Albtelecom provides services for about one third of the Albanian households 
and provides more than 50% of broadband internet connections. Albtelecom 
established its mobile service provider company, Eagle Mobile, in March 
2008. CETEL (a subsidiary of Çalik Holding) invested 70 million euros 
in development during the first three years and Eagle became the third 
biggest service provider with a 12% share by 2010. In 2006, Çalik Holding 
bought 60% of the shares of BTK, the second largest bank, then acquired 
the remaining 40% in 2009. Albaraka Türk, one of the most important 
Islamic banks in Turkey, is also planning to extend its operation to Albania.
Turkey is the fourth most important investor also in Bosnia after 
Austria, Slovenia and Germany, with investments exceeding 132 million 
euros by 2011.14 Founded in 1997, TZBB (Turkish Ziraat Bank Bosnia) was 
the first bank in Bosnia established with foreign capital. The initial capital 
was 10 million German marks, raised by 15 million German marks in 2000, 
so TZBB has become one of the biggest banks in Bosnia. This position 
was strengthened by further capital increases in 2004 and 2007. In 2008, 
Turkish Airlines has bought 49% of the shares of the Bosnian national air-
lines BiH Airlines; the majority of the shares remained in state ownership. 
Following Kosovo, Bosnia is the second largest beneficiary of Turkish aid 
in the Balkans. However, Turkey’s activity in Bosnia has recently been 
criticised repeatedly (mainly by local Serbs), and Turkey is less and less 
able to mediate between the Bosnian parties. Besides, Turkey’s interest is 
also distracted from Bosnia by Serbian opportunities.
Over the past decade Turkish businessmen became active in Kosovo, 
where Turkey is the third largest investor after Germany and the United 
Kingdom. The Kosovan Agency for Promoting Foreign Investments (APIK) 
registered 405 Turkish companies and more than 2,300 Turkish employees 
mainly in the field of construction, education, tourism, health care, telecom-
munications and trade.15 The most active companies were Bechtel Enka, 
Limak Group (construction), Ziraat, TEB and BKT (banking). Turkish 
companies realised 1.2 billion dollars in investment until 2014. In 2011, 
Limak and the French Aeroport de Lyon have jointly acquired the rights to 
operate Pristina’s two international airports for 20 years and made a com-
mitment to invest 100 million euros (construction of a new terminal).16 
14 See Sostaric 2011.
15 See Karadaku 2011.
16 See Brajshori 2011.
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Bechtel-Enka has won a 700 million euros tender for the construction of 
a motorway between Pristina and Durres (Albania), with possible connection 
to Serbia. Turkey shows interest in the privatisation of the Kosovan Post and 
Telecommunications Company and more state-owned companies. Turkey 
is also present in the Kosovan education and health sector, it has agreed 
with Kosovan authorities on the construction of the Medicana Turkish 
international hospital. Turkish companies are popular in Kosovo, many 
young people speak or learn Turkish, and many of them consider working 
in Turkey a great opportunity.
Fierce competition emerged between Greek and Turkish investors in 
Macedonia. Greek companies acquired many concessions at the beginning 
of the 2000s, Hellenic Petroleum has bought the oil refinery near Skopje 
in 1999. Greek companies invested 380 million euros in Macedonia until 
2010; at the same time Turkish companies invested only 50 million euros. 
Interest shown by Turkish companies became more intense after 2005. In 
2008, TAV Turkey acquired a 20-year concession to operate Skopje and 
Ohrid airports and committed itself to realise airport infrastructure devel-
opment (new runway, cargo buildings, modernisation) amounting to 200 
million euros within 2 years; in addition, the construction of a new airport 
in Stip is planned within 10 years.17 Turkish specialists are also working in 
the Macedonian financial sector (Halk Bank).
Turkish companies are also interested in the evolving Serbian privati-
sation, companies expressed their interest in JAT Airways18 (now faced with 
debts), the telecommunications company (Telekom Srbija) and the largest 
car and truck manufacturer (FAP Korporacija), but eventually these projects 
were not realised. Regarding the reconstruction of Nis airport, Turkish com-
panies were about to participate, having successfully implemented similar 
projects in the region.19 In addition to opening a branch in Belgrade, the 
state-owned Turkish Halk Bank has acquired the Serbian Cacanska Bank 
(having 23 branches) and is planning to expand. Turkish investors are also 
interested in retail and the entertainment industry.
In Serbia, Muslim-majority Sandzak attracts Turkish companies’ atten-
tion most. Even though it may carry political risks, in this region burdened 
17 Duridanski 2011.
18 This airline company ceased to exist, Etihad has become co-owner of the newly-es-
tablished Air Serbia.
19 Lynch 2015.
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by ethnic conflicts, the influx of FDI is favourable for Serbia as economic 
development can mitigate the region’s problem.20 Turkish investors have 
already discovered the region, Turkish clothing company Jeanci employs 
1,100 people in its two Serbian factories, one of them being in Sandzak.21 
Three major construction companies are involved in the construction and 
partly in the financing of the 445 kilometres long motorway section between 
Belgrade and Bar (Montenegro), crossing Sandzak.
The total annual amount of investment is around a few million euros 
in Montenegro, primarily in the field of tourism, retail, construction and 
infrastructure. Toscelik, a member of Tosyali Holding, invested almost 
45 million dollars in Zeljezara Niksic steelworks in 2012, while Global Ports 
Holding acquired a majority stake in the company operating the largest port 
of Montenegro (Bar) in 2014.22
In Croatia, Turkish investors are mainly focusing on tourism, chemical 
industry and textile industry.
6.1.4. Other elements of Turkish influence
Besides political and economic factors, the cultural factor plays an impor-
tant role in Turkey’s activity in the Balkans. About 9 million Muslims live 
in the Balkans, they are a majority in Albania and Kosovo; in Bosnia they 
represent one of the three main ethnic groups constituting the nation, while 
Muslims live in minority in Bulgaria, Macedonia, Serbia and Montenegro. 
One of the most spectacular fields of Turkey’s renewed interest in the 
Balkans was cultural life. Turkey has become active in the support of cultu-
ral organisations associated with Muslim identity; it encourages restoration 
of monuments recalling the Ottoman era and provides funding to that end.
Turkey’s participation in the education system is also significant. Turkish 
schools and universities opened in Albania, Bosnia and Kosovo; at the same 
time universities in Turkey offer scholarships to gifted students from the 
region. The Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency (TIKA) has 
financed more than fifty education-related projects in Serbian Sandzak.23
20 Alis 2011.
21 Lynch 2015.
22 Tokyay 2014.
23 Daily Sabah 2017a.
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In addition to its past, Turkey’s today is also promoted by the popular 
television series (soap operas).24
After decades, Turkey has reappeared in the Balkans, this time not as 
a military force or a conqueror but as one of the region’s most dynamically 
growing economies which can be attractive and can serve as an economic 
driving force for the Balkan countries. Although economic cooperation is 
closest with the EU member states, relations with Muslim-majority states 
have been a priority for Turkey; since 2010 the most important state of the 
Western Balkans, Serbia has been in the forefront of Turkey’s attention.
Here, too, competition is fierce. For the time being the European Union 
has a greater appeal by offering accession prospects. Russia, in addition to its 
historical and religious ties, is able to attract countries of the region with its 
oil stocks. Turkey cannot match these potentials, but given its geographical 
proximity and its dynamic and relatively developed economy compared to 
the region, Turkey is in a good position beyond doubt.
6.2. Middle East and North Africa
The region including the Middle East and North Africa, also referred to 
as MENA, spans the Arab world from Morocco to Iraq, and Oman, also 
incorporating Israel and Iran. For long decades Ankara did not keep it high 
on its agenda to build relations with countries of the Middle East and North 
Africa. Over the past decade, however, partly due to its increasing econo-
mic power, active foreign policy and foreign trade performance, Turkey has 
achieved decisive status in the region. Turkey’s new position is especially 
easy to see in the light of the events of the Arab Spring. Although Turkey 
continues to emphasise the strategic importance of the Western alliance, 
many people nurture visions of a regional leadership under the flag of Islam 
(the secular opposition in Turkey do that with a rather negative overtone).
The history of Turkey and the MENA region inhabited mostly by 
Arabs was for centuries interlaced under the Ottoman Empire, a major 
factor from the 15th to the early 20th century in the Mediterranean region and 
the entire Middle East. In its heydays, the Empire extended its supremacy 
from Algeria to Mesopotamia and Yemen. From the 19th century onwards, 
it became increasingly difficult to keep the huge territory under control, and 
24 The Economist 2011.
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so provinces started to spin off due to ever greater internal dissatisfaction, and 
the active intervention of external (mostly British and French) factors of power. 
The new Turkish state established following World War I considered Arabs 
to be traitors for a long period as they fought in collusion with the British to 
achieve the disintegration of the Ottoman Empire. But similar lack of trust 
and adverse feelings characterise the other side, too. Arabs held the Ottoman 
rule responsible for their backwardness, and viewed Turkey – denying the 
institution of the caliphate – the ‘traitor’ of Islam.25 In the subsequent period 
Turkey, building a close relation with the West, and especially with the US, 
and maintaining good relations also with Israel, was mostly treated as an 
enemy by Arab countries.
6.2.1. Political relations
A type of ‘Muslim priority’ has clearly taken shape over the past years in 
Turkish foreign policy, and, following the Palestinian question and the Arab 
Spring, it became the general approach in regard to the Middle East. Turkish 
leadership was characterised by a special division of labour. Erdoğan was 
mostly ‘in charge of’ the Muslim line, while Abdullah Gül (as president of 
the republic) or Davutoğlu (as foreign minister, then prime minister) used 
a much more restrained language. Erdoğan attempted to win over Shiite 
public opinion, too: in 2012 he delivered a speech in Istanbul at the Shiites’ 
greatest religious festival, and met Ayatollah Sistani, the religious leader of 
Iraqi Shiites; and in 2011, upon the Saudi-led intervention in Bahrain, he war-
ned strongly of a new ‘Karbala’. However, the past years, and the escalation 
of the Syrian conflict in particular strengthened Sunni unity.
Davutoğlu, referring to the ‘psychological affinity’ between the Turkish 
and the Arab world, emphasised Turkey’s priority role with regard to the Middle 
East.26 Turks feel it is their mission to mediate between Europe, the Western 
world and the Arab–Muslim world as they understand rational thinking, and 
are familiar with Western values, while at the same time Eastern thinking 
is not alien to them either. Turkey’s ties with the neighbouring countries are, 
in each relation, influenced, besides general strategic objectives of foreign 
25 International Crisis Group 2010.
26 Shadid 2011.
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policy, by individual factors, and therefore we will now embark on a brief 
overview of the most decisive political elements in bilateral relations.
Relations with Iraq were long overshadowed by border related issues. 
After World War I Turkey was reluctant to accept that Mosul had become part 
of Iraq formed as a British mandated territory. The applicable argument points 
out that Mosul is not an Arab but a Kurdish territory, and Turkey – labelling 
Kurds mountain Turks – was unwilling to recognise them as a nationality in 
their own right. Their relationship remained volatile also after World War 
II, depending to a large extent on the two countries’ internal processes. In 
the 1960s, following all-out Western orientation, Turkey slowly started to 
open towards the Middle East. That policy seemed lucrative when oil prices 
sky-rocketed during the 1970s, and the pipeline completed between 1973 
and 1977 resulted in even closer ties between Iraq and Turkey. Bilateral 
relations were based on mutual economic advantages, thus, from the 1990s 
onward, economic embargoes against Iraq under pressure from the US came 
as a serious drain on Turkish interests.
Good relations, however, were overshadowed by the river control 
program in South Anatolia. Although relations with Iraq were less tense 
than with Syria, the project and the agreement on water supply remain 
a fundamental dispute to date in the relationship of the countries involved. 
In years of draught in particular, the debate on the amount of water allowed 
through flares up. Under the tripartite agreement concluded in 2009, Ankara 
agreed to let more water flow through, and Iraq was committed to providing 
crude oil in return.
The Kurdish issue is likewise a source of ceaseless debates. North Iraq 
achieving growing independence controlled by the Kurds roused serious 
fears in Ankara dreading Kurdish autonomy. Tensions, however, were suc-
cessfully mitigated over the past period as the Iraqi Kurdish Government 
agreed to support the fight against the PKK. Iraqi Premier Núri al-Maliki 
himself promised more resolute action equating PKK and al-Qaeda. All 
this is ‘compensated’ for by the Turks through ever tighter economic ties.
Turkey did not take its share from overthrowing the Hussein system, 
but was still given a central role in re-building the country following the war. 
It is implementing a policy of active (aggressive) expansion in the whole of 
Iraq, but mainly in the North.27 Turkish politics tried to build good relations 
with the new Iraqi administration. It also supported the election of Jalal 
27 Kara 2011.
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Talabani in 2005, and Turkish government representatives regularly met 
with North Kurdish leaders (discussing mostly economic issues in addition 
to the fight against the PKK).
In 2009 Foreign Minister Davutoğlu, and in 2011 Prime Minister 
Erdoğan visited the Kurd capital Erbil.28 Although Ankara is no doubt try-
ing to help ensure the stability of the new Iraq, it is ready even for armed 
conflict when it comes to the Kurdish question.
Iran was one of the first allies of the newly forming Turkish nation state, 
and it was in 1926 that Kemal Atatürk and Reza Pahlavi signed the Treaty 
of Friendship between the two countries. One of the tacit objectives of the 
Treaty was to enable joint action against the Kurds. Sympathy between the 
two countries was also apparent in their similar modernisation policies: 
both strong leaders had a vision of a fast-developing Western-friendly 
country. They also participated jointly in the 1955 Baghdad Pact, and had 
good relations until the mid-1970s. Following the victory of the Iranian 
Revolution, however, the relation of secular and NATO member Turkey and 
anti-Western Iran rooted in Islam was no longer unclouded. Ankara held 
Iran responsible for its support of the PKK, while Teheran’s grievance was 
primarily the close cooperation between Turkey and Israel.
Turkey’s change of government in 2002 brought a turning point in 
the two countries’ relations. A populous delegation of businessmen led by 
President Ahmet Necdet Sezer had previously visited Iran with the aim 
of strengthening economic relations, and ties became even friendlier as 
the AKP took office. The primary focus was the economy: while bilateral 
trade amounted to barely 1 billion dollars around the millennium, by 2011 
it exceeded 16 billion. The US was not pleased to see intensifying economic 
relations between the two countries, but once it successfully counteracted 
building ties with the UAE, this time Ankara resisted the American pressure. 
Moreover, in 2010 Prime Minister Erdoğan visited Teheran with Brazilian 
President Lula da Silva to offer their assistance in the peaceful use of nuclear 
power.29 Turkey did not in fact turn its back on its Western allies, it simply 
wanted to send a message that it had become a significant factor in the 
28 Fidan 2016.
29 When the US and the UK requested Turkey to join the sanctions against Iran, Erdoğan 
said that Iran did not for the time being have a nuclear weapon, while Israel did, and 
Turkey was at equal distances from the two; then he asked why the international com-
munity failed to take action against Israel (Middle East Online 2010).
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region. Once more it intended to act as mediator monopolising the role of 
bridge between the Western world and the Muslim world.
Under increasing international pressure, in 2011 Turkey permitted the 
erection of a US (NATO) missile defence and radar system on its territory.30 
In the background of the move was partly Iran’s growing activity in Syria, 
which scared Turkey. At the same time Ankara wanted to prevent the US 
from sharing relevant information with Israel, which, however, Washington 
declined. The erection of the radar system deteriorated Turkish–Iranian 
relations. Iran warned Turkey to rethink its policy concerning Syria, its 
place in NATO, and the dissemination of its own secular model with regard 
to the Arab Spring. Their sour relation was part of the reason why the PKK 
relocated its camp from the Qandil Mountain in Northern Iraq to the Iranian 
side with Teheran’s clear consent.31
Turkey’s turn in 2002 seemingly put an end to the secular–Islamist 
conflict that existed up to that point. What in fact happened was the creation 
of a new fault between radical Shiite, and moderate Sunni Islamists. The 
Arab world clearly finds the Sunni and economically successful Turkey 
integrated in both the world economy, and world politics more attractively. 
That was perceptible also at the time of the Arab Spring. Iran became more 
hostile to Turkey due to the latter’s increasingly obvious regional leadership. 
The civil war in Syria further deepened the conflict between Iran supporting 
Assad, and Turkey promoting his ousting.
In Syria’s case, relations during the cold war were essentially deter-
mined by political-ideological conflicts, i.e. while Turkey was a NATO 
member, Syria counted as one of the Soviet Union’s most important allies 
in the region. Also, numerous additional conflicts sparked with Syria. One 
fundamental problem was represented by the Hatay province (Alexandretta). 
Syria struggled long to regain a territory that it thought was illegitimately 
annexed by Turkey, but in 2004 it waived its territorial claim, moreover, in 
2009 a number of agreements aimed at facilitating travel were concluded 
by the two countries. Yet to date Syria has not formally recognised Turkey’s 
title to the territory.
Another permanent source of conflict is the construction of the Euphrates 
dams. Turkey built a huge system of hydroelectric dams on the Tigris and the 
Euphrates from the 1980s onward, and used the water to irrigate the Southern 
30 Shanker 2011.
31 Paul 2012.
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Anatolia region, and to generate power. That, however, significantly reduced 
the water supply of the Euphrates in Syria. They tried to settle the conflict in 
the 2000s by reaching an agreement on dividing the water supply in return 
for which Ankara requested Syria to formally recognise the status of Hatay.
Another lasting conflict between the two countries came from sup-
porting ‘internal enemies’. While Syria regularly helped the Kurdish PKK, 
and allowed PKK guerrillas in the country, Turkey provided (and still pro-
vides) refuge to Syrian opposition members. When in 1998 under a secret 
agreement the Turks managed to have PKK leader Öcalan (then residing 
in Damascus) expelled, relations of the two countries started to improve at 
an unprecedented rate. They further improved in 2003 when the Turkish 
Parliament refused military involvement in the invasion of Iraq. That gesture 
resulted for Turkey in no longer being considered by Syria an American 
vassal. Next year Prime Minister Erdoğan travelled to Damascus to sign 
the FTA between the two countries.
In 2008, Ankara tried to mediate between Damascus and Tel Aviv in 
the Golan Heights conflict as the new Turkish foreign policy favoured the 
country’s role as mediator. Negotiations broke down after four rounds, partly 
due to the increased tension in Turkish–Israeli relations as a result of the 
Gaza conflict. All that brought even further development to Turkish–Syrian 
relations. In 2009, they conducted a joint military exercise along their com-
mon border, and plans were made for cooperation in the defence industry.
It was due to improving bilateral relations and a good personal rapport 
between Erdoğan and Syrian President Assad that in the civil war that 
erupted in 2011 in the wake of the Arab Spring Turkish interventions were 
initially quite restrained. But due to bloody action by the government, and 
the increasing number of Syrians seeking refuge in Turkey, the diplomatic 
warnings to the Assad regime became more and more serious. Border 
incidents and the downing of a Turkish military plane in June 2012 caused 
Ankara to discontinue relations with the Assad regime, and support the 
Syrian opposition forces.32 Developments since then, however, rendered 
Syrian–Turkish relations even more complex: the military successes of the 
Islamic State, conflicts on the Turkish border, the activity of Turkish Kurds, 
action by an international coalition against the Islamic State all render both 
the final status of the process, and the future of bilateral relations practically 
unpredictable.
32 BBC 2012.
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Apart from the three states bordering Turkey, it is worth describing 
briefly some of the other countries in the Middle East that are decisive 
factors concerning Turkey’s position and politics in the region.
Israel had been a particularly good partner to Turkey for a long period. In 
March 1949 Turkey was the first country with a Muslim majority population 
that recognised the new State of Israel. The US powerfully backed the good 
relations between Jerusalem and Ankara. The first spectacular confronta-
tion was triggered by the occupation in 1967 of Palestinian territories, and 
that was when Turkey joined the Arab League’s resolution that condemned 
Israel. Bilateral diplomatic relations were upgraded to ambassadorial level 
in 1992, and the 1990s in general brought an improvement of relations. In 
1996 a military agreement was signed which, besides arms purchases and 
renovation of military hardware, permitted Israel to use the Turkish airspace 
for practice flights. Then, in 2000 the two countries concluded an FTA.
Relations gradually declined in the 2000s even though both Turkey 
(with its ‘zero problem’ policy) and Israel were interested in maintaining 
the cooperation. In 2005 Erdoğan visited Israel, and offered his mediation 
services to move the peace talks forward. Still in 2007 they were planning 
to extend their military cooperation, and Israel offered a military satellite 
and air defence missiles to Turkey, and agreement was reached concerning 
the upgrading by Israel of the Turkish army’s F-4 and F-5 planes, and its 
M60A1 tanks (and agreement worth just below 1.5 billion dollars). A 5 
billion dollars combat car and a 2 billion dollars missile procurement deal 
was also on the agenda. The mediation offered by Turkey to help improve 
Syrian–Israeli relations was also accepted by Israel in 2007.
However, conflicts prevailed in two areas: the Palestine issue, and the 
assessment of Iran’s nuclear program. Even before the AKP took office, 
Turkey had condemned Israel’s action against Palestinians, and in April 
2002 Prime Minister Bülent Ecevit labelled the Israeli interventions as 
‘genocide’. The significant difference compared to the previous status quo 
was that while in the late 1990s, Foreign Minister Ismail Cem tried to mediate 
as an unbiased third party between Israel and the Palestinians, Erdoğan and 
the AKP clearly favoured the Palestinians, and viewed supporting them as 
the duty of the ‘elder brother’.33
33 Bilgin–Bilgiç 2011, 191.
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Relations declined spectacularly after 2006 when Israel resented that 
Turkey hosted Hamas leader Khaled Mashal. Ankara, on the other hand, 
strongly condemned Israel’s interventions in Gaza in 2008–2009. In early 
2010, amidst protests in response to a TV series unfavourably portraying 
Turkey, Israel communicated humiliatingly with a member of the Turkish 
diplomacy, for which Turkey required a public apology.
The weightiest conflict, however, came in May 2010 when Israel 
attacked a ship (Mavi Marmara) bringing supplies for the inhabitants of 
Gaza without the permission of Israel, claiming the lives of nine Turkish 
activists. As before, Ankara required an apology and damages, and when 
these remained unprovided for, it expelled the Israeli ambassador, and 
suspended all military agreements, and its orders previously placed there. 
Relying on Israeli assistance in exploiting Cyprus’ Mediterranean natural 
gas resources foreshadowed another confrontation.
At the same time the strategic significance of the two countries’ 
relations is indicated by the huge efforts made by the US to restore them. 
US President Barack Obama and his Foreign Minister tried personally to 
reconcile the parties.34 Relations over the past years have been normalising 
mostly on economic motivations, and the two countries’ interests overlap 
at multiple points in relation to Syria, one example being the reduction of 
Iran’s increasing profile.
For a long time the relation of Turkey and Saudi Arabia could not 
qualify as friendly. Although instances of economic cooperation became 
more frequent – Turkey needed oil, and Saudi Arabia needed Turkish 
construction businesses –, at a political level they still failed to come 
closer to each other despite efforts by the US. Moreover, in the early 1990s 
when Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Syria joined forces to create a new Arab 
world, Syrians eventually extended their aversion for Turkey also to the 
other parties concerned.35 Seeing Iraq’s occupation in 2003 and the Shiites 
gaining ground in Iraq, Saudi Arabia re-considered its policy. Faced with 
the Iraq–Iran Shiite axis, and the close Iran–Syria alliance the Saudis, 
too, were seeking an ally, and Turkey under the AKP seemed an ideal 
partner in ensuring stability in the region. Earlier, the Gulf States had 
repeatedly lined up behind the Turkish–Saudi ‘coalition’, e.g. in issues 
where they tried to counterbalance Iran’s claim for control. There were 
34 Abramowitz–Barkey 2011, 114.
35 Altunisik 2012.
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cases, however, where Turkey and Qatar, and Saudi Arabia supported 
different forces (most obviously with regard to Egypt).
Egypt and Turkey, seen as the vanguards of Arab nationalism, also 
had a lasting tension between them with relations consolidating only from 
the 1980s onward. Egyptian leaders coming to power following the Arab 
Spring added a new hue to the political spectrum. The country seeking new 
ways forward welcomed Erdoğan and his populous delegation with great 
enthusiasm arriving in Cairo in September 2011.36 The popularity of the 
Turkish premier before the Arab public opinion further grew as he made 
a firm statement concerning the existence of the independent Palestinian 
state, and as he promised to support the transition to democracy. Speaking 
of Egypt and Turkey, Foreign Minister Davutoğlu referred to the ‘axis of 
democracy’.37 The agreements concluded with Egypt concerned infrastruc-
ture megaprojects (power line and gas pipeline under the Mediterranean), 
and a significant expansion of trade and investment; they were all in line 
with a set of Turkish regional agreements concluded over the previous 
years. In addition, closer relations with Egypt also strengthened the Turkish 
position with regard to the relationship becoming sensitive with Egypt.
The election of Mohamed Mursi as President in 2012 created a situation 
similar to what Turkey was experiencing. A moderate Islamist govern-
ing party and president was facing an army defending a secular system. 
The restoration in Egypt, the military coup against Morsi (June 2013), then 
the assumption of power by General Sisi undermined their relationship. 
Ankara did not recognise the new leadership, and froze economic relations, 
in response to which Egypt expelled the Turkish ambassador, and down-
graded diplomatic relations to chargé d’affaires level. Political relations of 
the two countries were tense still in 2017, and Erdoğan stipulated politically 
undeliverable conditions to their improvement,38 but economic relations 
finally slowly got into gear.
Libya under Gaddafi ‘reconciling’ with the world was an attractive 
economic partner to Turkey. Economic relations came into full swing 
in the 2000s, and numerous fruitful agreements were signed by Turkish 
firms and Libyan leadership. In 2011, the Arab Spring igniting the Libyan 
36 Abouzeid 2011.
37 Fouad 2011.
38 They expect free presidential elections and the release of political prisoners imprisoned 
after June 2013 (Hassan 2017).
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civil war threatened the completion of Turkish projects of almost 15 billion 
dollars, which gave Ankara a reason to initially oppose NATO’s interven-
tion. By the end of March, however, seeing the changed circumstances, 
Turkish leadership became a supporter of the intervention. Building good 
relations with opposition forces (financial assistance, food supplies, a visit 
by Davutoğlu in August 2011, then Erdoğan’s visit in September) it tried 
to secure future Turkish positions in the country. Despite these efforts 
Libya, too, seems to lose significance for Turkey. Support for the Muslim 
Brotherhood amidst chaotic conditions of domestic policy resulted in crit-
icism by the other forces, and although Turkish foreign policy has recently 
tried to improve Turkey’s overall image, the former favourable position was 
lost in both political and economic terms.
The Maghreb countries (Morocco, Algeria and Tunisia) became a more 
valuable target for foreign policy as Ankara was looking for allies seeing 
the rise of the Shiite Iran and the conflict with Egypt, and in that plan the 
states of Sunni majority proved good partners. Tunisia’s aim was to reinforce 
the system born in the wake of the Arab Spring, and Turkey even provided 
economic aid. With Algeria and Morocco, however, economic interests and 
the restoration of its prestige shaken in the Arab world could be the primary 
foreign policy objectives.
6.2.2. Economic relations
Restructuring made the Middle East one of the most important destinations of 
Turkish export, and Turkey accordingly considers the conclusion of bilateral 
and regional agreements with the countries of the region a priority. Under 
the EU–Turkish customs union, Ankara signed FTAs with North African 
and Middle Eastern countries, and Turkish export to these countries started 
to grow fast as a result. Apart from trade, Turkish firms took their share of 
implementing projects worth over 30 billion dollars (airports, metro sys-
tems, oil refineries and other facilities of chemical industry). Over the past 
years, direct Turkish investment also appeared in the countries of the region.
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Table 8.
Turkish trade with countries of the Middle East (million USD)
Export Import
2001 2006 2011 2016 2001 2006 2011 2016
UAE 380 1,986 3,706 5,408 65 352 1,649 3,701
Iraq n/a 2,589 8,310 7,638 n/a 121 86 836
Iran 360 1,067 3,589 4,957 840 5,627 12,462 4,700
Israel 805 1,529 2,391 2,956 529 782 2,057 1,385
Yemen 100 198 272 536 0 0 0 0
Jordan 119 322 506 711 14 9 66 102
Qatar 8 342 188 439 6 66 481 271
Kuwait 104 219 297 431 123 56 270 110
Lebanon 183 241 718 734 26 126 283 82
Saudi 
Arabia
501 985 2,763 3,174 730 623 2,002 1,835
Syria 281 609 1,609 1,323 463 187 337 65
Source: TurkStat
For Iraq, Turkey is the most important source country for imports before 
China and the US. Iraqi export, although rising during the past years, 
remains far below that level. While crude oil would seem a plausible import 
commodity, Iraq is no longer the primary source country. The problem is 
that the Kurdistan region for which Turkey is a partner of priority status is 
only allowed to conclude oil related deals subject to approval by the govern-
ment of Iraq. Although the Kurds would export 550 thousand barrels of oil 
per day, the central government will not allow that for political reasons.39 
Consequently, a part of the oil ends up in Turkey through illegal channels 
(and also fails to appear in statistics). Unofficial crude oil trade used to be 
the primary income for the Islamic State, and for them, too, Turkey was the 
primary market. Many believe that Turkish government agencies themselves 
were actors in that trade.40
Kurdistan is the region in Iraq that is the fastest growing market of 
Turkish products. The region features a huge demand for all sorts of con-
sumer goods, and Turkey is logistically the most advantageously positioned 
to satisfy it. In 2007 Kurdistan had a share of 50%, in 2013 it had already 
39 Ünal 2017.
40 Nazemroaya 2015.
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67% of the trade volume that meanwhile grew almost fivefold. Turkish 
construction firms were particularly active in restoring the infrastructure 
with almost 80% of the projects won by Turkish businesses.41 In 2013 there 
were already 1,500 Turkish firms operating in Kurdistan, but the military 
conflict that developed afterwards coupled with the advancement of the 
Islamic state reduced trading and economic activity in general. Due to 
the budgetary resources held back by the federal government of Iraq, the 
Kurdish Government could not finance its own investments.
Thanks to good political relations (Ankara stood by Teheran in the 
nuclear dispute) Turkish–Iranian trade exceeded 21 billion dollars in 2012. The 
suspension of international sanctions promised even better prospects because 
on 1 January 2015 a preferential agreement came into effect that enabled 
lower customs tariffs, and higher quotas on almost 300 products. That 
created more favourable situations for numerous Turkish industries in the 
Iranian market,42 and plans suggested that bilateral trade would multiply 
within a few years.43 Reality, however, was disappointing. Despite a ben-
eficial legislative environment, trade significantly declined. True, Turkish 
export increased over the past two years, but with an intensity lower than 
expected.44 The explanation is clearly regional political disagreements. 
In February 2017, the Turkish economic minister’s plan to visit Teheran to 
breathe new life in economic relations went astray.45
The Syrian economy also saw rather beneficial processes get underway 
in the 2000s that were disrupted by the civil war breaking out in the wake 
of the Arab Spring in 2011. From 2012 onward, import from Syria stopped 
practically fully, while different tendencies worked in the opposite direction: 
following a short decline, Turkish export started to rise again in 2013, and 
approached its previous values. Its structure, however, significantly changed: 
previously the main export goods were lasting consumer goods from 
Istanbul and its environs, while today the same is comprised of foodstuffs 
and consumer staples.46 Turkey’s share of Syrian import has risen above 
41 Fidan 2016.
42 As Iran is not a WTO member, it is not obliged to apply the principle of the greatest 
benefit, counting as a basic WTO principle (that requires trade free of discrimination).
43 Doğan 2015.
44 Çetingüleç 2017.
45 Çetingüleç 2017.
46 Aïta 2017.
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20% from 9% in 2010. The number of Syrian firms established in Turkey 
suddenly rose in 2013, even though total investment remained at a negligible 
level given that most micro businesses were registered by Syrian refugees 
to ensure their own livelihood.47 Syria has become the greatest beneficiary 
of Turkish aid. TIKA data suggest that 3 billion dollars are spent annually 
on Syrian refugees coming in the country.48 
Israel and Turkey used to be important partners to each other tradi-
tionally even though political tensions of the past years left their mark on 
their excellent former cooperation. Import from Israel between 2011 and 
2016 dropped to 2/3 of its previous rate, and Turkish export grew by almost 
as much. Turkish exports consist of vehicles (cars, buses), electronics, and 
metallurgical products (iron and steel), while import is mostly processed 
oil industry items and products of the machine industry. Previously one of 
the main markets of Israel’s defence industry export was Turkey, and the 
deterioration of political relations also hit this area most severely. Trust, 
however, did not return even as relations normalised; and so Israel does not 
find that this is the right time to revitalise relations.49 Apart from trading in 
commodities, the trade of services (tourism) and the construction industry 
are equally important, and the expected rise in these areas ensures Turkey 
useful opportunities. The re-construction works in Gaza are a significant 
factor for the construction industry where Turkish firms were granted con-
tracts worth about 1 billion dollars, and Turkey may have special status in 
the Palestinian areas.50 For Israel, Turkey grew in significance again due 
to the natural gas resources in the Mediterranean as the export route to 
Europe of the recently found gas leads through Turkey. The pipeline called 
‘Peace’ bringing the gas to Turkey, and from Turkey to Europe, costs about 
4 billion dollars.51
Economic relations with GCC countries52 also developed with bilat-
eral trade rising from 1.5 billion dollars in 2002 to 16 billion in 2016. The 
most important partner is the UAE and Saudi Arabia. Base materials for 
47 Aïta 2017.
48 TIKA 2015.
49 Opall-Rome 2016.
50 Ateş 2016.
51 Ateş 2016.
52 GCC (Gulf Cooperation Council) is an alliance of Saudi Arabia, the United Arab 
Emirates, Qatar, Kuwait, Bahrain and Oman.
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the construction industry,53 and products manufactured by the processing 
industry (e.g. defence industry) and having higher technological content, 
have been added to the goods traditionally exported to Turkey (foodstuffs, 
textile), and mostly oil industry commodities are purchased in return. Saudi 
Arabia supplied approximately 10% of Turkish crude export in 2014, but the 
proportion of the chemical industry is also on the rise. Turkish construction 
firms are important players in the region in bilateral relations with prices and 
quality. GCC countries are important investors in Turkey with just below 1 
billion dollars coming from gulf states in 2012, and even in the past years 
the typical value of annual investment moved around 500–800 million 
dollars. Regional capital, however, fails to substitute for European capital 
in Turkey despite its increased significance. The most important investment 
is that of Saudi Oger Telecom purchasing 55% of Türk Telecom in 2005, but 
investment firms and banks (e.g. Abraaj Capital or Investcorp Bank), and/
or government funds (e.g. Kuwait’s Reserve Fund for Future Generations) 
also acquired shareholdings in numerous firms, and property acquisitions 
in Turkey have also become popular. GCC banks have entered the Turkish 
banking sector, and are very active in selling financial instruments in line 
with the teachings of Islam (i.e. not using the concept of interest).54 Apart 
from that, GCC countries are not only purchasers of Turkish agricultural 
products, but also investors in Turkish agriculture, even if sales of arable 
land incited outrage among parts of the Turkish population.55 Politics makes 
economic relations fragile; it had a role in preventing several investment 
projects, and the GCC–Turkish FTA dragging out since 2005 has also slowed 
down partly on account of political factors.56
53 Turkey provides 34% of the steel import of the GCC countries, the most important 
ingredient of building sky scrapers (OxGAPS 2015, 39).
54 Examples include Albaraka Türk, Turkiye Ginans and Kuveyt Turk banks.
55 OxGAPS 2015, 43.
56 That FTA was expected to be signed in 2017 (Kalin 2017).
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Table 9.
Turkish foreign trade with countries of North Africa (million USD)
Export Import
2001 2006 2011 2016 2001 2006 2011 2016
Algeria 421 1,021 1,471 1,736 1,064 719 1,150 464
Egypt 421 709 2,760 2,733 92 393 1,382 1,443
Libya 67 489 748 906 848 241 140 161
Morocco 98 551 920 1,469 38 174 419 918
Tunisia 141 324 802 911 73 150 250 214
Source: TurkStat
Egypt has also become an important partner to Turkey in the post-2007 
period. The FTA between the two countries came into effect in 2007. Turkey 
immediately abolished all customs tariffs, but Egypt only agreed to do the 
same by 2020, over a transition period of 12 years. Bilateral trade peaked 
in 2012 (at over 5 billion dollars), but has slightly declined since due to the 
change of political circumstances. Bilateral trade is characterised by major 
Turkish surplus with exports of the iron and steel industry and vehicles, 
and import consists mostly of plastic and other chemical industry products. 
Turkey invested nearly 5 billion dollars previously in Egypt, but the plants 
that employed a large number of local employees exported most of their 
output, and closed down following the unrest in 2011, and after a short 
period back in production in 2013, they closed again following the remo-
val of Morsi from power. In 2017, hopes of a new beginning flared up as 
both Turkey and Egypt have an interest in settling their economic relations 
despite the political fault between the two countries seeming unbridgeable 
for the time being.57
As for Libya, increasing Turkish export and shrinking import used to be 
typical. Prior to the Arab Spring, Turkey had increasing economic interests in 
Libya in projects worth almost 28 billion dollars.58 All ‘got stuck’ in 2011 as 
due to the civil war; even diplomatic missions left the country in 2014. In 
2017 there was a faint hope that the situation in Libya would normalise, and 
Ankara was among the first to re-open its diplomatic mission in Tripoli. 
Turkish ENKA Teknik continued the construction works on one of Libya’s 
57 Hassan 2017.
58 Müftüler-Baç 2016, 54.
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most important investment projects; the gas turbine operated 160 megawatts 
at the Obari power station that stopped in 2013 little short of completion.59
The share of the Maghreb countries (Morocco, Algeria and Tunisia) did 
not rise significantly in Turkish foreign trade; it negligibly exceeds 5 billion 
dollars meaning that it lags behind other countries of the neighbouring regions 
in terms of growth dynamics. Bilateral relationships, however, are relatively 
diversified even in comparison with EU–Maghreb trade, which also makes 
the Maghreb countries interested in developing relations.60 The main Turkish 
export commodities are vehicles, electronics and textile industry articles, 
and iron and steel products. Import means chemical products apart from 
crude oil and natural gas, and, as for Morocco and Tunisia, fertilisers and 
clothing items. For the main hydrocarbon exporter, Algeria, the negative 
commercial trend of the pre-2000s period reversed and now here, too, the 
balance is positive for Turkey (similarly to Morocco and Tunisia). While 
the FTA has been in effect with Tunisia since 2005, and Morocco since 
2006, the same is missing with Algeria. As Algeria concluded an FTA 
with the EU, it comes as a major disadvantage for Turkey as the volume of 
bilateral trade is calculated to have shrunk by about 15%.61
The Maghreb is likewise a not insignificant target area for Turkish cap-
ital investment. In 2013, the Tosyali steel plant invested 750 million dollars 
in erecting a steel mill in Algeria.62 In addition to that, Turkish businesses 
had a share of nearly 6 billion dollars in Algerian projects (hospitals, dams, 
motorways, tunnels and ports). The role of the public sector is significant in 
the Algerian economy, and even though partial privatisation has long been 
on the agenda, the public sector plays a significant role in the economy, 
which means a further opportunity for capital investment.
In Tunisia there was a 200 million dollars’ worth of Turkish capital 
investment between 2007 and 2011.63 The influx of private capital slowed 
down thereafter, but official development aid came more generously: Ankara 
provided support of 500 million dollars (aid and soft loans) to Tunisia, and 
the country became one of the main beneficiaries of TIKA. In Morocco, too, 
59 Libya Herald 2017.
60 Kirişci 2014, 71.
61 Dincer et al. 2017.
62 Telci 2014.
63 Ergün 2012.
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capital equal to about 240 million dollars was invested by Turkish firms over 
the past years, and they are also partners in numerous construction projects.
The role of Turkey has significantly increased in the regions around it, 
and more specifically, in the Middle East region. Turkey has managed to turn 
into what American foreign policy has long wanted it to be: the model state 
of the region. However, it owed its new status not to any external power, but 
only to itself. It was partly due to a conscious foreign policy strategy that 
initially built up the image of the reliable Turkey on the basis of the ‘zero 
problem’ principle, but later it focussed on its political and economic objec-
tives, and was even open to confrontation to strengthen Turkish positions. 
The political structure was an important ingredient to becoming a model that 
successfully ‘married’ democracy with Islamic ideology. Part of the success 
was the fast growing economy producing a variety of commodities making 
the country a primary trading partner to numerous countries in the region.
For a long time both the Turkish political model and the growing econ-
omy counted as a factor contributing to the region’s stability that squared 
with the US’s and the EU’s policy concerning the region. Turkey’s growing 
role in the region was viewed as a welcome fact from the point of view of 
external powers. The developments in the Middle East following the Arab 
Spring (civil war in Syria and Libya, restoration in Egypt) and the respective 
responses by Turkey in many respects question the effectiveness of Turkish 
endeavours of foreign policy and foreign economic policy. After being the 
model (düzen kurucu) in previous years, Turkey encountered problems and 
resistance with increasing frequency.64 All that significantly deteriorated 
the favourable image built up during previous years even in the case of 
countries of the Middle East.
6.3. The Caucasus and Ukraine
Historically, the Caucasus was of unique importance for the Ottoman Empire 
sometimes as an occupied region and at other times as a plain neighbou-
ring one, but when still part of the Soviet Union, it had little relevance by 
itself for Turkey. That was where the border between the Eastern bloc and 
NATO ran in the years of the cold war, and that circumstance offered little 
opportunity for opening relations. The 1990s brought a new chapter in the 
64 Kirişci 2013b, 215.
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history of Turkey and the region, and a similar situation emerged with the 
Ukraine winning its own independent statehood.
6.3.1. Political relations
The relations of Caucasian states winning their independence were oversha-
dowed by conflicts suppressed during the Soviet era. The conflict concerning 
the status of the Mountain Karabakh and where it belongs erupted as early 
as 1988 when the Soviet Socialist Republic of Armenia claimed back the 
area granted by Stalin to Azerbaijan but inhabited by an Armenian majority. 
The conflict ended up in an armed confrontation which, as the former Soviet 
republics became independent, escalated into war. In 1994 the two countries 
concluded a truce helped by international (mainly Russian) mediation, but 
the conflict has not been resolved up to the present day; moreover, clashes 
claiming human lives became more frequent in 2016.
Turkey followed an Azerbaijani-friendly foreign policy that only further 
deteriorated their relations with Armenia already poisoned by historical 
experience. Their relations with the third country of the Caucasus, Georgia, 
are well-balanced even if the current state of the Russia–Georgia and the 
Russia–Turkey relations influences cooperation.
Azeri–Turkish relations are rooted in common culture and history, 
and the language that all of them can understand, wherefore they are often 
called ‘one nation in two states’. Ankara was a supporter of Azerbaijani 
independence endeavours, the restoration of Azerbaijan’s territorial integrity 
and the economic exploitation of the Caspian Sea. Bilateral cooperation is 
a priority for both parties, a fact well reflected by wide-ranging cooperation 
in the fields of politics, commerce, finance, technology, science and art. The 
Turkish–Azerbaijani visa waiver, however, has not yet materialised due to 
Iran’s hostile intervention.
Armenian–Turkish relations have been, since 1915, substantially influ-
enced by the deportation of Armenians living in the Ottoman Empire, i.e. 
the Armenian genocide. During Soviet times, especially during the cold war, 
the question did not directly reach the level of macro-politics; the Armenian 
diaspora, however, used all its clout to ensure that the big powers achieve the 
assumption of historic responsibility by Turkey. In the 1980s, the Armenian 
Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia headquartered in Lebanon started 
a series of assassinations against Turkish diplomats setting the objective 
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of forcing Turkey to assume responsibility, pay damages and liberate the 
area granted to Armenia under the Peace Treaty of Sèvres. The terrorist 
attacks, however, were condemned even by the majority of the Armenians.
Interestingly Ankara was among the first to recognise independent 
Armenia in 1991, but Armenians quoted historic grievances, and remained 
reluctant to open diplomatic relations with Turkey until the latter admitted 
its responsibility. Borders on roads and railway between the two countries 
were opened nevertheless. The Azerbaijani–Armenian strife escalating to 
war due to the Mountain Karabakh had its implications on the Turkish–
Armenian relations, too. Seeing Armenian successes, Turkish public opinion 
was considering the necessity of military intervention, which, however, the 
government was reluctant to launch, and only made advisors and supplies 
available to Azerbaijanis. They also actively contributed to the resolution 
by the UN Security Council declaring that Mountain Karabakh belonged to 
Azerbaijan, and ordering Armenian troops to leave; in 1993 they announced 
an economic embargo together with the Azerbaijanis against Armenians, 
and closed their borders.
Due to the new Turkish concept of foreign policy, their relationship 
started to improve and in 2007 high-level talks took place in Switzerland 
between Turkey and Armenia in the spirit of Turkey’s policy of ‘zero problem 
with neighbours’. The Russian intervention in South Ossetia in August 2008 
further confirmed for the Turkish Government the need for a general settle-
ment and reconciliation in the Caucasus.65 In the spirit of sports diplomacy 
Abdullah Gül visited Yerevan to see the Armenian–Turkish world champi-
onship qualifier in September 2008 at the invitation of Armenian President 
Serzh Sargsyan, which the Armenian President reciprocated in October 
with an invitation to the return match. Top level informal talks brought 
some relief to bilateral relations, but when the secret talks in Switzerland 
leaked to the public, it triggered resentment in the nationalist forces of 
both countries; moreover, even the thought of reviewing the Azerbaijani–
Turkish gas agreement emerged. Eventually, the agreement signed by the 
foreign ministers of the two countries in October 2009 in Zurich remained 
unratified. To reconcile Baku, Erdoğan announced that they would make 
the Turkish action dependent on the settlement of the Mountain Karabakh 
question, in response to which Armenians stopped the ratification process. 
The reconciliation process has since come to a complete halt, moreover, 
65 Aras–Akpinar 2011, 60.
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as the Armenian–Azerbaijani conflict flared up in 2016, relations became 
tenser again.
Turkish–Georgian relations may be labelled outstandingly good, not 
overshadowed by political problems,66 leaving economic aspects and mutual 
advantages to dominate. A sign of good neighbourhood between the two 
countries is that their citizens enjoy visa-free travel to each other’s countries, 
and their ID alone entitles them to cross the border. That is surely one of the 
reasons why entry by nearly 2 million Georgians was registered in 2015.67
Turkey was among the first to recognise independent Ukraine; their 
bilateral relations were settled. However, the 2014 Ukrainian crisis brought 
with it a new situation whereby Turkey tried to manoeuvre its way between 
Western and Russian interests and concepts. Although Ankara supported 
the EU’s position in general, it continued to regard Moscow its strategic 
partner. It recognised the new Ukrainian Government in line with Western 
positions, but not the annexation of Crimea. In observance of NATO’s 
decision, it suspended military cooperation with Russia. Turkish–Russian 
relations turning sour from mid-2015 brought Turkey and the Ukraine closer 
together. They agreed on the reinforcement of bilateral defence coopera-
tion, and staged a joint marine exercise on the Black Sea. A reconciliation 
of Turkey and Russia, however, is expected to bring a setback to political 
and mainly military cooperation given that Russia is sensitive to that, but 
economic relations continue to strengthen.68 On that note the two countries 
agreed that from March 2017 onward, their citizens can enter the other 
country by simply showing up their IDs, a move expected to boost tourism 
and economic relations.
6.3.2. Economic relations
From among the four countries, the Ukraine is Turkey’s most important 
partner for both its size and economic weight. Bilateral trade once even 
66 Seizing the Turkish ships on their way to Abkhazia (separated from Georgia) caused 
a minor conflict in 2009–2010 but the parties managed to achieve negotiated settlement 
(Aras–Akpinar 2011, 63).
67 Find more information on the website of the Foreign Ministry of Turkey, www.mfa.
gov.tr/economic-relations-between-turkey-and-georgia.en.mfa (Accessed: 18 March 
2020.)
68 Balcer 2016.
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exceeded 6 billion dollars in 2011, but declined to around 4 billion dollars 
since the beginning of the political crisis in the Ukraine. It is easy to see 
at the same time that with the dropping of export to Russia in 2016, export 
to Ukraine increased. Turkey is currently Ukraine’s fifth most important 
trading partner with a share of almost 5%. Future prospects are promising 
as, following the signing of Ukraine’s EU association agreement, Turkey 
also began talks on a bilateral FTA. Ukraine became a substitute of Russia 
not only in terms of trading goods. In the first part of 2016, simultaneously 
to the Russian sanctions, the number of Ukrainian tourists to Turkey grew 
1.5-fold, which, even so, remains below the number of Russian visitors, but it 
still fuels hopes for the future. Besides a presence of Turkish subcontractors 
in the construction industry in excess of 5 billion dollars, direct investment 
is also significant. The most sizeable transaction took place in telecom as 
Turkcell bought 45% of Ukrainian Lifecell for 100 million dollars, thereby 
assuming 100% ownership.
From among the countries of the Caucasus, Turkey has practically no 
economic relations with Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia; however, they 
are important partners. Developing infrastructure is a major contributor 
to improving relations even if there is still room for further development.
The Baku–Tbilisi–Ceyhan oil pipeline was completed in 2006 costing 
4 billion dollars, has the capacity of transporting 1 million barrels of oil 
per day, and is owned by 11 oil firms.69 The South Caucasus gas pipeline 
completed simultaneously with it carries 8.8 billion cubic metres per 
year, and was later extended to 20 billion cubic metres per year. It runs to 
Erzurum. The two pipelines enable the direct export of Azerbaijani crude 
oil and natural gas, and made Turkey a key actor in regional energy transit.
Apart from the two pipelines, the completion of the Baku–Tbilisi–Kars 
railway also supports bilateral relations. The previous train connection in 
the Caucasus crossing Armenia has been down since the closing of the bor-
der in 1993, which called for an alternative solution. That is also essential 
from the point of view of the passenger and goods transportation between 
Azerbaijan and Turkey, but it also creates a new connection through the 
railway connection planned under the Sea of Marmora, while it also opens 
a new connection to Europe including goods coming from China. All that, 
however, only adds to the marginalisation of Armenia. Construction work 
69 The largest stake belongs to British Petrol (30.1%) and Azerbaijani SOCAR (25%).
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started in 2007, the Georgian section was built using Azerbaijani credit.70 
Completion, originally planned for 2010, was repeatedly delayed, the last 
deadline being 2017. The motorway connecting the two countries is now 
in the preparation phase.
Table 10.
Turkish foreign trade with countries in the Caucasus and Ukraine  
(million USD)
Export Import
2001 2006 2011 2016 2001 2006 2011 2016
Azerbaijan 225 695 2,064 1,286 78 296 262 278
Georgia 144 408 1,092 1,176 127 344 314 212
Armenia n/a n/a 0 0 n/a 0 0 0
Ukraine 289 1,121 1,730 1,253 758 3,059 4,812 2,547
Source: TurkStat
The weight of Turkish regional trading relations grew significantly even 
though it is only partly ascribable to the completion of regional projects. 
Turkey’s exports to Azerbaijan tripled up since 2000, and imports have also 
steadily grown. Although Azerbaijan’s share in Turkey’s total foreign trade 
is not high, Turkey has become its most important foreign trading partner. 
Trading volumes between the two countries amount to 1.5–2.5 billion dollars 
per annum, which falls short of the full potential. Moreover, due to declining 
oil prices over the past years, the import potential of the Azerbaijani economy 
has shrunk, which also put a lid on Turkish export potential. Even within 
bilateral trade Turkish export (1.2–2 billion dollars) significantly exceeds 
imports (0.2–0.4 billion dollars). Turkish export comes mainly from food, 
textile, construction material, communication and electronic products, 
vehicles and base material for the chemical industry (plastic). A requirement 
for developing exports is, besides reducing red tape, the simplification and 
harmonisation of the Turkish–Georgian–Azerbaijani tariff system.
The most dynamically developing branch of bilateral trade with the 
completion of the oil and the gas pipeline is hydrocarbons. One of the central 
70 The EU and USA would have preferred re-opening the Armenian section in one pro-
cess with Caucasian settlement, and that is why they were reluctant financing that 
alternative.
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questions of gas export is the amount that Turkey will be able to purchase 
from the Azerbaijani gas, and if it will be granted re-export rights. That is 
subject to negotiations.
Turkey is itself a major market for gas, the second biggest customer of 
Gazprom after Germany.71 Gas import from Azerbaijan started in 2007, and 
by 2009 it reached 5 billion cubic metres mostly by reducing Russia’s share. 
The most important dispute between the two parties was that the previous 
agreement promised 6.6 billion cubic metres of gas to Turkey at a relatively 
low price of 120 dollars/1,000 cubic metres, but Turkish BOTAS insisted on 
the re-export option, which would have resulted in significant profits, and 
would have given Turkey a role similar to that of Gazprom.
Turkish firms became the most important investors in Azerbaijan besides 
American and British firms. As far back as 2000, 1,300 Turkish firms operated 
here, and their number now exceeds 2,600, thus Turkey has had the greatest 
share among foreign investors in Azerbaijan based on the number of firms. 
Turkish firms invested 4.5 billion dollars over the past years in Azerbaijan 
becoming the No. 1 target country of Turkish capital. Turkish businesses 
are active in energy, telecom, tourism and some branches of the processing 
industry, and the financial sector. Another priority target of Turkish capital 
has been the construction industry since the early 1990s. In this area, Turkish 
investment exceeded 700 million dollars.
TPAO (the Turkish state oil firm) and Turkcell, one of the biggest 
Turkish telecom providers, entered the market as investors relatively early 
on, and the TPAO’s investments in energy amounted to more than half of the 
Turkish capital invested.72 DHT Metal, a subsidiary of Turkish DHT Holding 
has been present in the Azerbaijani market since 1996. In 2009 it launched 
a major investment project, a 200 million investment in Baku. The plant 
employs more than 1,000, and produces 450 thousand steel per annum.73 
DHT holding wanted to be an actor in the steel industry and agriculture, 
and planned the erection of a sowing seed plant investing 22 million dollars. 
71 In 2015, 55.3% of 48.4 billion cubic metre gas import came from Russia, 16.2% from 
Iran and 12.7% from Azerbaijan. As for crude oil, Turkey only ensures transit for 
Azerbaijani crude.
72 Kardaş–Macit 2015, 40.
73 That investment is important not only for the competitiveness of the industry, but also 
for environmental reasons. The investment will use the steel of the obsolete, rusting 
metal of oil rigs on the Caspian Sea to manufacture state-of-the-art earthquake resis-
tant steel structures for the construction industry.
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In 2010, however, DHT Holding suddenly sold its Azerbaijani interests 
(in addition to DHT Metal, it sold Azeryem, Azertoxum and Azerargo), and, 
on top, it sold it to Azerbaijani buyers, which the owner DHT explains by 
the deteriorated relationship between Dağıstan Turanlı and the Azerbaijani 
authorities.
Another important investor is the Azerbaijani interest of the Turkish 
Coca Cola İçecek, Coca Cola Baku that builds a new bottling plant in 
Azerbaijan investing 100 million dollars. The plant is going to be an impor-
tant production base of the company serving 350 million consumers in 
almost 20 countries producing 52 million bottles per year. The company 
present in the country since 1994 is a major taxpayer, and has contributed 
95 million dollars annually in taxes to the Azerbaijani central budget. But 
perhaps even more important than capital was the business experience and 
the know-how that the Turkish brought to Azerbaijan.74
During the past years, as oil and gas production came in full swing, 
Azerbaijan became an increasingly important exporter of capital. The primary 
target of Azerbaijan is Turkey where their investments so far equal 3 billion 
dollars over the past years. Azerbaijani oil giant SOCAR buying up Turkish 
Petkim chemical company and building a refinery (Ceyhan) using Azerbaijani 
oil will become a significant actor of the world market. SOCAR prepares to 
invest a total of 10 billion dollars in Petkim, which, when complete, may well 
reduce Turkey’s chemical imports now 70–75% to 30%. Besides, SOCAR, 
together with the Palmali group purchased for 520 million dollars, has a 50% 
stake in Tekfen Insaat, one of Turkey’s biggest construction firms.
Economic relations with Turkey are essential for the Nakhchivan 
area, part of Azerbaijan, which borders Turkey, but not the mother coun-
try. Numerous political positions have been created over the past period to 
strengthen cooperation, and more powerful activity of the corporate sector 
is being encouraged at business forums. In addition, the construction of the 
new 200 km gas pipeline between Igdir and Nakhchivan, and the railway 
connection between Nakhchivan and Turkey is likewise necessary.
Turkish experience in human resource development is similarly impor-
tant for independent Azerbaijan. The activities of Turkish businesses and 
educational institutions have greatly contributed to the strengthening of 
bilateral economic relations. Cultural cooperation is also close between 
the two countries, and currently Azerbaijani students are the second largest 
74 Bedirhanoğlu 2016, 118.
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group of foreign students after North Cyprus at Turkish universities. Also, 
a large number of schools and universities founded by Turkey operate in 
Azerbaijan.
Turkish–Georgian trade has also increased recently. Although a total 
volume of 1.4 billion dollars does not seem significant in terms of magnitude, 
it is still a considerable figure in the light of the Georgian economy. With 
17% of commodities imported from Turkey, it is the most important source 
of Georgia. Under the EU association agreement, Georgia concluded an 
FTA with the EU, so now negotiations are in progress on Turkish–Georgian 
free trade.
Economic relations are particularly important. While for Ankara Georgia 
is important as a transit country of Azerbaijani import of crude oil, natural 
gas and commodity trade, due to the mutual economic embargo between 
Georgia and Russia since 2008, Turkey has become Georgia’s most impor-
tant trading partner. Turkish businesses are particularly active in Georgia 
with construction firms realising more than 200 investment projects worth 
3.5 billion dollars. A Turkish company, TAV has modernised the Batumi 
international airport, which – due to its proximity to the border – Turks 
may use as their domestic airport.
Turkish experts play an important role in developing the Georgian 
army, although they have to be careful providing their assistance if they 
are to maintain their good relations with Russia.75
75 Aras–Akpinar 2011, 62.
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Chapter 7  
Major Powers and Emerging Regions
This chapter examines the relations of the three major powers, Russia, the 
United States of America and China. The currently developing relations 
between Turkey and other regions are also addressed.
7.1. Russia, the Eurasian partner and opponent
Analysis of the political and economic relationship between Turkey and 
Russia is an interesting issue in its own right due to the regional importance 
of the two countries, made particularly topical by numerous recent events. 
Both countries are emerging economic powers, members of the G20. Based 
on its GDP, Russia’s economic output is 1.5 times that of Turkey’s, but the 
Turkish economy has been closing the gap in recent years. Both are located 
in Eurasia, so they play a central role in the external relations of the EU and 
their relation with the EU is important for them. The two countries have 
significant influence in several regions, albeit less and less in the Balkans. 
Regarding the Caucasus, the Middle East and Central Asia, they play a cru-
cial role, albeit in different ways.
7.1.1. Political relations
Ottoman and Russian politics going back to centuries caused several conf-
licts between the two empires at the buffer zones. While the Ottomans 
supported Muslims and Turkic people living under Russian rule in the 
Caucasus or elsewhere (Astrakhan, Crimean Khanate), Russia meant to be 
the external support for the Slavic and Orthodox peoples in the Ottoman 
Empire living mainly in the Balkans. After World War I, a relatively close 
cooperation emerged between Turkey and the Soviet Union as a means of 
resistance against the Allied Powers. The Soviet Union helped Turkey with 
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its independence fight (1919–1923) in military and financial terms. After 
achieving independence, industrialisation was realised with significant 
Soviet aids and partly in a Soviet fashion. After World War II, conditions 
changed as the two countries were on opposite sides during the Cold War. 
In the Stalinist period their relation was severely stressed. From the 1950s, 
tensions slightly eased, but when Turkey became a member of NATO and 
a strategic ally of the United States, the antagonism was perpetuated.
Even with relations becoming more intensive after the Cold War, sev-
eral factors made cooperation difficult. The approach of the two countries 
regarding the Caucasian and Balkan conflicts (Chechnya, Nagorno-Karabakh, 
Bosnia) was fundamentally different, and Turkey created tension through 
its strengthening activities in the Central Asian region in connection with 
their Turkic relatives (the Kazakh, Turkmen, Uzbek and Kyrgyz peoples). 
By the end of the 1990s, the Pan-Turkic dreams died. Later, economic, 
cultural and educational cooperative programmes became more dominant 
than the military and political ones, which was less aggravating for Moscow.
The millennium marked a new approach in relations. Ankara consid-
ered Moscow less and less a geopolitical opponent. The policy of the United 
States (The Greater Middle East Project, Iraq and Afghanistan invasion, etc.) 
and several steps of the EU pulled the two countries together, also helped 
by the dynamically developing economic relations. The new Russian and 
Turkish leadership could now communicate in a more effective way than 
earlier. Russia welcomed the independent foreign policy of the moderate 
Islamic government, which refused to allow American combat troops to 
use Turkey as a base for the invasion of Iraq in 2003. The importance of 
bilateral relations is proved by the Turkish–Russian strategic partnership 
announced in 2010. A Common Strategic Planning Group was initiated 
aimed at improving economic, political, cultural and security cooperation. 
Some spoke of a new Eurasian federation, but in reality many of the conflict 
sources between the two countries still exist.
Flanagan states the cooperation is rather tactical than strategic, since 
the two countries do not have a common political programme and their 
interests are different.1 In the Caucasus, Russia became the strategic part-
ner of Armenia, the relation with the Azeri is balanced, but because of the 
oil and gas business it is often burdened with conflicts. On the other hand, 
a threat of war was gradually forming with Georgia. Turkey has strategic 
1 Flanagan 2013, 166.
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relations with Azerbaijan, has balanced relations with Georgia – although 
in some cases there is tension –, and it does not have diplomatic relations 
with Armenia.
Despite differing interests, the foreign policies of Turkey and Russia 
agreed in numerous issues and they respected each other’s sensitive areas. 
Ankara did not intervene in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, and Moscow sup-
ported the Armenia–Turkey rapprochement, which led to signing the Zurich 
Protocol in October 2009. Separatist activities were mutually denounced, 
therefore Turkey did not stand up for Chechnya’s independence, and Russia 
did not support the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) and did not provide 
asylum for its leader, Öcalan. Ankara provided (unofficial) support to 
Abkhazia and did not stand up for NATO membership of Georgia and 
Ukraine. Conflicts seemed to be handled well and the economic interests 
in the background outweighed political conflicts. Albeit 10% of the popu-
lation in Turkey is Caucasian (Circassian, Abkhaz, Azeri and Chechen) or 
Crimean Tatar in origin, politics managed to calm down the sensitivity of 
some of the population.2
The Syrian conflict starting in March 2011 was a new conflict source 
between the two countries. Russia supported Assad’s regime and Turkey 
supported the rioters and urged Assad’s resignation, which put the two 
countries on opposite sides. The annexation of Crimea in 2014 became 
another source of conflict, analysed above in connection with Ukraine. 
Ankara was very cautious. While it did not acknowledge the border changes, 
it reacted to the Russian annexation very slowly, and did not enter into 
confrontation with the ‘strategic partner’.3 It seemed for a long time that 
clever manoeuvring could make Turkey a beneficiary of the deteriorating 
relation between Russia and the West.
Shooting down the Russian fighter plane flying into the Turkish aviation 
space during the Syrian action in November 2015 brought a new turn, and 
political and economic relations plunged to their lowest; Moscow retaliated 
with targeted sanctions, mainly affecting tourism. Not only does tourism 
contribute 6% to the Turkish GDP, but it is also a major employer (providing 
2 Markedonov–Ulchenko 2011.
3 Crimea is an internal political question for Ankara. Opponents of Russia’s seizing 
power, the Crimean Tatars, constitute only 15% of the population of the peninsula due 
to earlier displacement and are a strong interest group in Turkish political life, therefore 
the status of Crimea is a sensitive issue.
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half a million direct and over two million indirect jobs). There was a decline 
in this sector, which had an impact on the GDP.4 The import of Turkish 
food and textile products was also sanctioned by Russia,5 but Russian 
exports (primarily wheat) and energy were not sanctioned because of their 
importance, although some major investment projects were suspended, 
including the construction of the pipeline TurkStream. Finally, the conflict 
was settled by a Turkish apology in June 2016.6
The key elements of political relations are the following:7
1. Pragmatism. Instead of ideological disputes both parties are involved 
in practical politics, which provides effective and flexible coopera-
tion and creates opportunities for broadening relations.
2. Multifunctional approach. The two countries deliberately develop 
relations in increasing numbers of areas of the economy (energy, 
tourism, trade) and of culture and politics.
3. Common features despite the asymmetries and oppositions. However, 
asymmetries are more tangible in opportunities, resources and, in 
many cases, goals. Domestic processes were similar in both countries 
(e.g. strengthening the position of the President) and both count-
ries are increasingly dominant participants of regional geopolitics.
4. They are still strategic partners despite occasional confrontations. 
The goal of both countries is to support good relations, which has 
not been significantly altered by past conflicts (Syria, Crimea).
But many doubt the sustainability, or even the existence, of a strategic 
partnership. Balcer thinks that economic relations are overemphasised, and 
conflicting positions in regional issues will not be so easy to manage in the 
long run.8 The arising geopolitical and geostrategic disputes, significant 
in some key areas such as energy, handling regional conflicts or security 
strategy issues, make the formation of partnership impossible. Turkey does 
not agree with the regional policy of Russia, which, on its part, questions the 
4 More than 90% of the 3 or 4 million Russian tourists ‘vanished’. Already in trouble 
because of the Istanbul terror attacks, tourism slumped 35% due to the Russian sanc-
tions (Biryukov 2016).
5 The consequences also hit Russia; furthermore, the sanctions were not always effective 
and they could be evaded by re-exports across other countries (Uzun 2016, 68).
6 There were several different factors in the background.
7 Based on Warhola–Bezci 2013.
8 Balcer 2014.
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territorial integrity of many countries in the region (Azerbaijan, Georgia, 
Moldova and Ukraine). Unlike Russia, Ankara is interested in alternative 
transport routes and sources of energy.9 However, mutual economic inter-
ests in many cases outbalance existing political conflicts of interest.10
7.1.2. Economy
The relatively lively economic relations between the two world wars declined 
after World War II. The initial hostile relations reduced economic relations 
between the two countries; with the relaxation of the international situa-
tion, improvement started from the 1960s. Based on an agreement signed 
in 1967, Turkey received a 200-million-dollar Soviet grant in the form of 
a steelworks, an oil refinery and an aluminium smelter. Following the oil 
price shock, Turkish demands for alternative sources of supply promoted 
the revival of trade relations. Moscow and Ankara signed the gas transport 
agreement in 1984. Then in 1985, they concluded a 25-year agreement whe-
reby Turkey could purchase gas from Soviet sources up to 6 million cubic 
metres. In the same year, transport started down the Trans-Balkan pipeline 
through Romania and Bulgaria.
After the Cold War, new opportunities appeared in bilateral economic 
relations from the 1990s. Relatively low priced Turkish export products 
soon became popular with low-budget customers in Russia. Exports took 
the form of ‘out-of-the-suitcase trade’: small amounts of goods were sold 
directly to customers. Exports were very small in quantity; in addition, the 
1998 Russian economic crisis had a negative effect on Russian demands 
and also on the Turkish economy. The 1990s seemed to be a loss for both 
countries in political and economic terms alike.
The first years of the 2000s marked the beginning of an economic suc-
cess story for both countries, albeit the economic growth originated from 
vastly different sources. In Russia, the economic driver is the energy sector, 
i.e. gas and oil.11 But economic growth based on raw materials has several 
9 Aktürk 2013, 133.
10 Öniş–Yilmaz 2016, 71.
11 The oil price per barrel has increased to 140 dollars from 20 dollars at the beginning 
of the 2000s, which also influenced the price of gas. Currently, in the case of Russia, 
the energy carriers provide 16% of GDP and 70% of the export.
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disadvantages: the phenomenon of the Dutch disease hinders the growth of 
competitiveness in the manufacturing sector and, consequently, the diver-
sification of exports. On the positive side, Russia has become an outlet for 
other countries’ products.
Gas import remained in the centre of bilateral relation. The agreement 
between the two countries on a direct connector replacing the former Trans-
Balkan route was signed in 1997 by Gazprom and Botaş. Transport started 
in 2003 through Blue Stream with an annual capacity of 16 million cubic 
metres, although the official inauguration took place only in 2005 due to 
a price dispute between the two parties. Because of the Ukraine transit 
conflicts and the ensuing European demand of diversification, Turkey got 
into a key position.12 South Stream was announced in 2007 as an alterna-
tive for European supply (bypassing Ukraine, built with Turkish transit) 
as a joint project of Gazprom and Italian ENI. The South Stream project 
became a competitor to Nabucco, which had already been at the planning 
phase and would have been an alternative for European gas supply not only 
in terms of route but also its source. Russia was striving to tip the scale in 
South Stream’s favour by making Nabucco’s supply sources insecure (e.g. 
gas agreement with Azerbaijan), and also by persuading Turkey. Although 
South Stream would not have crossed Turkey onshore, the section under the 
Black Sea was to go through Turkey’s exclusive economic zone and therefore 
Ankara’s consent was required. Consent to South Stream was a trump card 
for Turkey. Eventually, in 2015 a decision was made to build a new, direct 
gas pipeline, TurkStream, instead of South Stream frustrated by the EU. 
The bilateral agreement was signed in October 2016 (after resolving the 
political differences).
Today Russia provides 55–60% of the Turkish gas import, which 
serves for generating one-third of the electricity Turkey uses, therefore 
Russia’s role in the Turkish energy supply remains significant. In addition, 
Turkey intends to be an international ‘energy hub’ vying for a significant 
position in the gas transit of the region. It is eminently suitable because 
of its location at the intersection of the Russian, Central Asian, Iranian, 
12 The agreement signed for twenty-five years in 1987 expired and Turkey would have 
liked more favourable conditions instead of the old “take and pay” (the feed in tariff 
of the quantity already contracted.) Finally, they managed to achieve an agreement 
that was 1 billion dollars more favourable than the one before (Ulchenko 2013, 8).
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Persian Gulf and Eastern Mediterranean gas fields and the transit route to 
the European markets.
Examining trade relations, it is noticeable that bilateral trade started to 
increase dynamically in the 2000s due to a large extent to direct gas import 
from Turkey. Between 2002 and 2008 exports increased five and a half times 
and imports more than eight times.13 Because of the 2009 crisis and mainly 
the drop of oil prices, bilateral trade shrank nearly by half. Although after 
the crisis both exports and imports started to rise, from 2012 they have 
plummeted again against the background of dropping oil prices, stagnation of 
the Russian economy, and the 2015–2016 Russian sanctions. Of the products 
imported from Russia, about 65% is oil and gas. The increasing value of 
imports was the effect of increasing prices rather than quantities: the price 
of oil in 2012 was four times higher than in 2003. Devaluation of the Turkish 
lira and the lower prices of Turkish exports resulted in a relatively slower 
growth in the value of exports simultaneously with dynamically growing 
quantities. As a result, while in the mid-1990s bilateral trade was roughly 
balanced, today it is characterised by a huge surplus on Russia’s side.
Table 11.
Russia–Turkey trade relations, 1996–2016 (USD million)
1996 2001 2006 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
Exports 1,510 924 3,238 5,993 6,681 6,964 5,943 3,588 1,733
Imports 1,921 3,436 17,806 23,953 26,625 25,064 25,289 20,402 15,161
Total 3,431 4,360 21,044 29,946 33,306 32,028 31,232 23,990 16,894
Balance –411 –2,512 –14,568 –17,960 –19,944 –18,100 –19,346 –16,814 –13,428
EX/IM 
(%)
78.6 26.9 18.2 25.0 25.1 27.8 23.5 17.6 11.4
Source: TurkStat
Between 2006 and 2014 Russia had been the most important trade partner 
of Turkey, but in 2016 it dropped to third place behind China and Germany. 
It was due to the price fall of gas and oil imported from Russia. Turkey is 
the seventh most important trade partner of Russia. Even China, some EU 
countries, Belarus and Ukraine are ahead of it. For Russia, a dynamically 
13 Because of high oil and gas prices, the import in 2008 was over 31 billion dollars.
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developing Turkey means an appropriate alternative market for its oil and 
gas products. Looking from the other side, the third most important country 
for Turkish exports is Russia. Currently one-fourth of Turkish exports is 
contributed by textile and apparel, 15% by food, 12% by vehicle and another 
12% by electronics. The contribution of high-tech products is barely 3%. 
The most stable elements of bilateral trade are food, mainly citrus fruits. 
The position of the new manufacturing industry products is less significant 
in the Russian market. To improve this situation, the number of Turkish 
trade representations and exhibitions in Russia has been increased over 
the past years.14
Formerly the heads of the state of both countries hoped for a 100-bil-
lion-dollar bilateral trade within a few years (by 2020), which will likely 
not be realised, seeing the currently slowing dynamics. The Turkish trade 
deficit is slightly compensated by trade in services, primarily tourism, where 
traditionally Turkish surplus is significant. Due to the visa waiver agreement 
between the two countries signed in 2011, four million Russians travelled 
to Turkey in 2013, but only 200,000 Turks travelled to Russia.15 As regards 
bilateral direct investment, in the early 2000s Turkish companies invested 
more. The main Turkish investors included Efes Beverage (brewery, member 
of Anadolu Group), VitrA (sanitary and ceramic products), Vestel (electronics), 
Pasabache (glass), Enka and Gama (construction) with a combined Russian 
investment of over 4 billion dollars. Besides these companies, another 200 
important construction businesses are present in Russia, having carried out 
nearly 1,000 projects since 1990 including hotels, roads, shopping centres 
and plants in the value of more than 30 billion dollars.16
Recently Russian investors have become more active in Turkey. Sberbank 
bought the Turkish DenizBank in 2012 for 3.6 billion dollars, Magnitogorsk 
Metallurgia built steel works together with the Turkish Atakas in Turkey, 
and Yandex (IT) appeared as an internet provider. Total Russian investment 
reached 6 billion dollars. In 2010, the two countries agreed that the Russian 
Rosatom would build a power station consisting of four 1.2 GW units by 2018, 
which would cover 10% of the energy demand of Turkey. The 20-billion-dollar 
cost would be provided and operated by Russia. (It would be the first Build 
Own Operate financed power station.) It is to be mentioned that in 2013 
14 Ulchenko 2013.
15 Öniş–Yilmaz 2016, 80.
16 Görikmak 2012.
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Turkey signed an agreement with a Japanese–French Consortium about 
the construction of a 22-billion-dollar power station of a similar capacity.
Russia and Turkey planned and jointly implemented several projects 
concerning trade and economic cooperation of the two countries, e.g. 
logistic terminals and joining of the two countries’ railways via sea ferry 
(bypassing Georgia).17
Russia and Turkey are two significant participants of the emerging 
multilateral world order. Directly or indirectly, both of them have an influ-
ence on the surrounding regions: the Balkans, the Black Sea region, the 
Caucasus, the Middle East, Central Asia, and the European Union and 
its member states. The strategic partnership agreement between the two 
countries raises questions, many doubt its sustainability, but the past events 
support the perception that both parties are interested in maintaining the 
special relationship. With a mutually pragmatic approach, arising issues 
and disputes are handled successfully.
7.2. The United States of America
Strategic relations between Turkey and the United States were strengthened 
at the beginning of the Cold War. The Truman Doctrine was drafted with 
the intent to counter Soviet geopolitical expansion in Southeast Europe, 
so Turkey was included in the American assistance package, the Marshall 
Plan. Turkey was among the first countries to join the American invasion 
in Korea, which was a major step towards its NATO membership finalised 
in 1952. NATO has been a key element in Turkish–American relations 
from the outset. During the Cold War period, strategic interests outweig-
hed identity differences, and NATO considered Turkey an equal member 
of the Western world.18
Following the Cold War, relations became controversial. The direct 
external threat disappeared, many questions were raised in connection with 
the future of NATO. Turkey’s position was not clear, and the importance 
of the American relation was questioned in Turkish politics. With the new 
conflicts in the 1990s, Turkey’s importance was again on the rise, stoked 
by the Gulf and Balkan wars, the Armenian–Azeri conflicts, the Central 
17 Vasiliev 2010.
18 Sadik 2009, 16.
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Asian power balance. While the nature of cooperation had changed, due to 
its strategic position, Turkey became a more valuable partner for the United 
States than ever before.19 Besides the stability of the region, fight against 
terrorism, drug trafficking and monitoring the Iraqi activities (from Ankara’s 
point of view, mainly the Northern Iraqi Kurdish activities) became the new 
priorities. Turkey is also attached to the USA due to the modernisation of 
the Turkish army.
Despite the common interests, relations were not easy. The military 
action against Iraq in 2003, which the USA executed without the authority 
of the UNSCR, especially aggravated the disagreement. The Parliament 
of Turkey denied consent to the invasion from Turkish territory, which 
reduced military opportunities. Following Iraq, Syria also became a source 
of conflicts. The support of the Syrian opposition forces failed, so the Kurds 
became the local force supported by Washington, which hurt Turkish inter-
ests. Recently, another dispute surfaced in connection with Fethullah Gülen 
living in the United States, whose extradition has been increasingly sternly 
demanded by Turkey following the July 2016 coup. After the millennium, 
the ‘traditional’ anti-American public opinion has also become stronger. 
This shift has a much stronger impact on foreign affairs decisions than 
before. Consequently, in order to improve Turkey–USA relations, it would be 
essential to improve the image of the United States in the eyes of the Turkish 
public. 20 Despite all that, relations with the United States have remained 
close. Turkey is important for the USA due to its geostrategic importance 
and as an idol for a functioning democratic Muslim state.
Traditionally, Washington is considered to be one of the main support-
ers of Turkey’s EU integration. However, the motivation and the intensity 
of support have changed significantly in the past few decades. While the 
Eisenhower Administration supported Turkey for political reasons, in 
President Kennedy’ s era, trade interests, to some extent, ran counter, but 
relations were still supported strategically. In the second half of the 1960s, 
the American activity was reduced, and improved again only in the early 
1970s because of the Cyprus crisis. President Ford urged cooperation 
with Ankara for a Cyprus settlement and supported Turkey’s possible EC 
membership. But the question was put on a backburner in the Carter era.21 
19 Sadik 2009, 17.
20 Sadik 2009, 85.
21 Çakir 2016, 282.
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It is thought if the United States had pushed harder in this period, Turkey 
could have joined then (together with Greece).22 From the end of Reagan’s 
presidency, the United States again urged the EC to put Turkey’s accession 
on the agenda. The EU–Turkey relations turned sour because of the coup in 
1980, but the USA had a good relationship with the Turkish military leaders, 
and tried to act as an intermediary between the two parties. In 1990 President 
George Bush offered Ankara his influence with the European countries in 
an effort to promote Turkey’s accession, but Ankara turned it down for fear 
of such a move being counterproductive. Instead, only Secretary of State 
James Baker drew attention to the advantages of Turkish accession in a letter 
addressed to the EC foreign ministers.23 The American lobbying reached its 
peak in the Clinton era. The customs union agreement was signed (December 
1995), the common European defence and security policy was established 
(December 1998) and the Helsinki decision on candidate status (December 
1999) were all preceded by strong American diplomatic pressure. Under 
the Bush and Obama administrations, the intensive American lobbying 
for Turkey continued, albeit with no spectacular achievements. As Günter 
Verheugen, Enlargement Commissioner said, in some cases the American 
pressure was rather counterproductive (especially between 2002 and 2004).24
Table 12.
USA–Turkey trade relations (USD million)
1996 2001 2006 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
Exports 1,639 3,126 5,061 4,584 5,604 5,640 6,342 6,396 6,624
Imports 3,516 3,261 6,261 16,034 14,131 12,596 12,728 11,141 10,868
Total 5,155 6,383 11,322 20,618 19,735 18,236 19,070 17,537 17,492
Balance –1,877 –135 –1,200 –11,450 –8,527 –6,956 –6,386 –4,745 –4,244
EX/IM 
(%)
46.6 95.9 80.8 28.6 39.6 44.3 49.8 57.4 60.9
Source: TurkStat
22 Çakir 2016, 284.
23 Çakir 2016, 283.
24 Çakir 2016, 284.
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Traditionally, the United States was an important foreign trade partner 
of Turkey: in 1996 it was the second most important export partner after 
Germany, and third in imports behind Germany and Italy. In the last few years, 
although bilateral trade has been increasing, global opening-up has been less 
tangible vis-à-vis the United States. Bilateral trade has increased but its dyna-
mics is lagging far behind other regions and also behind potentials.25 Still, the 
USA is the fourth or fifth most important foreign trade partner. Significant 
changes can be seen in the balance of relations. While before and during the 
1990s, bilateral trade was characterised by deficit, in 2001, due to the drop 
of imports, the value of exports and imports was nearly the same. By 2011 
exports declined while imports increased, but since then, the trend has again 
been decreasing imports and increasing exports.
Turkey is in a favourable position as it has been involved in the GSP 
system supporting economic growth in developing countries and offering tariff 
preferences. As a result, Turkey can export nearly 5,000 products to the USA 
duty free, including automotive parts.26 Exports by Turkey are rather diversi-
fied, comprising mainly textile, apparel and machinery products and iron and 
steel products. Free trade negotiations between the EU and the USA (TTIP) 
made Ankara review the impacts of a future FTA with the United States.27
The USA is the second biggest investor in Turkey.28 Ford Motors has 
been active in the Turkish market since the early 1930s. In the 1960s, Otosan, 
a new model manufactured under Ford license was introduced in the local 
market (named Ford Otosan since 1977). Since the 1990s, Ford models have 
been produced, nearly 400,000 cars a year. General Electric has invested 900 
million dollars since 2012 (e.g. power station construction and diesel locomotive 
engines manufacturing). AmGen has bought Mustafa Nevzat pharmaceutical 
company for 700 million dollars. With the help of a 1-billion-dollar investment, 
DOW Chemical created a joint venture with the Turkish company AKSA to 
produce carbon fibre.29 Western countries were ready to invest in Central Asia 
and in the Middle East through Turkish companies.30 Istanbul has become 
an investment centre for both regions (as well as the Balkans).
25 Kirişci 2013a, 12.
26 Sadik 2009, 65.
27 See Kirişci 2013c. Should the TTIP not materialise, Turkey would stand to lose a lot.
28 About 8% of the FDI stock is contributed by American companies (UNCTAD data).
29 Daily Sabah 2017b.
30 Sadik 2009, 53.
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7.3. China
For Turkey, similarly to the other countries of the world, China is one of 
the fastest growing economic opportunities, appreciated not only because 
of direct trade but also because of the transit route plans.
As a NATO member and a state linked to the western alliance, Turkey 
did not have a diplomatic relation with the People’s Republic of China up to 
the 1970s. This only changed in 1971, during the détente between the USA 
and China. Ideological differences remained rife despite the potential eco-
nomic advantages, and up to the 1990s economic relations between the two 
countries remained mostly negligible. Then in the 2000s, bilateral relations 
started to develop dynamically. The process is still going on and relations 
are expected to further improve in the coming years.31 Admittedly, the effect 
of the western alliance is still conspicuous: in 2013 Ankara decided to buy 
a Chinese missile system and only gave up the idea upon NATO pressure.32
Although today political relations are basically settled, there are some 
sensitive areas, such as the effort at autonomy of the Uyghurs, a Muslim 
minority of Turkic ethnicity who live in West China (considered separa-
tist by the official Chinese politics), which often was a source of conflict 
between the two countries. In 2014–2015 it affected the bilateral relation so 
much that during his visit to Beijing in July 2016 Erdoğan had to appease 
Beijing showing a strong resolve against terrorism, which, for China, meant 
a stand against Uyghur terrorism.33 Turkey is convinced that keener bilateral 
relations (e.g. the Silk Road) can improve the conditions of the Uyghurs 
the best, so in this respect, too, the priority of economic goals is visible.34
Interestingly enough, China’s appraisal by the Turkish public opinion is 
worse than that of the EU or the United States. Perhaps it is a consequence 
of the Sèvres Syndrome that Turkey is mistrustful of even those powers 
with which they have not had negative historical experience.35
31 Tao 2016, 20.
32 Lavi–Lindenstrauss 2016, 121.
33 China expressed its resentment of the ambitious policy of Turkey, which supported 
Uyghur terrorism, while Turkish demonstrators attacked Chinese restaurants and 
Korean tourists thought to be Chinese and burned Chinese flags, angered by alleged 
Chinese steps against the freedom of religion (banning the celebration of Ramadan) 
(Lavi–Lindenstrauss 2016, 123).
34 Koru–Kaymaz 2016.
35 Koru–Kaymaz 2016.
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There is a huge Chinese export surplus in bilateral trade relations. 
While Turkish exports increased up until 2013, since then it has shrunk to 
approximately two-thirds, so the Turkish trade deficit has increased and 
the EX/IM rate has decreased recently. On the other hand, several Chinese 
products compete with Turkish products (e.g. in textile industry and in other 
manufacturing sectors), undermining the Turkish position in both internal 
and external markets.
Table 13.
China–Turkey trade relations (USD million)
1996 2001 2006 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
Exports 65 199 693 2,466 2,833 3,601 2,861 2,415 2,329
Imports 556 925 9,669 21,693 21,295 24,685 24,918 24,873 25,440
Total 621 1,124 10,362 24,159 24,128 28,519 27,779 27,288 27,769
Balance –491 –726 –8,976 –19,227 –18,462 –21,084 –22,057 –22,458 –23,111
EX/IM 
(%)
11.7 21.5 7.2 11.4 13.3 14.6 11.5 9.7 9.2
Source: TurkStat
An important element of the Turkish opening-up to the East is that Turkey 
feels their relations with Europe have reached a ‘saturation point’ both poli-
tically and economically, and EU accession can hardly be expected. They 
do not have too much leeway with the United States either: relations there, 
too, are strategic rather than economic. Asia is a ‘virgin’ area for them and 
accordingly, the Silk Road project largely falls in line with long-term goals.
Historically Turkey was part of the Silk Road, the trade route stretching 
from China through Persia to Europe. As a legacy, many towns in Asia Minor 
are located 35 kilometres from each other, at the daily distance of caravans’ 
progress. The new project would open the way not only to China but also 
to other Asian markets.36 Currently, most of the Turkish trade takes place 
along EU, Balkans and the Middle East roads, but using roads to get goods 
even to Central Asia is inauspicious, let alone further east (e.g. to China): 
the land link does not work, not only because of poor infrastructure but 
also relevant agreements are missing. China announced the revival of the 
Silk Road under the name of ‘One Belt, One Road Initiative’ in 2013. The 
36 Koru–Kaymaz 2016.
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project was labelled the ‘Project of the Century’ at the Beijing summit in May 
2017, and the President of China promised a 100-billion-dollar investment 
for constructing new railways, motorways and ports.37
The vast majority of the Turkey–China trade (27 billion dollars) is 
realised through Rotterdam. Not only is it economically counterproductive, 
but it is also a symbol of Western influence on South–South relations.38 
The Silk Road project can change this. The present 30-day shipping time 
can be reduced to 10 days, which can hugely energise bilateral relations. 
Together with the land project, the Maritime Silk Route is also underway, 
and it can also impact the bilateral trade between China and Europe. 
Due to the Suez Canal Expansion, since 2016 the flow of goods is much 
greater on this route, and the importance of ports in the Mediterranean 
region has gone up. The Greek port of Piraeus has been the primary route 
for the Chinese trade, since COSCO, the state-owned Chinese shipping 
company acquired a minority stake in the container port in 2008, followed 
by a majority share in 2016 and significantly expanded capacities. This 
new development has also given a boost to Turkish ports. In 2015 COSCO 
acquired 65% of Kumport Terminal next to Istanbul for 920 million dollars 
and is considering other development opportunities.39 A Chinese company 
built high-speed railways between Istanbul and Ankara for 4.1 billion 
dollars. The State Railways of the Republic of Turkey is planning another 
10,000 km railway for 45 billion dollars, in which Chinese companies will 
be heavily involved.40 Independently from the Silk Road project, China is 
an increasingly significant actor in the Turkish capital market, not only as 
an investor but also as a financer.
7.4. Central Asia
At the beginning of the 1990s, following the dissolution of the Soviet Union, 
Turkey was among the first to establish diplomatic relations with the newly 
independent Central Asian states. The main motivations were not so much 
geographical proximity or economic interests but rather linguistic, cultural, 
37 Kuhn 2017.
38 Koru–Kaymaz 2016.
39 Atli 2017.
40 Inanç 2016.
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ethnic and religious factors. Similarly to Turkey, the dominant religion in 
the region is Hanafi Islam, and except for Tajiki, the languages are Turkic 
languages. The denial of accession by the EU in 1989 also contributed to 
Ankara’s opening to the East, and rekindling the ideal of Pan-Turkism, 
Turkey tried to carve out a better position in a region offering good oppor-
tunities. Russia was withdrawing, China did not expand so far yet, so the 
main regional rival was Iran. No wonder that the United States supported 
the NATO member Turkey that embraced western values.
First to recognise the newly independent states, Ankara opened embas-
sies and concluded bilateral agreements to promote trade and the flow of 
capital. It was the first to provide higher education grants, launch air services 
and extend its satellite television system. Furthermore, Turkey promised 
significant financial aid and investment to the countries in the region. 
To realise it, they established the Turkish Cooperation and Coordination 
Agency TIKA.41
Despite the ambitious plans and Turkish activity, the expected influence 
in the region fell short of expectations. The efforts of the 1990s turned out 
to be a failure rather than success. The Turkish economy at the time was 
not strong and stable enough to provide great volumes of support on an 
ongoing basis. The ‘export of the Turkish model’ did not work: having just 
got rid of the Russian influence, the countries in the region did not accept 
Turkey as a big brother. While they embraced the theory of common Turkic 
origin, they developed independent identities, which they were not prepared 
to subordinate (again) to a wider cultural or political community.42 In 
addition, competition was fierce as several global and regional powers were 
competing for the region rich in fossil fuels. Besides Turkey, Russia, China, 
the USA, Iran, Saudi Arabia and even Pakistan, India and Japan – almost 
like the great historical game between Russia and the British Empire.43
In the early 2000s, Turkish foreign policy was much more active in 
other directions, turning first to the EU, then to the Middle East.44 Aids 
extended within the region declined,45 although Turkey is still one of the 
most important donors in the region. Between 2005 and 2010, it donated 
41 Wheeler 2013, 3.
42 Aydin 2004, 7.
43 Aydin 2004, 6.
44 Balcer 2012, 154.
45 Wheeler 2013, 4.
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Kyrgyzstan 450 million dollars in aid, contributing with 20% to total aids 
extended to the country.46
In recent years, the Turkish foreign policy has again paid more attention 
to Central Asia, but it did not return to its former ambitious political goals. 
Instead, Turkey works on improving bilateral economic, energy or cultural 
cooperation. They intend to strengthen the idea of ‘one nation, many states’ 
among the Turkic peoples, they do not interfere with political processes and 
appear to be neutral.47
Ankara tries to institutionalise the relations to a greater extent. In 2009 
it was a founding member of the Cooperation Council of Turkic–Speaking 
States (the Turkic Council), established with the intent to enhance the 
economic opportunities of the trading state. Countries of the region are 
not enthusiastic about the institutionalised forms of closer cooperation, 
although their attitude is now changing as they feel the need to counteract 
the increasing Chinese and Russian influence.48 Turkey has an important role 
in the relationship between the region and NATO; in the NATO programme 
‘Partnership for Peace’ Turkey acts as a ‘liaison’, e.g. they regularly organise 
military training for the officers coming from the region.
From among the countries of the region, Turkey has the best politi-
cal relationship with Kazakhstan, but they have also established a high-
level cooperation council with Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. Relations with 
Turkmenistan were strained until 2006, but after that, there was a radical 
change due to the new Turkish foreign policy. Turkmenistan enjoys prior-
ity as a potential partner because of its significant gas reserves. Political 
relations are also tense with Uzbekistan for historical reasons: in the 1990s, 
the Uzbek opposition found shelter in Turkey.49 Here, too, relations have 
improved in recent years.
46 Balcer 2012, 156.
47 Except for the most flagrant cases such as the Andijan massacre in Uzbekistan in 2005 
or the revolution in Kyrgyzstan (Balcer 2012, 153).
48 Balcer 2012, 155.
49 Balcer 2012, 154.
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Table 14.
Turkey–Central Asia trade relations (USD million)
Exports Imports
2001 2006 2011 2016 2001 2006 2011 2016
Kazakhstan 120 697 948 750 90 994 1,995 1,094
Kyrgyzstan 17 132 180 295 6 27 52 101
Tajikistan 16 72 173 163 14 118 324 162
Turkmenistan 106 281 1,493 1,858 71 190 392 422
Uzbekistan 90 176 355 489 36 416 940 709
Source: TurkStat
The trade data indicate that although the volume of bilateral trade has 
increased, it took off from a very low base value and at present it is still 
relatively low, below the potential level that can be expected, given the 
geographical location, good political relations and kin cultures. One of the 
main reasons is the lack of infrastructure connections (public roads, railway 
and pipelines). Their construction (e.g. the new Silk Road) offers a signifi-
cant growth potential. Bilateral trade is realised via Iran (80%) and Russia 
(11%) on land, and by ferry via Azerbaijan and the Caspian Sea (9%), which 
means it is vulnerable to transit countries.50
Over the past 15 years there have been significant differences and 
trends51 regarding the importance of countries and in exports and imports. 
Since the settlement of political relations, Turkmenistan has become Turkey’s 
most important trade partner. Currently, the value of the Turkmen export is 
above the aggregate value of export by the other four Central Asian coun-
tries. Regarding imports, Kazakhstan is the most important partner ahead 
of Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan; however, in recent years there has been 
an overall decline. For Turkmenistan, Turkey is the most dominant import 
partner (33%), well before Russia (15%) and China (15%).52 For Tajikistan, 
Turkey is the main export destination.
The position of Turkey in the region is strong. It is the fourth most 
significant trade partner of the region following China, the EU and Russia.53
50 Koru–Kaymaz 2016.
51 Doğan–Kutlay 2011, 36.
52 OEC s. a.
53 Konopelko 2016, 431.
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The change in Turkish foreign policy pushing for its own regional 
power penetration besides, or together with, the East–West bridge role, is 
conspicuous in Central Asia. For instance in the field of energy, Turkey 
strives for the role of the regional distribution hub,54 and wants to be one of 
the alternative routes for the Central Asian hydrocarbon market. The region 
has a huge hydrocarbon reserve. Kazakhstan possesses 3% of the world’s 
oil stock; Turkmenistan possesses 4.5% of the natural gas stock. These 
landlocked states deliver all of their minerals to the world market across 
transit countries. The most important transit partner is obviously Russia. In 
the Soviet era, some of the exploited fuels was distributed to other Soviet 
member states and the rest was exported to Eastern Europe. Their vulner-
ability to competing Russia made the situation of the newly independent 
Central Asian countries very risky, therefore transport diversification has 
become a priority.55 The first attempt at the beginning of the 1990s was 
to pipe natural gas to Turkey via Iran. A pipeline has been built in part, 
but the international sanctions against Iran meant permanent instability of 
transport through a pipeline that had a low capacity anyway.56 The best 
alternative was China. The pipeline to Turkmenistan across Kazakhstan 
and Uzbekistan were commissioned in the early 2010s. Started in 2015, 
the construction of the pipeline to India across Afghanistan and Pakistan 
is expected to be completed in 2019. The simplest would be to build a link 
between Turkmenistan and Azerbaijan under the Caspian Sea for the Western 
pipelines (to Turkey and the EU), but it has been hampered by the dispute 
about the jurisdiction over the sea for more than a decade. Russia and Iran 
are opposed for environmental protection reasons, but in reality, the subma-
rine pipelines are against their economic interests. The oil and gas pipelines 
have been built from Azerbaijan to Turkey and to the Mediterranean Sea 
ports.57 A popular route for oil is Novorossiysk on the Mediterranean Sea, 
from where the raw material can be shipped to the destination countries 
in tankers. The problem here is the narrow capacity of the Bosporus. The 
increasing amount of oil transport through the heart of Istanbul has risks, 
54 Efegil 2008, 169.
55 Different countries had different Russian strategies depending on their relations.
56 Akiner 2015. The swap deal with Iran opened new opportunities, in return for the raw 
material transported to North Iran. Iran provides the countries involved with equivalent 
amounts from its southern production.
57 Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan can transport oil in the Baku–Tbilisi–Ceyhan pipeline, 
oil is transported across the Caspian Sea in tankers.
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therefore Turkey would like to replace maritime transport with a North–
South pipeline in Turkey.
The importance of the construction industry has increased dynamically 
in Central Asia. Nearly 2,000 Turkish contractors realised projects amounting 
to approximately 50 billion dollars in the above mentioned countries.58 In 
Turkmenistan alone, more than 20 billion dollars were invested by Turkish 
companies, and the Kazakhstani involvement is similar in size, competing 
with the Russian activity. The other three countries offer fewer opportunities 
(with an aggregate investment of 1 or 2 billion dollars), but in proportions 
they can be considered significant.59
Turkish foreign direct invest (FDI) was deployed primarily in Kazakhstan 
(650 million dollars), and a smaller amount in Uzbekistan (110 million dol-
lars).60 Turkey is among the four or five biggest investors in Turkmenistan (9% 
of the total FDI), in Tajikistan (5%),61 and in Kyrgyzstan.62 The development 
aid facility diminished the role of capital influx in the region, although in 
2014 Turkey extended aid to Kyrgyzstan (85 million dollars), Kazakhstan 
(41 million dollars), Turkmenistan (12 million dollars), Uzbekistan (4 mil-
lion dollars) and Tajikistan (3 million dollars). In the same year Kyrgyzstan 
was the third biggest beneficiary following Syria (2.2 billion dollars) and 
Tunisia (200 million dollars).63
Education is a priority area of bilateral relations (and assistance), since 
several thousand Central Asian students are learning in Turkey. Turkey has 
also been active across the borders: two universities have been opened in 
Kyrgyzstan, two in Kazakhstan and one in Tajikistan.64 These universities are 
among the best in the region, the language of tuition is English and Turkish, 
in an attempt to reduce the dominance of Russian as the lingua franca.
The stronger Turkey is, the more attractive partner it can be as a coun-
terbalance of other powers. On the other hand, a lesson from the competition 
for the region is that cooperation among the partners such as realisation of 
58 Republic of Turkey Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2018.
59 Balcer 2012, 158.
60 UNCTAD data, 2012 stock.
61 ADBI 2014, 48.
62 Balcer 2012, 158.
63 TIKA 2015, 108.
64 Balcer 2012, 156.
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the Chinese Silk Road, involving Iran, and establishing balanced relations 
with Russia can be beneficial for all partners.65
7.5. East Asia and South Asia
The aim of the Eastern and Southern opening-up pushed by Turkish policy 
is to vitalise trade and economic relations with the countries of Southeast 
Asia and Africa so far neglected. Formerly, relations were determined by 
alliance systems of the Cold War. While good relations were maintained 
with South Korea and Pakistan, relations with China and India were almost 
non-existent. The increase in activity can be captured in the growing num-
bers of visits by the President and the Prime Minister in countries which 
were economically important and/or had a significant Muslim population. 
Besides China, the targets of changing priorities include Japan, South Korea, 
Pakistan, Bangladesh, India, Indonesia and Malaysia.
Japan has been the model of successful modernisation for Turkey since 
the early 20th century,66 even though specific Japanese economic policy 
measures could not be adopted. Following the Turkish opening-up in the 
1980s, Japan became the most important economic partner from the region, 
not only in the field of trade, but Japan also appeared as an investor in Turkey. 
However, from the 2000s, the position of Japan has gradually deteriorated. 
From 2001 China, South Korea and India have outdistanced Japan in trade 
relations and after 2011 Japanese imports have shrunk in absolute value.67 
The position of Japanese consumer goods and intermediate products is clearly 
taken over by the products of South Korea and China.68 Turkish exports are 
barely 10% of imports and comprise mainly foodstuffs and textile products.
Japan continues to dominate in FDI. In the period from 2002 to 2015, 
about one and a half billion dollars were invested by Japan. Currently there 
are nearly 200 Japanese owned companies operating in Turkey.69 One of the 
biggest is Toyota, which has produced automobiles here since 1994, with 
a capacity of 150,000 cars per year at present. A number of high-profile 
65 Duarte 2014, 38.
66 Worringer 2014.
67 It is also true that in 2016 there was a significant upswing.
68 Akkemik 2016, 56.
69 Republic of Turkey Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2019a.
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infrastructure investment projects (new Bosporus Bridge, tunnel under 
the Sea of Marmara, Izmit Bridge and Sinop Nuclear Power Plant) are 
constructed with Japanese participation.70
Because of the EU–Japan free trade negotiations, Ankara also initiated 
talks with Tokyo. A possible FTA could help bilateral relations; however, 
the trends of the past decade suggest that Japan is not likely to regain its 
former position.
Turkey has fostered a good relationship with South Korea since the 
1950s. It joined in the Korean War on the side of the South. The strong 
relationship lives on, as suggested by the expression “Kore–Türk dostluğu” 
(Korean–Turkish fraternity). The volume of the bilateral trade started to 
grow in the 2000s. The Turkish deficit was quite big at the time and it was 
not helped by the FTA signed in 2013. In accordance with the agreement, 
tariffs on industrial products will phase out by 2020; furthermore, in 2015 an 
agreement on investment and trading in services was signed.71 On the other 
hand, in agriculture the relatively high tariffs and other barriers still prevail.
Between 2002 and 2015 South Korea invested 564 million dollars in 
Turkey, and Koreans had holdings in approximately 270 companies.72 The 
biggest investor is Hyundai Motor Company producing 120,000 cars per 
year in the country and intends to increase this number to 200,000 in the 
near future.73 South Korean Posco manufactures special steel and is one of 
Hyundai’s suppliers. As regards Turkish investment, 84 Turkish companies 
deployed 73 million dollars in South Korea.
Although Turkey entered into diplomatic relations with the independent 
India in 1947, there was hardly any contact between NATO member Turkey 
and non-aligned India. Although there has been some improvement after 
the end of the Cold War, as Ankara persistently supported Pakistan (e.g. in 
the matter of Kashmir), there has been no significant change. Recently the 
more pragmatic Turkish foreign policy has made efforts to improve relations 
and has taken strong diplomatic moves since 2008. President Abdullah 
Gül and Prime Minister Erdoğan visited New Delhi, which significantly 
70 Akkemik 2016, 57.
71 Kilinc et al. 2015, 1.
72 South Korean statistics set the volume of investment at 1.5 billion dollars. The diffe-
rence is due to a different method of calculation, which includes indirect investment 
(deployed through third countries) (Republic of Turkey Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
2019b).
73 Witter 2013.
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boosted bilateral relations.74 India has become the third most important 
partner from the region after China and South Korea. It also initiated free 
trade agreement with Ankara, but currently India imports just refined oil, 
oil products and textile materials from abroad.
Between 2008 and 2014, Turkey invested 212 million dollars in India, 
while India, in the same period, invested 102 million dollars according to 
official data, but the real figure was probably considerably higher.75 The 
Indian GMR Group is the biggest shareholder of Sabiha Gökçen Airport. 
Other important Indian investment projects have also been realised in the 
Turkish steel and pharmaceutical industries.
In 2010 Turkey became an observer in ASEAN. Its external trade with 
ASEAN states grew dynamically and quadrupled in ten years and was over 
8.5 billion dollars in 2014. Four new Turkish embassies were opened in the 
region, in Myanmar, Cambodia, Laos and Brunei.
Traditionally, the most important partners among these countries were 
Indonesia and Malaysia, the two most significant Muslim states in Southeast 
Asia. Relations with Malaysia were upgraded to strategic partnership in 
2010, and in 2015 Malaysia was the first country in the region to sign an 
FTA with Turkey. Since 2011, Indonesia has also been a strategic partner 
of Turkey. In recent years, Thailand and Vietnam have assumed a similar 
status in foreign trade, mainly in imports, while Singapore has the biggest 
share in Turkish exports. The free trade agreement with this state signed in 
November 2015 covers trade in goods, services and investment.
The relationship with Pakistan is traditionally good, although interests 
differ regarding numerous issues. During the Afghan war Ankara supported 
the Northern Alliance which had a strong Turkic population, while Pakistan 
stood up for the Pashtuns and the Taliban. Pakistan was not happy about the 
keen Turkey–India relations, but all in all, bilateral relations are exception-
ally good. The two countries started free trade negotiations in 2015, and the 
agreement was finalised in October 2017. Turkey played an important role in 
the rebuilding of Afghanistan and with the help of tripartite Turkish, Afghan 
and Pakistani talks and agreement, it promoted stabilisation in the region.
74 Özkan 2011, 127.
75 Republic of Turkey Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2019c.
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Table 15.
Turkey–Southeast Asia trade relations (USD million)
Export Import
2001 2006 2011 2016 2001 2006 2011 2016
Afghanistan 7 91 276 146 0 10 5 9
Bangladesh 15 92 132 264 22 168 896 881
South Korea 62 156 528 519 759 3,556 6,298 6,384
Hong Kong 146 148 425 400 102 142 100 126
India 74 222 756 652 355 1,579 6,499 5,757
Indonesia 32 85 307 254 202 1,031 1,931 1,424
Japan 124 263 296 354 1,307 3,217 4,264 3,944
Malaysia 35 60 183 321 239 934 1,568 1,997
Pakistan 31 130 213 347 101 380 873 263
Singapore 104 357 840 418 111 254 354 363
Taiwan 67 80 164 138 316 1,649 2,025 1,597
Thailand 37 61 125 164 152 937 1,592 1,482
Vietnam 13 45 100 234 21 189 1,009 1,736
Source: TurkStat
7.6. Sub-Saharan Africa
While North Africa was a well-known region as a legacy of the Ottoman 
era with uninterrupted relations, Sub-Saharan Africa was a neglected region 
in Turkish foreign policy and foreign trade. Although Eritrea, Somalia, the 
Sudan and the Chad were under Ottoman reign for a short period and con-
tacts were made with the West African states of the time, mainly with the 
areas inhabited by Muslims; these relations fizzed out during the time of 
the republic after the termination of the caliphate.76
The new start was the Africa plan initiated by Ankara in 1998 but 
implemented under the AKP Government after 2005 because of the eco-
nomic and political crises. The year 2005 was declared the Year of Africa 
by Turkey. Prime Minister Erdoğan visited numerous African countries 
(e.g. Ethiopia and South Africa). Turkey also became an observer, then 
a strategic partner of the African Union, and a shareholder of the African 
Development Bank. In 2008, the Africa Summit was organised in Turkey 
76 Özkan 2011, 119.
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with more than fifty participant countries. In the same year openings of 
embassies in different African countries were announced.77 In November 
2014, the second Turkey–Afghanistan Partnership Summit was held in 
Equatorial Guinea, where a plan was accepted for the period of 2015–2019.78 
It envisioned increasing the volume of trade from 3 billion dollars in 2013 to 
50 billion dollars. Upon the requirements of the EU customs union, Ankara 
would grant preferential treatment for African products, and would increase 
development and humanitarian assistance.
While many considered such vigorous development of African relations 
unnecessary, Turkey saw some indirect benefits.79 The new foreign policy 
tries not to separate the importance of North Africa and Sub-Saharan Africa, 
although significant differences exist in the intensity of economic relations.
The economic networking was assisted by the development agency 
TIKA and also promoted by Turkish NGOs, including IHH, highly active in 
humanitarian assistance.80 TIKA’s original activity concentrated on Central 
Asia and the neighbouring regions (the Caucasus and the Balkans), but by 
today it has become global, and it has become particularly prominent in 
Africa. It opened local offices in many countries, e.g. the Sudan, Ethiopia, 
Senegal, which coordinate dozens of aid programmes regarding health care, 
education, agriculture, infrastructure and environmental protection.81 The 
amount of aid is about 150 million dollars a year. The Yunus Emre Institute 
is expanding as well: besides Khartum in Sudan, they intend to open new 
centres in South Africa, Djibouti, Gambia and Niger.82
77 Özkan 2010, 94. The number of Turkish embassies in Africa increased from 12 in 
2009 (including five in North Africa) to 40, while the number of African embassies in 
Ankara increased from 10 to 32 (Republic of Turkey Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2017). 
78 Republic of Turkey Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2014.
79 For example, the support of African countries greatly contributed to Turkey’s mem-
bership of the United Nations Security Council (2009–2011) (Özkan 2011, 122).
80 Özkan 2011, 124.
81 TIKA 2015.
82 Republic of Turkey Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2017.
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Table 16.
Main trade partners in Sub-Saharan Africa (USD million)
Exports Imports
2001 2006 2011 2016 2001 2006 2011 2016
Angola 8 44 220 128 n/a 27 0 6
South Africa 78 598 510 406 345 1,793 1,955 1,058
Ivory Coast 9 29 66 110 17 44 139 251
Ethiopia 32 92 275 404 0 24 42 35
Ghana 18 33 219 298 36 57 292 180
Kenya 10 85 199 127 3 4 15 13
Congo 4 15 78 103 1 15 26 8
Nigeria 69 83 394 242 228 87 366 158
Senegal 13 40 155 154 0 1 3 6
Somalia 0 2 40 116 0 3 2 2
Sudan 54 216 244 462 1 8 9 50
Tanzania 3 27 171 96 1 16 22 23
Source: TurkStat
The approximately 6-billion-dollar trade with Sub-Saharan Africa is still 
not very big. The most important partner is the strongest economy of the 
continent, South Africa: the former trade value of several hundred million 
dollars increased to approximately 2 billion dollars. Turkish imports dominate, 
while exports lag far behind, and in the last few years there has even been 
a decline. The two G20 emerging economies plan to strengthen relations, 
but South Africa still does not want to conclude a free trade agreement 
with Turkey despite the fact that it has already signed an FTA with the EU.
Turkey has a free trade agreement with Mauritius and Ghana. Besides 
Congo and Cameroon, other ACP countries have initiated FTAs.83
Turkish exports cover mainly furniture, major household goods, 
foods, textile, iron and steel products, electric equipment and construction 
materials. Regarding imports, oil, raw materials, gold and other minerals 
dominate. Turkish investment and business companies can help diversify 
African trade: agricultural technology transfer and development of food 
processing are potential possibilities.84
83 Source: https://aynokom.com/free-trade-agreements/. These are also customs union 
related obligations of the EU.
84 Özkan 2010, 102.
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For the Turkish construction industry Africa is an important area 
(contributing 21% of the total general contracts), but at the moment it is 
mainly focused on North Africa (19%), with Sub-Saharan Africa contrib-
uting only 2%. The total value of the 1,150 projects realised in Africa is 
55 billion dollars.85
85 Website of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Turkey. www.mfa.gov.tr/turkey-africa-
relations.en.mfa (Accessed 19 March 2020.)
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Chapter 8  
Dilemmas of Turkey at the Beginning  
of the 21st Century
The twin-track situation of Turkey between East and West has for a long 
time had a fundamental influence on the country’s identity, ambitions and 
politics.
The establishment of the new Turkish nation state has been strongly 
determined by the circumstances of its formation: the heroic fight, led by 
Kemal Atatürk, which recovered sovereignty in areas formerly considered 
the sphere of influence of external powers, and the consequent mistrust of 
these powers still affect Turkish consciousness. However, the failure of earlier 
modernisation was blamed on internal factors: the Islam, the betrayal of 
the peoples formerly belonging to the empire and now neighbours (Greeks, 
Armenians, Arabs) that wanted autonomy. Turkey saw the solution in radical 
Europeanisation and the reduction of the Islam as fully as possible. In the 
economy, an intensive industrialisation was launched, also inspired by the 
Soviet example. Foreign relations with the neighbouring countries were 
reduced to a minimum. On the other hand, they were reluctant to be allies 
with the European countries.
In the new world order following World War II, Turkey became a stra-
tegic ally of the United States, which was helped by the Marshall Plan and 
NATO membership. Nevertheless, relations with Western Europe remained 
ambivalent. Despite the association agreement with the EEC and permission 
for labour migration, the acceptance of being European, an old desire of 
Turkey, was not obvious. Although the political life became diverse, it led 
to a decline in efficiency. The army interfered with the life of the state on 
several occasions to ensure the dominance of the fundamental principles of 
the Kemal model. The weaknesses of the import substitution strategy in the 
economy could be noticed in the 1970s, and the new model based on exports 
and initiated by Turgut Özal was slow to be successful, partly because of 
the defensive foreign policy. Nevertheless, the new economic policy made 
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foreign trade opening necessary. The primary intent was to engage in trade 
with the European Union, but Turkey had to face successive failures and 
obstructions. The dissolution of the Soviet Union created new opportunities, 
but the cooperation with the newly independent Turkic peoples of Central 
Asia did not meet expectations. Political controversies also complicated 
relations with the neighbouring countries and the economy was hit hard by 
repeated crises due to liberalisation, executed perhaps too quickly.
The new millennium brought radical changes in Turkey in every 
respect, which was discussed in detail in Part 2. The signs of changes had 
been present for a long time and at the beginning of the 2000s, their coac-
tion thoroughly changed Turkey’s political and economic life as well as its 
regional and global position.
The most important factor in politics was the return of Islam. For 
a long time, the secular state discouraged its appearance in public life, 
but Islamism never entirely disappeared in Turkey. It survived in religious 
movements based mainly on Sufism, then political liberalisation allowed 
it to appear in parties. Although the Islam-based parties were regularly 
banned, they were always restored because the rural conservative groups 
constituting its base also became stronger and stronger. Named Anatolian 
Tigers because of the successful export oriented production, conservative and 
religious entrepreneurs having an interest in global and European integration 
embraced a sort of Muslim ‘Calvinism’. This point of view, which exempli-
fies the compatibility of Islam and modern capitalism, emphasised taking 
advantage of worldly economic success and globalisation, whilst keeping 
the Islamic morality. This required a new approach of the Islamist parties 
as well. Founded in 2001, the AKP met this demand the most. Although it 
had an Islamist basis, it supported the country’s liberalisation and integra-
tional efforts. After coming to power, it urged political reforms required by 
the European integration. The programme was successful economically, 
and reasonable politically, as besides increasing foreign economy trust in 
Turkey, the reforms resulted in weakening the former Kemalist state model.
New reforms were instituted in the economy already after the 2001 
crisis. Their aim was to consolidate the weak financial system. The AKP 
Government continued this policy. In the next decade, it took measures 
that improved the competitiveness of the Turkish economy and contrib-
uted to rapid economic growth, which was named (with some degree of 
overstatement) the Turkish ‘economic miracle’. Started in the late 1980s, 
the structural changes bore fruit by then, and a more diversified economy 
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was able to appear in the world market with competitive products in an 
increasing number of sectors.
Political and economic changes had an impact on foreign policy and 
external economic relations. The former security-oriented and reactive 
foreign policy doctrine was replaced by a proactive new line, which mainly 
opened up to the surrounding regions and countries. In the spirit of the ‘zero 
problem’ ideal, Turkey’s intention was to settle relations even with countries 
with which relations were stressed, such as Greece, Armenia and Syria. 
Behind the new approach, the emerging trading state policy could be seen, 
which, driven by its economic interest, intends to keep good relationship 
with everybody. Moreover, this aspect appeared not only in bilateral politics, 
but acting as a mediator, Turkey also tried to promote the reconciliation of 
the neighbouring regional countries.
Some saw the increasing interest in neighbours as the manifesta-
tion of ‘neo-Ottomanism’, i.e. Turkey’s intent to control again the areas 
that used to belong to the Ottoman Empire. Although the official Turkish 
politics denied it, since the expansion of the Turkish economic potential 
was the most spectacular in the neighbouring regions, it is also here that 
the increasing ‘soft power’ became most dominant, and made the Turkish 
relation desirable. Putting the religious and cultural background aside, 
the successful ‘Turkish model’ became a model for the Muslim countries 
also from a political and economic point of view. All these influenced the 
economy, from which Turkey profited through expanding business relations 
and increasing tourism.
The consequences of the slow progress of accession and the 2008 global 
financial crisis had a serious impact on the European economies slashing 
import demands, which led Turkey to question the priority of European 
integration. In the new foreign policy, which emphasised the strategic 
importance and position of Turkey, the unilateral Euro-Atlantic linkage 
was replaced by a multidimensional approach. In the official Turkish com-
munication, alliance with the European Union and the West has remained 
the central theme, since the country is a NATO and a Council of Europe 
member as well as a candidate of the European Union. However, the new 
strategy has been gaining ground in economic processes, foreign policy 
actions and in government rhetoric.
In the second part we examined the changing relationship between 
Turkey and the European Union, the neighbouring regions, and other 
countries and regions that are significant as potential or actual partners. 
Turkey’s Dilemmas in Foreign Policy and External Economy…192
Relations with the EU and its member states have been ambivalent since the 
very beginning. Although Turkey has always tried to become a European 
nation, Europe has never thought Turkey was ‘one of us’. This perception 
was due to Islamism, in addition to historical memory. Although Turkey 
became a secular state, the difference in religion seemed to be the strongest 
reason for those who rejected the idea of accession. Yet strategic interests 
rather support cooperation, therefore relations are characterised by a per-
manent volatility, a combination of conflicts and cooperation. Currently, 
the Turkish authoritarian forces urge for a review of political cooperation 
and strengthen doubts about EU integration; on the other hand, in areas 
such as migration, foreign policy or energetics cooperation it is absolutely 
necessary. There are significant differences in the member states’ attitude 
towards Turkey’s accession. In some countries it largely depends on the 
political composition of the government; in other countries public opinion 
is clearly either opposing or supportive.
From an economic point of view, appreciation and strengthening of 
relations was conspicuous at the beginning of the 2000s. The integration 
of a dynamically developing Turkey as a market, a production base, and 
a tourist destination has become important for the EU. Including Turkey 
in the customs union had basically a positive effect on the economy, but 
it came at additional costs for Turkey. Besides the harmonisation of laws, 
the lack of participation in the decision-making processes and the negative 
effects of agreements concluded between the EU and other trade partners 
have become important sore points. Turkey undertook these costs primarily 
in the hope of accession, but as it is still an open question, the issue of the 
customs union is becoming increasingly urgent.
Seeking alternatives of full membership seems to be more and more 
relevant for the future development of relations. Germany has for a long 
time been the ambassador of establishing a special partnership but Turkey 
refused a second-line membership. Perhaps the present processes within 
the European Union including Brexit and the possibility of a multi-speed 
integration will make forms of integration other than full membership 
more palatable.
It is still possible that conflicts will escalate and institutional relations 
will be disrupted. European politicians voice more and more frequently 
the possibility of breaking off the accession negotiations, and Turkey is 
exploring alternative integrations (Eurasian Economic Union, Shanghai 
Cooperation Organisation). Nevertheless, these statements can be considered 
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exaggerated and are intended to influence domestic public opinion and the 
other party alike. For the time being Turkey’s cooperation in the migration 
crisis makes the country an indispensable partner for the EU, while close 
European economic relations have no real alternative for Turkey as yet.
Therefore, while unfavourable political processes, violation of the 
rule of law and of fundamental rights in Turkey, the unresolved Cyprus 
issue or the problems related to the customs union challenge the relations 
between the EU and Turkey these days, still mutual dependence and inter-
ests support their continuity. It is important not only for the two parties; its 
demonstrative effect influences the relations between the EU and countries 
of the neighbouring regions; therefore, it can be significant in the long term 
for European security and welfare.
The Balkans is one of the regions where both the European Union 
and Turkey have a significant impact on future processes. Although the 
EU is more dominant, since most states of the region are candidates, and 
the Union is more important because of its economic weight, recently the 
Turkish ‘soft power’ has shown a spectacular increase in the region. The 
competition for the region can doubtless generate some confrontation, but 
involving Turkey in the politics of the Balkans, mainly in connection with 
Muslim minorities, can rather be advantageous for the EU.
Because of the European orientation, Turkey made efforts to move 
away from the Middle East region for a long time, but this was impossible 
to realise. The Kurdish problem connected Turkey to Iraq, Iran and Syria, 
and even its energy demand made relations with the Middle East necessary. 
The 2000s gave good opportunities for Turkey. Iraq (mainly Kurdistan) and 
Iran became major economic partners and relations with other countries of 
the region also developed dynamically. Simultaneously, ‘soft power’ also 
increased, the Turkish model started to be attractive for the whole region. 
For a long time the ‘Arab Spring’ seemed to bring yet more opportunities, 
and Turkey could grow to be a major regional player – a goal long set in its 
foreign policy doctrine. However, the events exacerbated several problems, 
dormant until then, in the region, dragging Turkey into a maze of complex 
problems. All of it forced Turkey to give up its former foreign policy; ‘hard 
power’ gained more and more ground, which had a negative impact on 
economic relations.
The Caucasian and Black Sea neighbourhood relations are also replete 
with ambivalent processes: on the one hand, Turkey strengthened eco-
nomic relations with Georgia, Azerbaijan and Ukraine; on the other hand, 
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increasing political influence greatly affected opportunities. Moreover, 
relations among the countries in the region are equally complex; the most 
important factor is Russia that has traditionally considered this area its 
sphere of interest, exercising not only its influence but also interfering to 
promote its own agenda.
Special emphasis has been accorded to discussing Turkey–Russia rela-
tions, since the two Eurasian powers had traditionally been competitors and 
even opponents, but recently a new chapter has opened in bilateral relation 
and seems to have benefits for both parties. This was slightly overshadowed 
by the Syrian incident of 2015, which resulted in freezing relations, but the 
fact that the situation was settled within a year clearly shows that the partners 
are interested in normalisation. For Russia, Turkey’s geostrategic position 
is important, and Turkey has been an increasingly important customer of 
the Russian energy industry products and services. For Turkey, besides 
the export of products, Russian construction industry orders and Russian 
tourism are crucial, as highlighted by the negative effects of the sanctions. 
Many foresee a stronger cooperation based on similar developments of the 
political systems (hybrid regimes), but in reality, cooperation is mostly 
motivated by the interests.
Relations between Turkey and its former main ally, the United States, 
are not all rosy. Although the United States has been a staunch supporter 
of Turkey’s EU integration, their strategic interests regarding Middle East 
issues often differ. This was the case earlier with Iraqi and Iranian or Israeli 
and Palestinian politics, and the same applies now to Syria, where US sup-
port of the Kurds angered Turkey. Extradition of Fethullah Gülen living 
in American exile also causes tension. All this has not much bearing on 
economic relations as the United States is still a priority partner for Turkey, 
albeit to a decreasing extent. That is why a free trade agreement between 
the EU and the United States would have affected Turkey in a particularly 
negative way if they had not been able to conclude a similar agreement at 
the same time.
The importance of the emerging superpower China has surged. The 
new Silk Road project offers especially great perspectives. Due to its geo-
strategic position, Turkey can vie for a key position in the ambitious Chinese 
plans, although admittedly, there are alternative routes. China’s increasing 
activity can be an important catalyst of Turkey’s ‘opening to the East’. The 
infrastructure projects to be realised would create new opportunities not 
only for China but also for the intermediate regions.
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Central Asia stands out among these regions, where Turkey has tried 
to forge stronger relations since the early 1990s. The approach based on 
the Turkish kinship had limited popularity. Instead of political cooperation, 
culture and education emerged as significant. The development of economic 
relations was set back by the lack of infrastructure connections. This can 
be improved by the envisioned ambitious development programme initiated 
by China, which can also promote more intensive economic cooperation 
with several Asian regions. Besides India, which has recently risen to be 
a significant partner, the Asian Muslim states are priority allies at present. 
Economic relations between Turkey and several African countries have 
also been strengthened over the past two decades.
Considering external alternatives, we find that while the EU’s economic 
difficulties and declining demand urged Turkey to diversify its trade relations 
and to search for new markets (in Africa, the Middle East, the post-Soviet 
region or in Asia), these relations lag far behind the importance of European 
markets and European cooperation. Regarding the opportunities outside 
Europe, some of the rhetoric is exaggerated and does not reflect economic 
rationale. Retaining close European economic ties remains a top priority for 
Turkey, partly because Turkey has already been embedded in the production 
value chains of the European multinational companies, which contribute 
three-quarters of FDI; but also because the advantages of the customs union 
and cooperation in RD&I are crucial for the state.
Although opening up to the East brings opportunities involving long-for-
gotten neighbouring regions or remote markets of Asia and Africa, for the 
time being they only constitute ancillary benefits rather than a real alter-
native for EU relations. On the other hand, Turkey’s geopolitical weight 
and role is also growing. It is a hub in the energy sector, especially with 
regard to the gas supply of Europe, and ‘the epitome of the Muslim state’, 
whose economic success and democratic structures may serve as a positive 
example for other countries in the region. This makes Turkey strategically 
important for the European Union.
Based on the above summary, it seems that rather than choosing between 
European integration and opening to the East, Turkey can most successfully 
shape its orientation in the 21st century by finding a synthesis of the two.
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Turkey has long sought to act as a bridge between 
the East and the West, and today it aspires to be 
not only a bridge but also a regional factor that 
is significant on its own right in a strategically 
important region. A Turkey that can combine 
the elements of both the Western and Muslim 
civilisations and ways of thinking may become 
a most successful and competitive society of the 
21st century, and may serve as a model and regional 
hub for neighbouring countries and regions.
However, for the time being, although open-
ing up to the East brings opportunities involving 
long-forgotten neighbouring regions or remote 
markets of Asia and Africa, they only constitute 
ancillary benefits rather than a real alternative for 
EU relations.
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